

to bring them back home. They were stranded. The Kentucky farmer with his tobacco, the cotton farmer down South, and the manufacturer of this land with his products are stranded now. Let us afford them some relief, too. They do not ask you to send money over there to aid them; but they are stranded, just as many of the rich Americans abroad at the time of the outbreak of the war were stranded. They were worth their millions, but they could not get a dollar, just like our farmers have got their hogshead upon hogshead of tobacco and their bale upon bale of cotton, but can not sell it for the price of production, and the manufacturers of this land, with their thousand upon thousand of orders from all the world. They are stranded. Do not let us make flesh of one and fowl of the other.

When we sent ships abroad that gave this relief, it did not call forth the great cry of Government ownership.

Why, Mr. President, the fact is that when these Senators cry out that this bill will be a failure, that is exactly what the Shipping Trust does not believe. If they did, they would be for this bill more strongly than I am. If I could assure Wall Street that this measure would result in a failure and loss to the people of the United States, I could raise \$20,000,000 to-morrow in order to aid in the passage of this bill, but that is the very thing they do not believe. What they fear is that it will be a great success; they are afraid that it will drive monopoly off the sea and free the ocean from its piracy. That is what they are afraid of—nothing more.

Mr. President, the people of this country are aroused to the great importance of this issue. The people of Kentucky are aroused. They are for this measure, and they want to see it passed.

To my Democratic friends who have seen proper to bolt their party caucus, to refuse to act with their party after it has registered its decree, I am here to beg them to return to the Democratic Party. Come back. "There is a vacant chair awaiting there; arise and say you will come." It is the party that has honored you; it is the party that has lived for more than a hundred and thirty years; and it is a party so great that no man and no set of men with their betrayal can destroy it. It will live on. I beg these Senators to remember that the smiles upon the other side of this Chamber would not play across their countenances if it were not for the fact that they see in this breach between the Democrats upon this side their only hope of success.

I am not going to be unkind or going to say bitter things to any of the Democratic Senators who have left our party on this question, because I can see plainly written across their once smiling countenances the furrows of regret, and whenever they have further time to think of this question they will come back, I hope, to the Democratic Party.

But, Mr. President, above everything, if this bill must go down, if this great constructive measure must fail, if this must be the first defeat for the greatest President who has occupied that chair in 50 years, if he must fall and above his body the wild shouts of a triumphant Republican Party shall rise, I do pray God that I may be spared the humiliation of reaching down to pull from his body a dagger bearing the impress of the hand of a Kentucky Senator.

RECESS.

Mr. CLARKE of Arkansas. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. CLARKE of Arkansas. I move that the Senate take a recess until Monday next at 12 o'clock noon.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 25 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until Monday, February 8, 1915, at 12 o'clock meridian.

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

FRIDAY, February 5, 1915.

The House met at 11 o'clock a. m.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Our Father who art in heaven, once more in faith and confidence we approach Thee in prayer. Make us, we beseech Thee, tractable; that we may be led by the holy spirit of truth to a faithful and conscientious disposition of every duty devolving upon us, so that when we are called upon to leave this existence men shall rise up and call us blessed, and, above all, that we may have Thine approval, which will be more blessed than all things else. This we ask in the name of Him who taught us faith, virtue, love, and good will to all men. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

### MILITARY ACADEMY BILL.

Mr. HAY, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, by direction of that committee, reported the bill (H. R. 21328) making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916, and for other purposes, which was read a first and second time and, with accompanying papers, ordered printed and referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union. (H. Rept. 1369.)

Mr. MANN reserved all points of order on the bill.

### NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 20975, the naval appropriation bill.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Tennessee moves that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the naval appropriation bill.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, with Mr. HAY in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The House is now in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the naval appropriation bill, of which the Clerk will read the title.

The Clerk read as follows:

A bill (H. R. 20975) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916, and for other purposes.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the chairman of the committee a question. I have no desire to make any speech in a general way. I am going to offer a substitute for a paragraph in the bill, and I would like to ask whether it is contemplated that there will be any extra time devoted to debate more than is allowed ordinarily under the five-minute rule? I am not asking for it, but it was done, I think, a year or two years ago.

Mr. PADGETT. The practice has varied somewhat. Sometimes there has been a little debate, and then a liberal discussion under the five-minute rule. I have no desire to hold down hard and fast under the rule, but I am willing to allow a liberal debate under the five-minute rule.

Mr. SLAYDEN. That is perfectly satisfactory to me.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will proceed with the reading of the bill.

The Clerk read as follows:

### INCREASE OF THE NAVY.

That for the purpose of further increasing the Naval Establishment of the United States the President is hereby authorized to have constructed two first-class battleships, carrying as heavy armor and as powerful armament as any vessel of their class, to have the highest practicable speed and greatest desirable radius of action, and to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not to exceed \$7,800,000 each.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute for the paragraph that has just been read.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an amendment to strike out the word "two" and insert the word "four."

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. SLAYDEN: On page 64 of the bill, under "Increase of the Navy," lines 2 to 8, inclusive, strike out the provision for two first-class battleships and insert in lieu of the provision for the same the following:

"Three submarines of seagoing type, to have a surface speed of not less than 20 knots, at a total cost not exceeding \$1,600,000 each, and 30 submarines of coast-defense type, at a total cost not exceeding \$665,000 each, and the sum of \$10,000,000 is hereby appropriated for said purposes, to be available until expended."

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. PADGETT. I want to reserve a point of order against the amendment.

Mr. MANN. What is this amendment a substitute for?

Mr. SLAYDEN. For the paragraph at the top of page 64.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an amendment, but I will allow the chairman of the committee to first discuss his point of order to the amendment of the gentleman from Texas.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Tennessee make or reserve the point of order?

Mr. PADGETT. I will reserve the point of order.

Mr. MANN. If one of them is subject to a point of order, the other is.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I will ask the Chair to recognize me to offer an amendment as a member of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will recognize the gentleman to perfect the paragraph, but the gentleman is not now in order because the gentleman from Tennessee has reserved a point of order.

Mr. HOBSON. Then I will wait until the point of order is disposed of.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I regret to say that parliamentary law per se has never appealed to me as an entertaining branch of study. I am almost ashamed to admit that I am not familiar with the rules, and I doubt if I have ever read them through. They do not appeal to me particularly; but the substitute for this paragraph which I propose is in the interest of economy, and if my motion should prevail it would, in my judgment, give us a much more effective Navy, a Navy certainly immeasurably better for defensive purposes and, I believe, a much more effective aggressive Navy; and, moreover, I believe it is in order because it proposes a saving.

As I have figured it out, and I think with approximate accuracy, the adoption of the substitute for the paragraph on the top of page 64 which I offer will result in saving to the Treasury \$5,116,227.50, to which might be added, as a consolation to gentlemen who possibly would regret the giving up of these majestic but useless battleships, a greater security for the people. There can be no question, in view of what has happened within the last 60 days and what is happening every day, that the weak point of the Navy of the United States and of some other navies of the world, which I will forego mentioning, is an insufficient supply of submarines.

No vessel of war, no implement of war, has grown more steadily and I may say more rapidly into complete effectiveness. The fact is that the activity of the German submarine at this hour has terrified the greatest naval power on earth as naval powers have heretofore been reckoned. That Government which has sailors of rare skill, men of unimpeachable courage, backed up by resources almost unmatched by any other Government on earth, has been to some degree paralyzed by the activity and the intelligent handling of the German submarines. A few days ago these submarines turned their attention from acts of hostility directed at war vessels to the merchant vessels of Great Britain, and, Mr. Chairman, in that connection I would like to call attention to some publications anent that new phase of this great and horrible war. Of course these are newspapers which are the source of my information, but none of us has any better sources of information except, perhaps, the great departments of the Government, and we must rely on that common source of information open to all of the people of the country. I mention that fact because some gentlemen may impeach the authority:

A London dispatch states that the recent destructive raids by German submarines in the Irish Sea, following bold and extensive operations in the North Sea, the Channel, and off the north coast of Ireland, has convinced the British that no waters, no port even, is quite safe from Germany's submersible destroyers. Lloyd's insurance on coastwise traffic jumped at a bound from 5 to 15 per cent. It is reported that a German submarine was observed in the Irish Sea 18 miles from Liverpool yesterday morning.

That is from the New York Sun of a very recent date. The same paper in an editorial says:

#### WHAT DEFENSE AGAINST THE SUBMARINE?

By sinking two British merchantmen in the Irish Sea the German naval authorities have again disclosed the high state of practicability to which they have developed the submarine boat. The exploits of the U-21 prove that Conan Doyle was not a dreamer when he predicted exactly such attacks on England's ocean-borne commerce, and that Admiral von Tirpitz when last December he suggested the starvation of England by the destruction of her ships off her own coast was revealing a plan, and not speculating as to a possibility.

The New York Commercial, of February 1, says:

#### A SUBMARINE BLOCKADE.

Like a flash of lightning out of a blue sky came the news that a German submarine captured and sank two and probably three British merchant vessels almost at the mouth of Liverpool Harbor.

Mr. Chairman, within the last week there has been discussion in the English press, echoes of which have been cabled to this country, to the effect that people living up the Mersey from Liverpool are apprehensive that there may be a raid from these German submarine boats.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for five minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. SLAYDEN. The New York World says:

#### THE SUBMARINE'S LATEST.

The presence in the Irish Sea of a powerful German submarine, 800 miles by the most direct route from its nearest base, is one of the most significant developments of the war. If one hostile undersea boat can

invade waters that are practically a British lake and carry terror to the mouth of the Mersey, others may be expected to follow its example.

While it is hardly to be expected that the Germans will be able right away to execute Admiral von Tirpitz's threat to cut off Great Britain's food supply by this means, there can be no doubt that Saturday's raid puts the greater part of the United Kingdom's commerce upon warning. Henceforth the ocean lanes between New York and Liverpool, no matter how well patrolled they may be in midocean, will present dangers adjacent to the British coast that can not be ignored.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to abuse the patience of the House, but I have submitted an amendment, in the nature of a substitute for this paragraph at the top of page 64, which will effect a very material saving to the Treasury, and that will effect a saving which will run up into millions and which, if agreed to, will, in my judgment, add very largely to the security of this country.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SLAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. SHERWOOD. How much saving does the gentleman estimate it will make?

Mr. SLAYDEN. Between five and six million dollars. From the defensive point of view of the submarine, I am going to quote a line or two from the testimony of that great man, Admiral Fletcher, whose splendid poise, whose calm judgment, whose patience under trying circumstances, and whose skill in handling delicate relations with another people have given him a high place in the estimation of the people of this country. He says:

The use of the submarine with its torpedoes in warfare may be designated as a weapon of opportunity. If the opportunity occurs for its use it is formidable and destructive, but a skillful enemy need not permit the opportunity to occur.

Possibly not, Mr. Chairman, but one of the most skillful enemies in the history of naval warfare has not been able to overcome the opportunity. The submarine makes its own opportunity. Admiral Fletcher says, in reply to a question by Mr. BUTLER, of Pennsylvania, a member of the committee:

It is very effective for the protection of a port or harbor if ships attempt to enter that port or to lie off the port and to obstruct the commerce of the port. It is probable that a fleet would not be able to do that effectively unless protected against submarines.

Elsewhere in this testimony—I have not the time to quote it—Admiral Fletcher says that there has not yet been found any effective protection against submarines, although he anticipates it will develop in time, and perhaps it may. No one can tell what is in the lap of the gods.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SLAYDEN. I have only two or three minutes, but I will yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GARDNER. Admiral Fletcher says also:

The use of the submarine with its torpedoes in warfare may be designated as a weapon of opportunity. If the opportunity occurs for its use it is formidable and destructive, but a skillful enemy need not permit the opportunity to occur.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I have read just precisely that statement of the admiral, and I can not yield time to the gentleman to repeat what I had already stated to the House. Admiral Fletcher says in reply to a question from Mr. BUTLER:

No; they [the enemy] would not pretend to land in the presence of the submarines, unless they had assurance that they had secured a safe place of operation where submarines could not attack them.

Mr. Chairman, that seems to me to be a confession of the enormous superiority of these weapons. Speaking of conditions in the Spanish War, Admiral Fletcher says:

The fleet would not have attempted a close blockade. It would have been impracticable to do it that way with effective submarines in the harbor.

He also says:

Submarines could be effectively used against a close blockade. The fleet may have been off 100 miles from the harbor, and yet have been in a position to intercept the Spanish fleet when it came out.

Mr. Chairman, I have not time to quote further from the testimony of this great admiral of our Navy. I wish I had, because I think his testimony sustains the contention that I make. I believe that this amendment will help to secure for our Navy the greatest engines of war that have ever been devised, and at the same time will make an important saving to the Treasury. Right now it is impossible for us to tell how soon it may happen that the relative naval rank of the nations may change. In 24 hours, as I said the other day, we may become the greatest navy in the world, even measured in terms of dreadnaughts.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has again expired.

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that his time be extended for one minute in order that I may ask him a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.



Mr. FOSTER. I notice the gentleman's amendment provides for the cost of these submarines at \$3,340,000 each?

Mr. SLAYDEN. Oh, no. Mr. Chairman, I ask the Clerk to again report the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Clerk will again report the amendment.

There was no objection, and the Clerk again reported the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Tennessee still reserve the point of order?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not think it is germane to this paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Tennessee make the point of order?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Inasmuch as the paragraph beginning line 12, page 64, deals with the question of submarines and the paragraph to which the substitute has been offered deals with the question of first-class battleships, the Chair is of the opinion that the amendment is not germane, and the Chair sustains the point of order.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as this substitute which I propose was ruled out on the point of order, I would like to be informed by the Chair whether or not it may be properly reintroduced in the next paragraph but one?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks so.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an amendment to the paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

On page 64, line 4, after the word "constructed," strike out the word "two" and insert the word "four."

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama asks unanimous consent to proceed for 10 minutes. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is offered for the purpose of having the bill make adequate provision on a minimum basis for our national defense. I am sure that in the present disturbed condition of the world every proposition bearing upon our naval program will meet the very careful and earnest consideration of all Members. I desire very briefly to point out the reasons why this amendment is on the minimum basis. We have vast vital interests that are exposed; larger interests than any other country in the world; in fact, about the equivalent of the exposed interests of all other countries combined. By "exposed" I mean interests within gunshot of the water. Furthermore, those interests of ours are more exposed than similar interests of any other country. We are not a military people. We are a nonmilitary people. We have no great mobile army; other nations have. If other nations get control of the sea, they can strike us without any appreciable resistance on our part. I do not mean to say that in our vital mainland that they could permanently maintain a base, but what I do say is that they could make what is known as "raids" without serious opposition; and a raid in the region of New York, or, say, within 150 or 200 miles of New York, or two or three raids simultaneously, could not possibly be resisted by the available military forces we have. The enemy could levy tribute upon more than half of all the wealth of the Nation. Now, to imagine they would not levy tribute, would be simply to fly in the face of history and of current events. Then the enemy could retire with his tribute, and we would have no possible chance to strike back at him. Moreover, when he retired, he would have destroyed the plants of our shipyards, navy yards, arsenals, and the factories for military supplies, and put us in such a position that for months, if not years, we would be unable to make the preparation necessary to prosecute a war to a successful termination. As to our outlying possessions, the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, the Panama Canal, Cuba, Porto Rico, an enemy in control of the sea can seize and permanently occupy these without serious resistance. Therefore I lay down this as fundamental: Being thus defenseless, having such vast values exposed, America can not afford permanently to live in a status where a military nation of Europe, having a great standing army all ready, has control of the sea.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Will the gentleman yield for an interruption?

Mr. HOBSON. Certainly.

Mr. SLAYDEN. The gentleman has just stated that our sea-coast cities—he did not use the phrase, but I understood him

to mean that—are utterly defenseless in the presence of a raid of an enemy's fleet. Admiral Fletcher says that the present forts, supplemented by mines, are expected to be able to prevent any fleet from bombarding New York. How does the gentleman reconcile that difference of opinion?

Mr. HOBSON. If the gentleman would study the plans worked out by the War College as to how an attack would be made on New York City or farther down the coast, he would find that an enemy would not have to stand up and bombard New York City. He would land one or more Army corps on Long Island and on the coast of New Jersey and approach New York from the rear.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOBSON. I will be glad to, but I want to say if my time is thus taken up I shall have to ask an extension.

Mr. SLAYDEN. I shall ask an extension for the gentleman.

Mr. HOBSON. Certainly; I will yield.

Mr. SLAYDEN. I want to call the attention of the gentleman to another statement of Admiral Fletcher. Mr. BATHURICK asked him the question if an enemy would be likely to approach a harbor if they knew submarines were located there, and Admiral Fletcher answered no; so, according to the opinion of Admiral Fletcher, who is a fair authority on naval matters, I supposed we had adequate defense.

Mr. HOBSON. The gentleman, of course, is aware of the fact that the Germans have submarines in the English Channel, and yet the English troops have been landing in France without interference and British transports are continually passing without hesitation. I now yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. GARDNER. Has not there been evidence in the last two or three days before the fortifications committee tending to show that New York can be bombarded?

Mr. HOBSON. I understand that it can, and I believe that it can.

Mr. GARDNER. And did not Admiral Fletcher's evidence show that he was unaware of the fact that foreign superdreadnaughts were now carrying guns which outranged the guns on our seacoast defenses?

Mr. HOBSON. I do not know as to that. I do know that the standard coast-defense 12-inch gun of disappearing type was never built with carriages for long ranges, such as would be chosen in a bombardment. These short-range guns are the types upon which we now chiefly depend for our coast defenses.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I lay it down, and it can not be disputed successfully, that as a living policy, a status of defense for this Nation, as a permanent policy, we can not safely permit any great military nation of Europe that has a great standing army and has a vast merchant marine supplying transportation, and therefore always ready to have what is known as the control of the sea between its shores and ours. We could not strike them back if we had control of the sea, because we would have no Army, and the fleet alone can not go ashore, but if they have control of the sea they can strike us almost instantly without any chances of resistance on our part. The same principle applies to the Pacific Ocean. We can not safely permit a nation in Asia that is a great military nation, with a vast standing army available and a merchant marine ready for transportation, to be in control of the sea in that ocean. Now, then, these oceans are so far apart that we can not permit this condition to exist in either ocean. Therefore a single-fleet Navy will not answer. We must maintain as a living proposition a fleet in the Pacific Ocean superior to the navy of Japan and a fleet in the Atlantic Ocean superior to the navy of Germany, both at the same time.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the Panama Canal is not a sea-level canal like the Suez Canal, and there is a question whether the Suez Canal is going to remain permanently open even when it is under the protection of a nation in control of the sea. If we are in control of the sea, troops can not land on the Panama Canal. We may be able to give it such protection as to insure its integrity so that when occasion permits and the strategy demands we may then be able to concentrate our two fleets and get the superiority that will insure us the victory. But we can not depend upon it. Having no great standing army there, if an enemy gets control of the sea he will soon control the Panama Canal. Of course, we might destroy the locks before we surrender it, but then it would be out of use for us as well as for the enemy.

Therefore I lay it down as a fundamental principle of self-preservation that this Nation to-day ought to establish its naval strength on the basis of being equal to the navy of Germany and of Japan combined.

Mr. MONTAGUE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOBSON. Certainly.

Mr. MONTAGUE. Why would you limit the equality to Germany? Why not to England?

Mr. HOBSON. I am coming to that now, if the gentleman will permit.

Mr. Chairman, the war in Europe has brought out certain matters of cardinal importance in their bearing upon our national defense.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be permitted to proceed for five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, it is clear that if a belligerent of Europe has undisputed control of the sea, that belligerent will curtail the rights of neutrals in time of war. America is the chief of all the neutrals of the world. You might call her a chronic neutral. The nations of Europe are chronic belligerents. In the interest of our own commerce it is clear that we can not conduct that commerce and expand it in time of war when the European nations are belligerent and when one of the belligerents has undisputed control of the sea. In the years to come it will be realized more and more as a result of this war that a chronic belligerent can not in justice to all the neutrals, can not in justice to the weak nations of the world, can not in justice to the cause of general peace—whose commerce ought not to be entirely dislocated when war exists—be safely intrusted with the undisputed control of the high seas. With such control it is clear that not only a belligerent can overthrow what otherwise would be peaceful over-sea commerce of its enemies, but it can overthrow the peaceful commerce of neutrals. The English undisputed control of the sea to-day not only is tending to throttle Germany, but it is tending to prevent the development of America and her over-sea commerce.

Now, Mr. Chairman, we can not ignore a fact that this war has brought out. The Anglo-Japanese alliance is offensive and defensive. No matter where the war may take place, such is the case. Now, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. PADGETT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOBSON. Will the gentleman help me to get a little more time in case I yield?

Mr. PADGETT. No; I do not think so.

Mr. HOBSON. Then I will go ahead.

Mr. Chairman, one of those nations would have undisputed control of the sea. The other would have a great army, and the one would have the bases for operation right along our shores and contiguous to our own frontier. In addition to these vital interests affected fundamentally, there is the Monroe doctrine, which is a permanent part of our international policy, though not accepted by international law. The American people are going to maintain in the Western Hemisphere the principle of protecting the weak people of this hemisphere against the oppression of the strong military nations of Europe, and maintain the principle of equal opportunity in trading with this hemisphere—fair chance and no favor.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. HOBSON. I have had to decline to yield to one colleague, and I must do the same with my friend.

Likewise in the Pacific—

Mr. MANN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOBSON. The gentleman knows that I have declined to yield.

Mr. MANN. I was going to ask unanimous consent that the gentleman might have a little more time.

Mr. HOBSON. Pardon me, then.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, how soon does the gentleman's time run out?

The CHAIRMAN. In one minute.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the gentleman from Alabama have 10 minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois asks unanimous consent that the gentleman from Alabama may proceed for 10 minutes more. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. HOBSON. Now I will be very glad to yield to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT].

Mr. PADGETT. The question I want to ask you is, if I remember correctly, several years ago the question of the alliance between Japan and England came up, and at the request of England Japan consented to a modification of that alliance agreement whereby the United States was excepted from its operations?

Mr. HOBSON. And I remember very well, Mr. Chairman, that also not very long ago, since the period to which the gen-

tleman refers, when the question of our relations with Japan over the matter of land-ownership bills passed by the Legislature of California was cleared up, and everything was straightened out, the English papers distinctly stated how relieved they were to find it so. They said, in effect, that if trouble had come they would have felt the obligations of their alliance.

Now I yield to the gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield first to me for a moment at that point?

Mr. HOBSON. Yes.

Mr. PADGETT. It was the California dispute that called for a revision of the treaty of alliance, and England asked for the revision because of the California dispute?

Mr. HOBSON. Yes; and it was felt—the feeling was expressed—that they were happy that the relations had not become more strained between America and Japan, because of the obligations of their alliance.

Now I yield to the gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. BARKLEY. My question was prompted largely by the question propounded by the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT]. What I desired the gentleman to explain was whether he had any basis for the statement that there was an alliance between England and Japan, both offensive and defensive, that applied to the United States?

Mr. HOBSON. Well, I can state it in the terms of the treaty. If the gentleman will read the treaty he will find that its words specify cooperation in upholding common interests in the Far East. Now, I am coming to that in the next minute, and I will show how the treaty will apply, irrespective of all other considerations, because "interests" are now being affected.

Mr. BARKLEY. If it be true, then, that Japan and England are in an alliance that will require England to come to the assistance of Japan in case of war with the United States, whoever might bring on the war, does not the gentleman think it would be well for us to build a series of several hundred forts along the Canadian boundary line that might protect us from invasion by Great Britain from Canada—along a boundary line which has been unprotected for over a hundred years?

Mr. HOBSON. Well, I will say to the gentleman that I do not think a series of forts spread along a 3,000-mile boundary line would be any more effective or expedient than to build a series of forts up and down the 3,000-mile coast line.

Mr. BARKLEY. Any more than a series of forts between France and Germany, which could be avoided by the invasion of Belgium?

Mr. HOBSON. Oh, no. To-day Japan has made 21 demands upon China. We have not the power to interpellate the administration in this country, but we have the right to get information. I now call on the Secretary of State to give to us and to the people of America the substance of the 21 demands that Japan has made upon China. What is the occasion for making these demands? Japan has occupied Kiaochow. When China declared that the fighting was over at Kiaochow and abolished the war zone, Japan said it was an unfriendly act. And now Japan has opened up negotiations direct with China to determine the future development of the Chinese Empire, and England has O. K'd Japan's demands, thus making community of interest. When Japan went into Manchuria, to determine the future development of Manchuria, the very next year we lost \$20,000,000 of our market for cotton goods, and we all know that the system of distribution there gives the advantage to Japan.

Mr. Chairman, the fate of China and the open-door policy are now hanging in the balance. The European nations that helped to promulgate the open-door policy in China are now tied hand and foot in Europe. It remains for America alone to maintain the open-door policy, to safeguard the integrity of China and the principle of a fair chance and no favor, the principle of justice and right in the Far East, where we have vital interests and have fundamental rights. We joined gladly in proclaiming the open-door policy. It now devolves upon America, and America alone, to say whether the open-door policy is to be a discard forever, whether China is to become a vassal nation to the necessary prejudice of our commerce throughout that whole nation as we have suffered in Manchuria and Korea.

Now, then, what applies to-day will apply for years to come. America has vital interests in the Far East. No one can deny it. America can not sit still and see the Chinese Republic made a vassal nation of a military monarchy.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Alabama yield to the gentleman from Texas?

Mr. HOBSON. Certainly.



Mr. SLAYDEN. Will the gentleman tell us how we are going to prevent it if the Chinese reconcile themselves to such a situation? Are you going to shoot them into behaving?

Mr. HOBSON. The gentleman knows that the Chinese would not reconcile themselves to the domination of any outside power willingly. She yields to force, and she is compelled to yield because she is not prepared to defend herself.

Now, Mr. Chairman, reviewing the first proposition, we must have a Navy in the Atlantic equal to that of Germany and a Navy in the Pacific equal to that of Japan; and, consequently, we must have a total Navy equal to the combined navies of the two countries.

Now for the second conclusion brought out by this war.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Alabama yield to the gentleman from Kentucky?

Mr. HOBSON. Yes.

Mr. BARKLEY. If Japan and England have brought themselves into alliance, why do you limit the necessities of the American Navy to being equal to the navy of Germany and the navy of Japan and not make it equal in addition to the navy of Great Britain?

Mr. HOBSON. I am coming to that. Mr. Chairman, the march of history can not be set aside. America can not escape her responsibilities, even if she would. As Members we may temporarily ignore them here, but the mighty march of destiny in the progress of civilization and the advance of the race is going to demand that in the interests of humanity America shall supplant Great Britain upon the high seas of the world. [Applause.]

The present exigencies may involve the Monroe doctrine in an acute stage in Mexico. We are not certain that after the war is over, if Great Britain should be victorious, she would consent to America's continued paramountcy in Mexico. Our paramountcy in Mexico under the Monroe doctrine and the open-door policy and integrity of China are our settled foreign policies. These foreign policies demand that America should have a Navy as big as the navies of Great Britain and Japan combined. In other words, instead of the British two-power policy it must hereafter be an American two-power policy.

Mr. MONTAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman permit me to ask him a question there?

Mr. HOBSON. Yes.

Mr. MONTAGUE. I want the gentleman's practical opinion. I am more interested in that than in his forecast of the policies of nations. How long will it take us to realize this vast combination of units that the gentleman suggests, and what would be the annual appropriations with which to reach it in any approximate length of time?

Mr. HOBSON. I will now come to that. To start with, for such a vast establishment as our Naval Establishment must be there must be system. The money that we put in must be economically expended. There must be a proper organization. Naval policy is a part of the great scheme of national defense; the whole question of national defense must be determined by adequate and scientific agencies. You may refuse to establish a council of national defense while I am in Congress, but the day will come when you will establish it. The Secretary of War is already inaugurating an informal, irresponsible conference of members of the Cabinet and chairmen of defense committees of Congress—an admission of the need of such a council.

Mr. MONTAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman pardon me one suggestion?

Mr. HOBSON. Yes.

Mr. MONTAGUE. The gentleman accentuates with great zeal the need of national defense, but if we are going to resist the invasion of China by Japan, have we not embarked beyond the realm of national defense and gone into the great theater of international offense?

Mr. HOBSON. I think not. It is in the protection of our vital interests in China, a protection that all the nations of the world, including Japan, have actually pledged, protection of the integrity of the Chinese Empire—a defense of China and not an offense against Japan.

Mr. BARKLEY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOBSON. In just a moment; then I shall have finished my remarks and will answer any additional questions.

In addition to the investigation and scientific determination of the great question of national defense we must have a similar coordination in the Navy Department. You may throw out this bureau of strategy, so called, on a point of order, but you will come to it. The time is coming when you will be compelled to have one.

Now, when we have established a council of national defense and the office of chief of naval operations, then we can balance our measures of defense, take the question out of politics, and insure efficiency and economy in a businesslike way, like Germany, Japan, and England. If these countries continue the general programs they have followed for the last eight years, our program each year will have to provide at least six capital ships. It is on this basis that I am urging four dreadnaughts and two battle cruisers in this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Hobson], although I do not for one moment imagine that this amendment will be approved by this committee, because I know that it ought not to be. I do not imagine that it will even be seriously considered at this time, although it is offered in sincerity by a very earnest gentleman of conviction who is well acquainted with naval affairs. It is an additional pleasure to say that it is offered by a gentleman for whom I have a fondness, and I regret that he is so soon to leave the House.

Mr. Chairman, if we are going to fight, we have not sufficient armament. If we are going to have peace, we have too much armament. [Applause.] This Nation has never had a policy upon the subject of armament. If gentlemen will give me their attention, I will endeavor to not tire them. I do not attempt to persuade or convince anybody. This question involves morals and not, in my judgment, economy. I would not think of economizing if it became absolutely necessary to increase our military in order to defend our national honor, but I do not think the proposed increase necessary at this time. Although, as I repeat, this Nation has never had a fixed policy upon naval development, we have always had sufficient armament to protect ourselves and keep us from harm. Permit me for a moment to refer to myself. For many years I have endeavored to learn what was the right position to take in the way of providing a sufficient armament for the protection of our country, or what is known as a national defense. I am glad to say that no political division has ever shown itself in this House on this subject, and it ought not. Parties in their platforms have from time to time declared that we ought to have an adequate defense. What is an adequate defense? I suppose it is one that defends. I quite agree with the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Hobson] that if we are to arm ourselves against all nations and against all emergencies we are not now doing nearly as much in the way of preparation as we ought to do, but in my opinion it is unnecessary at this time.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman permit a question?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Mr. SLAYDEN. The gentleman spoke of agreeing with the gentleman from Alabama in some respects. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania go with him so far as to think that we ought to defend ourselves by invading the Asiatic danger zone?

Mr. BUTLER. Oh, no.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Does the gentleman think we ought to have a navy large enough to police the world?

Mr. BUTLER. I do not. I would invade no territory—

Mr. SLAYDEN. That is satisfactory to me.

Mr. BUTLER. Unless it became necessary as a part of our defense during an attack—positively no.

Mr. SLAYDEN. That is the point of my question. Does the gentleman believe it is necessary, in order to defend ourselves, for us to go across the world and go into the Asiatic war zone and into foreign questions?

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I am not enough of a military man to answer that question, and I want to keep away, as far as I can, from foreign complications. Eighteen years ago I asked to be appointed a member of the Naval Affairs Committee in order that I might prevent the coming of what I very greatly fear will come to us in the near future if we do not stay at home and behave ourselves as we ought to do. [Applause.]

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. The gentleman is a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs, and I should like to get his views on this subject: Suppose—and I do not know that it is a very violent presumption—suppose we should wake up some morning and find that there was a declaration of war against us by Japan. Will the gentleman explain how we would defend the Pacific coast?

Mr. BUTLER. I would leave that to those who know better than I do. I want to answer the gentleman just as civilly as I can.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. I want to know what your theory is.

Mr. BUTLER. Not being able to answer, because I do not know, I will refer the gentleman to those who know better than I do—the military men—but I have no fear of an attack from Japan. I believe that we are thoroughly prepared for any assault that Japan may make upon us. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BUTLER. I ask for a little more time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania asks unanimous consent that his time be extended five minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. HENSLEY. Will the gentleman yield right there?

Mr. BUTLER. Of course I will.

Mr. HENSLEY. I have great respect for the opinion of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and I am desirous of knowing whether or not he has heretofore subscribed to the doctrine that preparedness is an insurance against war; and if so, how he feels upon that proposition now, in the light of recent events?

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I am one with a bursted theory [laughter], but I am thankful to God Almighty that I am strong enough to admit my mistake. [Laughter and applause.] I never for one minute imagined that the civilized nations of the world would be fighting to exterminate themselves, as they are now doing, but my theory has failed, and I believe now, as I will until my mind changes, that nations prepared to fight will fight. [Applause.] And the better their preparation to fight the quicker they will go to it. [Laughter and applause.]

However, I do not propose, as far as I am able and as far as I can see light, to leave this country absolutely unprepared and defenseless. We ask no quarters from anybody. [Applause.] We are both independent and able. We are positively willing at all times to provide for ourselves in our own way, as this great body may see fit.

Mr. HENSLEY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUTLER. I will yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HENSLEY. Does not the gentleman believe that this great Government should take a more advanced stand and do more toward bringing about pleasant relationship between other countries, to the end that disarmament may be given to the world, than it has done in the past?

Mr. BUTLER. Of course I do; I would rather visit than fight any day. [Laughter.]

Mr. MILLER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUTLER. In just a moment. I will confess in my ignorance that I can not see distinctly. I am like a man walking in the dark; I do not know what is the best to do on the present occasion in the direction of a national defense. I want to do what is right, and as soon as I can see it then I am ready for my share of responsibility. I am against any increase of armament at this time above that which we usually provide in time of peace, because I assume—I may be mistaken again as I reckon with human nature and my knowledge of it—yet I assume that after the present great war is over, when these nations are bankrupt, when the people face the miseries of this war, they will be willing to join with us in an agreement limiting armament for a number of years; and if we can obtain that concession we will have done more than civilization has done since Christ appeared upon the earth. [Applause.]

I am not sure that I will then be a Member of this House; but if I am and these present belligerents insist upon increasing their armament, insist upon rebuilding the armament lost in the present war and greatly increasing it, I will join with the American people in increasing ours, because I think it will then be necessary. But until that time comes, until we have an opportunity to make an honest effort with the belligerent nations to reach such an agreement by which we will limit armament, and thereby secure ourselves greater safety, I am unwilling to increase our armament beyond that which we have usually provided. Therefore, if the amendment of the gentleman from Alabama should prevail, it will be without my approval and against my opposition. Now, I will yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. MILLER. My question was pertinent at the time I asked the gentleman to yield, but it may not be now. Does the gentleman think when we are in the presence of an armed enemy we ought to discontinue all preparations to protect ourselves against any aggressive act?

Mr. BUTLER. I do not; but I do not think we are in the presence of a hostile country.

Mr. MILLER. I did not say "hostile."

Mr. BUTLER. I do not think we are to be attacked. If I did, I would join with the gentleman and all others in making the necessary defense.

Mr. WITHERSPOON and Mr. GARDNER rose.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania has just spoken on the same side.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON].

Mr. GARDNER. A parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. GARDNER. Is it proper to recognize two gentlemen in succession to speak in the negative of a proposition when somebody arises to speak in the affirmative?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks it is within the discretion of the Chair. The Chair will recognize all gentlemen.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] is mistaken in saying that the gentleman from Pennsylvania and I are on the same side. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to proceed for 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi asks unanimous consent to proceed for 10 minutes. Is there objection?

Mr. GARDNER. Reserving the right to object, I call the gentleman's attention to my statement, that on the pending amendment the gentleman from Mississippi and the gentleman from Pennsylvania are on the same side.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?

There was no objection.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I want to address the House solely for this reason: I want the House to be put in possession of the facts. My service on the Naval Affairs Committee of four years has thoroughly convinced me that with a great deal of study I know nothing about the Navy, and that the only way in which a Member of this House can vote intelligently upon the various questions that arise on this appropriation bill is to get the facts from the only witnesses who know the facts, and they are the naval officers.

In addressing the House a few days ago I reviewed the statements of a number of naval officers who testified substantially that we already have a sufficient Navy, an adequate Navy, to protect us against any attack by any nation on earth except that of England.

I desire to speak this morning in order to call your attention to the testimony of another naval officer, a member of the general board, a rear admiral of the Navy, Rear Admiral Fiske. No man can take his testimony and study it and understand it and believe that there is the slightest excuse for another battleship. If you will give me the time, I will show you that and disprove the necessity for any such appropriation as this bill contains. Let me read you from page 1007 of the hearings. He says:

But there is one serious fact about naval engagements, especially modern naval engagements, and that is that the victor comes off without very much injury.

The cause for that is mathematical. Say one nation has a slight superiority in gunfire at the start, that puts the other fellow at a disadvantage. That increases, and it increases with accumulative effect.

I published some tables about 10 years ago in the proceedings of the Naval Institute to show how when two forces engaged with each other, if one hit the other 10 times and the second one hit the first one 9 times, in a comparatively short time the relation of those two forces from that standpoint would be 2 to 1 instead of 10 to 9; and it increases very rapidly after that. That explains why in the Battle of Manila Bay, in the Battle of Santiago, the Battle of Tsushima, and in the recent battle off the west coast of Chile, the victors came off almost uninjured.

Mr. ROBERTS. It is a geometrical progression?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mark that. He tells you that where two naval forces oppose each other with just a slight advantage in gunfire on one side, where they stand at the beginning in point of power in the relation of ten to nine, that in a short time the result of having a slight advantage in gunfire will reduce their relation to two to one instead of ten to nine. That is his statement. According to his testimony that is the fact, and I want to apply that to the relation of the American Navy and the German Navy, which is admittedly the greatest on earth except that of England. Admiral Fiske was asked to take up the list of battleships in these two navies and compare them, and he testified as a result of that that ship for ship the American Navy is the most powerful on earth. Take, for instance, the last two ships in the program of each nation. The two German ships are armed with eight 15-inch guns.



The corresponding ships in the American Navy are armed with twelve 14-inch guns, and every naval officer that has testified says that those two last ships in the American Navy are more powerful than the German ships. Take the next three ships in the American Navy and the next three in the German Navy. The German Navy ships are armed with ten 12-inch guns, and the corresponding American ships are armed with twelve 14-inch guns. Not only has each one of them two more guns, but the guns in the American Navy are much more powerful. Then after these five take the next four ships in the American Navy. They are armed with ten 14-inch guns, while the German corresponding ships are armed with ten 12-inch guns. That makes nine. In those nine ships we have one hundred 14-inch guns, and in the corresponding nine ships of the German Navy there are eighty-six 12-inch guns and sixteen 15-inch guns, fourteen less on their ships than on ours; and if you will carry the whole list through to the very beginning you will find there is the same superiority. While the Germans were equipping their battleships with 9 and 14 inch guns we were equipping ours with 13-inch guns. While they were equipping theirs with 11-inch guns we were equipping ours with 12-inch guns. That superiority in gunfire stands from the first to the last ship in both Navies.

Let us see what that amounts to. I asked Admiral Fiske if he did not think that was an immense advantage in gunfire. He said that he would not call it an immense advantage, but he would call it an advantage in gunfire. I then said to him that we were told by Admiral Twining, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, that a 14-inch gun has a destructive force 50 per cent greater than a 12-inch gun and shoots with 30 per cent more accuracy than a 12-inch gun. I asked him whether he approved or disapproved of that statement. He said that it had been such a long time since he had anything to do with ordnance that he would not put his judgment up against that of Admiral Twining.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for five minutes longer.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, can we not come to some sort of agreement on this thing as to time?

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I thought that we could run along a reasonable time and allow this debate. Later on in the bill there will not be necessity for so much debate. I think we can run along with liberality and brotherly love at the present time.

Mr. GARDNER. I wanted to see if we could not come to something reasonable. There are so many amendments besides this one to consider that I think we ought to come to some agreement on time.

Mr. PADGETT. It will not be very long, I think, before we can dispose of this.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I then said to him, supposing now the statement of Admiral Twining that each one of these 14-inch guns with which our ships are armed, amounting to 100, has a destructive force 50 per cent greater than the 12-inch guns on the corresponding German ships, is accurate, and it has been approved by Admiral Strauss, the successor of Admiral Twining, as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance—supposing that is true, and he said he could not question it, then I asked him if he would consider that just an advantage or whether he would consider it an immense advantage. He then said, if that statement were true, it would be an immense advantage in gun fire. Then I asked if the other part of that statement is true, that these two Chiefs of Ordnance, the greatest experts in the Navy on that subject, are correct in their statement that a 14-inch gun shoots with 30 per cent more accuracy than a 12-inch gun, whether that would be a slight or an immense advantage. He then said that he hardly believed that that was true. He did not question it at first, but when he saw the immense advantage it amounted to, then he began to question the statement. Then I said, "Admiral, let us see whether you approve it or not. The reason given by these ordnance experts why the American gun of 14 inches in diameter shoots with an accuracy 30 per cent greater than the German 12-inch gun is based by them on the fact that it has a flatter trajectory. Suppose you are shooting at this target with a rifle, if you aim right at the book, which is the target, you would hit it every time." He said, yes, that that was true, and that it would not make any difference how far away it was, if

it were within the range of the gun and the gun were aimed at it, you would hit it. Then I said that in shooting these big guns they did not shoot right at the target, but that they have to shoot up and the shell comes down. He agreed with that statement. Then I said, "The great problem in accurate shooting is to determine the exact distance to the target." He said, "Yes; that is true." I said, "If you take a 14-inch gun that has a trajectory that comes over like this, very flat, and a 12-inch gun that has a trajectory which has to go away up and then come down, does not the accuracy of the shooting and the chances of hitting increase as the trajectory is flattened and becomes more like a rifle that shoots directly at the target?" He said that that was true. He then admitted that the 14-inch gun was bound to shoot with more accuracy than the 12-inch gun, because it had a flatter trajectory. Then I said, "Admiral, the experts have calculated that accuracy to be 30 per cent, and I ask you again if that would not be of immense advantage in favor of our fleet?" and he said, yes, that it would be of immense advantage.

That is the testimony of this expert. Mr. Chairman, if it be true, as he says, that a slight advantage in gunfire resulted at Santiago in destroying all of the enemy's ships without losing any of our own; if, as he says, a slight advantage in gunfire resulted in our destroying all of the enemy's ships at Manila Bay without losing any of our ships; if, as he says, a slight advantage in gunfire resulted in the battle of Tsushima in the Japanese destroying all of the Russian ships with very little loss to themselves; if, as he says, a slight advantage off the coast of Chile enabled the victors to destroy all of the enemy's ships without losing any of theirs; if that is the result of a slight advantage in gunfire, I put it up to you, what would be the result in a contest between our Navy and the German Navy, with our having what Admiral Fiske admits is an immense advantage in gunfire?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has again expired.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, I favor the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Hobson], because I favor fair protection and defense for every part of this great country. I rise particularly at this time to reply to the question asked of Mr. BUTLER, of Pennsylvania, by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. HUMPHREY] as to the adequacy of defense on the Pacific coast. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] is always so fair that I am sure he will correct that part of his statement concerning the defense of the Pacific coast. Mr. Chairman, we have very little defense on the Pacific coast. We are not only not prepared for war, but we are not prepared to keep the peace or to defend ourselves against whatever nation might attack us. I am not a naval expert, but I can imagine, and so can you, that any country expecting to attack the United States could have some of its ships within one or two thousand miles of the Pacific coast and we not be fully aware of the purpose. They could attack the Pacific coast before the vessels of our Navy could get from the Atlantic coast to San Francisco. It takes 23 days, it has been testified to, for a battleship to travel from New York to San Francisco, and I submit that the vessels of any nation that might want to go to war with us on the Pacific coast could get nearer than 23 days before we would know much, if anything, about it.

Mr. Chairman, if war should break out to-morrow in the Pacific Ocean the Pacific coast would be attacked and some of our cities destroyed, perhaps, before we could bring the battle fleet from the Atlantic against the enemy. There is not a first-line battleship out there. The only one we have is the grand old *Oregon*, 20 years of age. We have had no battleships there at any time except when the fleet stopped for a day at each of our ports on the way round the world.

Mr. MONTAGUE. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Yes; I yield.

Mr. MONTAGUE. I desire to ask the gentleman whether or not there are coast fortifications on the Pacific coast?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. There are.

Mr. MONTAGUE. Have not you very considerable fortifications to protect San Francisco?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. There are fortifications at San Francisco, but the largest guns there are 12-inch guns. There are fortifications at Puget Sound, but the largest guns there are 12-inch guns, while there are ships built or building for the German Navy that carry 15-inch guns and for the British Navy with 15-inch guns. There is no first-class battleship to-day that does not carry at least 12-inch guns.

Mr. MCKELLAR. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. I yield.

Mr. McKELLAR. Is the gentleman afraid that the ships of the German Navy may reach San Francisco or Panama before the vessels of the American Navy can get there?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. We are not going to war with Germany or any other nation, but whenever a nation desires to attack this country it will have its ships nearer our Pacific coast line, if that is the plan of attack, than 23 days away.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. I will.

Mr. GARDNER. Is it not true that Japan is building four battleships which each twelve 14-inch guns and two battle cruisers carrying each eight 14-inch guns?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. I think the gentleman's statement is quite correct. I am sure that Japan is building battleships that carry larger guns than we have in our coast defenses. Now, Mr. Chairman, I am not one of the Members of this House who believes we are to be attacked by Japan at any early date, if ever at all, but I do believe this country should be adequately prepared to defend itself against all comers.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. I will.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I have heard it stated that if Pearl Harbor was properly fortified the Japs could not get to this country until they broke through those fortifications, and I was talking to an Army strategist who was preparing fortifications at the Panama Canal, and he stated that with our fortifications properly equipped at Pearl Harbor it would take Japan a year to get to the western coast. Does the gentleman know anything about that?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. I am not a naval expert, and if the gentleman from Texas pretends to be I would like his opinion on that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I do not pretend to be an expert.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may have five minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania? [After a pause] The Chair hears none.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I was talking to an Army strategist, Morrison, who was sent to Panama to lay out the fortifications for Panama; I went down on the same boat with him—

Mr. STEPHENS of California. In further answer to the gentleman I will say that while I am not a naval expert I can not believe the Army strategist meant what the gentleman thinks he did. The gentleman can see how easy it would be to go far from and not near Hawaii.

Mr. MILLER. Will the gentleman from California permit?

Mr. CALLAWAY. Will the gentleman wait until I get through with this?

Mr. MILLER. I want to make a little statement in connection with the gentleman's inquiry.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I am making an inquiry now. If it is necessary for us to have naval equipment enough to meet any possible assault from the Pacific side, would it not be necessary for us under the gentleman's contention to have a Navy over on the Pacific side larger than Japan or any Government that might attack us from that side?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, that would be desirable, but in any event I would like a part of the Navy over there at all times. We have nothing now on the Pacific coast except the grand old *Oregon*, 20 years old, a few armored cruisers, and from three to five submarines.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Is it not a fact that a half of a Navy over there when you need a whole one would not be any defense, that if a war should call for a defense from our Navy that half a Navy would not meet any possible attack?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, if I was starving I think half a loaf of bread would help my case, and if there was an attack on the Pacific coast and we had a fleet half as large as the fleet on the Atlantic coast it could hold off the enemy until the larger fleet from the Atlantic coast could get to the Pacific.

Mr. CALLAWAY. But it would not be a real defense on the Pacific coast, according to your idea.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. It would help. We have so little defense now. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER. I wanted to ask the gentleman if it is not a fact that Pearl Harbor as a defense is only such if we have a powerful Navy? It is a center on which a navy can operate, and a defense that we speak of as being afforded by Pearl Harbor is but that defense that will come from a superior fleet that will radiate from Pearl Harbor as a base.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. What the gentleman says is true. I do not believe it can be seriously contended by men who know and have studied the question of defense that the Pacific coast is fairly protected to-day. With but two fortifications, one second-line battleship, a few battle cruisers, and three to five submarines along our entire coast we certainly are poorly protected. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me we are hardly protected at all.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I may continue for 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri asks unanimous consent that he may continue for 10 minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased, indeed, if I could get the attention of the committee. I do not consume so very much of the time of the House and shall only take this brief time to present some views I have upon this subject. I want to lay down the proposition, Mr. Chairman, that, in my judgment, can not be disputed, and that is this, that the state of preparedness on the part of a nation as well as on the part of an individual determines the degree of aggression. Do you catch that point? I can take the hearings, the testimony given before the Naval Affairs Committee by admirals of the Navy, and they will establish that proposition in a way that no Member of this House can gainsay. The better prepared we are the more insistent we are upon other nations of the world observing what we conceive to be our rights. We are not as willing then as we are, perhaps, under other conditions to submit whatever questions are involved in the dispute to a fair and just consideration before resorting to the use of armaments. But we insist when armed and prepared, as young men frequently insist upon others observing their rights, because we are in a state of preparedness. It occurs to me, Mr. Chairman, that Members of this Congress now, after having witnessed what we all have, after having seen what has occurred across the ocean, would hesitate some time before they would get up before this body and insist that preparedness in the way of armament means an insurance against war. Was not Germany prepared and did Germany avoid war? By no means. Did the state of preparedness prevent Great Britain from going to war? By no means.

The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Hobson] would insist at all times on this Nation being in a state of preparedness for war. My God, let me say to you that there is no department on either side of that great struggle over there that is prepared upon a war basis to-day. Why, even the hospital facilities are not adequate to meet the needs of those armies. On a war basis the gentleman insists. Why, did you know the gravediggers over there are not upon a war basis; they are not in numbers sufficient to lay away those that have given up their lives in that struggle. Talk to me about a nation being in a state of preparedness for war at all times. Gentlemen, let me say this to you here now, I believe in an adequate Navy, a Navy that will meet the needs of this country, but the question of adequacy I do not want to have determined by men who are interested in these increases. I do not want those who are getting the profits out of it to be the ones who are laying down the policy of this great Government of ours as to what constitutes an adequate Navy on the part of this country of ours.

Now, if we want a Navy to meet the needs of this Government, if it is our purpose to have a Navy for defensive purposes, let us take into consideration the fact that in this war over in Europe Germany has had sunk by submarines something like 200,000 tons of armament. England has had something like 150,000 tons of armament that has gone to the bottom of the sea because of submarines operating on the part of either side party to the conflict. The greatest dangers those men can be exposed to is to put them on board a battleship, unless you hide and conceal your ship so the men operating the submarines can not find them.

I maintain, my friends, that if this war continues for the next six months or a year, beyond any sort of question we can not only pit the armament of this country, in a naval way, against Germany, but we will have the most powerful Navy afloat. You all have observed how the navies of the Old World are being whittled down from time to time. Let me say here and now, that if we accept the position taken by the great concerns that are supplying the material to our Navy, if we take their views as to what constitutes an adequate Navy, we never on earth will have a Navy sufficient to meet the needs of the country, according to their views. If we had a Navy to-day twice as strong as the British Navy, do you mean to tell me that these great supply companies would be satisfied, and that



they would not be clamoring at every session of Congress for other increases in armament?

Mr. CALLAWAY and Mr. HOBSON rose.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom does the gentleman from Missouri yield?

Mr. HENSLEY. I will first yield to my colleague on the committee, the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I desire to ask the gentleman in case that it were possible to have the Government itself manufacture practically all of its material, would the gentleman then change his position and vote for larger equipment?

Mr. HENSLEY. I can not determine that. I will vote for whatever I conceive to be the needs of this Government from time to time. But let me say to the gentleman from Alabama that if the Government establishes its own plants for the furnishing of materials and all those things, so as to take the profit out of the increases in the Navy—profit out of war, if you please—you would not find the clamor over the country for increases of armament that we find to-day. [Applause.] And the gentleman knows well that that is the correct statement of the facts. If I had time, I could convince even those who are fixed in their views on this proposition that it is the supply companies, the men directly interested in this line, who are clamoring and holding up to the American people the needs of the Navy from year to year.

Mr. CALLAWAY and Mr. MILLER rose.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER. I know that the gentleman has given a great deal of study to the details of this question, and—

Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. HENSLEY. Yes; I will yield first to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I have one question to ask. That is about the limitation of these armaments. These people contend that we should have an adequate Navy, and I have been listening to them until I have gotten the notion of their idea of adequacy, that it must be large enough to meet any possible navy or combination of navies that could be brought against the United States. I want to know if it would be, in the judgment of the gentleman, possible for this Nation, with its taxing powers and the resources we have, to make a Navy big enough to satisfy these fellows that are scared, or these men who are now interested in increasing the Navy, or these men that want to take the whole earth under their protecting wing and administer it under the protection of the Federal Government, like the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON]?

Mr. HENSLEY. I will answer the gentleman from Texas in this way: He recalls that only in the last Congress the gentleman from Alabama—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have two minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri asks unanimous consent to proceed for two minutes more. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. HENSLEY. The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] upon the floor of this House in his speeches in former Congresses has insisted that we should have a Navy equal to Germany's Navy in the Atlantic and a Navy equal to that of Japan in the Pacific, and here to-day he comes and presents his views and insists that we should have a Navy in the Atlantic equal to that of Great Britain and a Navy in the Pacific equal to that of Japan. The gentleman a few years ago, as you all know, did not confine his speeches to this House, but went all over the country, and insisted that in a very short period of time this country would find itself involved in a war with Japan. I rejoice over the fact that his prophecy never came true. I am sometimes in doubt as to whether others get the pleasure out of that fact that I do. I sometimes think that folks wedded to their views are disappointed because those prophecies did not come true. I truly hope that my friend from Alabama is not in this category.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts asks unanimous consent to proceed for 15 minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, I have read in a good many newspapers the statement that this campaign which I am carrying on for a proper armament is inspired by those who make war materials. Recently, in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, I read an editorial headed, if I recollect rightly, "Gardner's suspicious crusade." There was a peace meeting here in Washington the other night where at least two Members of Congress were present. There the statement was made that this campaign was inspired by the manufacturers of war material.

Mr. Chairman, those statements, whoever make them, are noisome slanders; noisome slanders—I repeat it in case any gentleman on the floor of this House objects to the term.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there for a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Massachusetts yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

Mr. GARDNER. I do.

Mr. BUTLER. Does the gentleman suppose that any Member of this House would for one instant charge such a selfish motive as that which the gentleman has spoken of?

Mr. GARDNER. I have read a certain petition prepared at a certain peace meeting, or at least I have read in the newspapers what purported to be the petition—the petition addressed to the Committee on Military Affairs, or something purporting to be the substance of it. I have not seen the petition itself. This petition, according to the newspapers, stated that the manufacturers of war material are at the bottom of this movement for increased armament. It may not have been so worded.

Is there any gentleman on the floor of this House who wishes to comment on that statement of mine? [After a pause.] Then, Mr. Chairman, I shall go on. I am speaking for good old American spunk, and I am speaking against this doctrine that the right way to protect ourselves is with a supine, pliable spine, because that is the doctrine that is being preached to you, gentlemen, and this statement that being prepared for war brings on war simply shows the confusion of men's minds.

Being prepared for war as Germany was prepared for war may induce the bringing on of war, but being prepared against war, which is what I contend for, will never bring about any war. In fact it would tend to prevent war. It would have prevented this war if Great Britain had been prepared, and preparation would perhaps have saved little Belgium.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Massachusetts yield to the gentleman from Texas?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes; but I would rather not have my thread of thought interrupted.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I want to ask the gentleman a question. I would like to have the gentleman's idea of the amount of equipment that would prepare us for war?

Mr. GARDNER. Oh, let the gentleman possess his soul in patience for a moment. I have always subscribed for what is known as the Liberal Yearbook of Great Britain. It is the political bible of the Liberal Party. I have noted the textbooks which are recommended to the English Liberals to read. I find that the Liberal textbooks are pacifist textbooks. Mr. Norman Angell is one of the favorite authors whose works are in the textbook list of the Liberal Party. Mr. Angell, like so many of my fellow Members, last year prophesied that there never was going to be another war, because the bankers would not permit it and the laboring men of Europe would not fight each other.

Mr. Chairman, it was those teachings, it was those textbooks, which the Liberal Party allowed to guide them, and so left England unprepared for war. I hope that we shall find ourselves confronted with no such result here.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I was astonished this morning to hear extracts read from Admiral Fiske's evidence and extracts from Admiral Fletcher's evidence, tending to show that this demand for dreadnaughts is unreasonable.

Why, Mr. Chairman, if I were to take extracts from the testimony of those gentlemen and not read the context, I could prove anything on earth. But everybody knows that Admiral Fiske is one of the three rear admirals on the General Board which made this recommendation for four battleships which is provided by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] in this very amendment which we are now considering.

But the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] went into a long explanation of the superiority of our 14-inch guns over somebody's else 12-inch guns. He did not tell you that there are 14 British dreadnaughts built and building and 3 German dreadnaughts built and building which carry 15-inch

guns of 45 calibers each. Our largest Navy guns are 14-inch guns. I am not an expert, so I can not say which is best—our 14-inch guns or the British and German 15-inch guns. There was a big fight in the North Sea the other Sunday. Nine big ships were engaged. Every one of them was faster than the fastest battleship we have in our Navy. The slowest ship, the *Blücher*, was sunk because she could not keep up with her sister ships. Her speed was 5 knots an hour less than the others and she was sunk. Yet the *Blücher* was faster than the fastest ship we have in the United States Navy, except the small fry, like submarines and destroyers. Now, gentlemen, you can not get away from facts of that sort even by saying that the people on the Mersey are terrified for fear of attack from some German submarine. How do we know they are terrified? Because the headlines say so? The papers said that London was terrified at the prospect of Zeppelin raids; that early in the winter London was going to be attacked by a fleet of Zeppelins. That prophecy has not as yet been fulfilled. I have had many letters from those with whom I worked in London last summer. Up to date they have not heard of the terror over there.

Now, as to these submarines, I do not know whether the people are terrified by them or not. I am a great believer in plenty of submarines, especially ocean-going submarines, but I want fighting ships more.

In reply to the question of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. CALLAWAY] as to how big an armament I believe in, I answer in this way: The gentleman from Washington [Mr. HUMPHREY] asked the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] how he proposed to protect the Pacific coast against Japan in case of war, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania replied, "I leave that to the military experts." That is the most sensible remark anybody has made on the floor of this House to-day. What is the use of taking the best officers in the Navy and putting them on the General Board and then, when they report year after year what we need in the way of armament, what is the sense of always telling them, "Oh, that is all wrong. You gentlemen do not know what you are talking about. You are all rascals who are trying to increase your rank. That is what you are. We congressional experts are the only people who know"?

Supposing that we Congressmen are actually the real people who know. Perhaps we know by intuition. We certainly do not know from listening to debates, because we do not listen, and on a good many questions we do not vote because we are in our offices when the Committee of the Whole divides. I took the RECORD of last Monday to find how many of us were present when the votes were ordered on questions relating to the plucking board of the Navy. I found that—counting everybody who came out of the smoking rooms, counting everybody within sound of the division bell, counting everybody from the lobby, and counting everybody in their seats—about 80 Members out of over 400 decided all these questions. By the way, I doubt whether there are more than 80 Members in the Hall at the present moment. There may not be so many. Of those present I venture to say that there are not a dozen who can tell us, as a matter of fact, what armaments our dreadnaughts carry or how many dreadnaughts we have completed.

Mr. HELM. Will the gentleman yield a moment?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Mr. HELM. You stated a moment ago that the *Blücher* was the slowest ship in the German Navy.

Mr. GARDNER. Not exactly.

Mr. HELM. In that engagement.

Mr. GARDNER. I stated that she was the slowest of the nine big ships engaged.

Mr. HELM. She was the slowest in that engagement.

Mr. GARDNER. Of the nine engaged.

Mr. HELM. And that she was faster than our fastest battleship.

Mr. GARDNER. Our fastest battleship or any other ship except the small fry.

Mr. HELM. Who is to blame for the defect in the construction of our battleships, that do not measure up to the worst ship that was in that engagement, almost all of which battleships have been constructed since the construction of the *Blücher*?

Mr. GARDNER. Do you mean to say, Is the Republican Party to blame?

Mr. HELM. No; just a moment, please.

Mr. GARDNER. I am going to answer.

Mr. HELM. I want the gentleman to understand the purpose of my question.

Mr. GARDNER. What the gentleman wants to know is whose fault it is. It is the fault of the people of the United States, that we cut and pare. When the General Board told

us we must have 48 battleships, we have given them 37 instead. When they told us we ought to have 192 destroyers, we have given them 68 odd. Every year we have chopped and cheese-pared until now we have a navy which is a bad third to Great Britain and Germany; and when the ships of France that were built and building on July 1, 1914, are completed and our own ships under construction at the same date are completed, we shall be fourth.

Mr. HELM. Now will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Mr. HELM. Is it not a fact that this defect is a defect of speed, not a defect of numbers? And, as a matter of fact, instead of having in my mind that it is a dereliction of the Republican Party, if I were going to place the blame, answering my own question, I should place it on the Navy Department and not upon Congress.

Mr. GARDNER. All right. Now, Mr. Chairman, if I have my way, I will accept an amendment to the proposition of the gentleman from Alabama and couple his amendment asking for two more battleships with another amendment sending to the scrap heap our three oldest battleships, for they are over 20 years old.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Mr. FITZGERALD. There were no battleships engaged in that fight.

Mr. GARDNER. There were nine battle cruisers.

Mr. FITZGERALD. But no battleships.

Mr. GARDNER. I shall correct that in the permanent RECORD. The battle cruisers engaged were the *Indomitable*, the *Lion*, the *Princess Royal*, the *New Zealand*, the *Tiger*, the *Blücher*, the *Moltke*, the *Seydlitz*, and the *Derfflinger*.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Those are in a distinct class from the battleships.

Mr. GARDNER. I want to correct that. The *Blücher* is not a battle cruiser, but is an armored cruiser.

Mr. FITZGERALD. The battle cruiser is a different type of vessel from the battleship.

Mr. GARDNER. As I said, the *Blücher* is not a battle cruiser, but an armored cruiser far inferior, with a 23-knot speed; but that is not the point.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes; it is the point.

Mr. GARDNER. It is not the point. The point is that we have not got in the Navy vessels that can compete in speed with the fleets which they would have to fight in case of war.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Let me ask the gentleman—

Mr. GARDNER. The gentleman will not let me complete my answer.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I was trying to keep the gentleman calm.

Mr. GARDNER. What is the question?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I ask the gentleman if the criticism that we have not the speed of these battle cruisers is not due to the fact that the General Board has not recommended and Congress has not provided battle cruisers, which are needed chiefly for their high speed and for armament, and that the General Board, and Congress following its recommendations, has provided for battleships, which are distinct from the battle cruiser by not having such high speed and being more fully protected by armor.

Mr. GARDNER. The gentleman says that the General Board has not recommended battle cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman's time be extended five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. JOHNSON of South Carolina). The gentleman from Pennsylvania asks that the time of the gentleman from Massachusetts be extended five minutes. Is there objection?

Mr. HAMLIN. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I want to say that the other day I was allowed 10 minutes in which to present some arguments, and when the time was up I had not quite finished and I asked to have my time extended, and the gentleman from Massachusetts graciously objected. I then asked to extend my remarks in the RECORD, and he objected to that.

Mr. GARDNER. Oh, I did not. I went to the gentleman and told him that I should not object the second time.

Mr. HAMLIN. Well, I beg the gentleman's pardon; but he objected to my proceeding.

Mr. GARDNER. The gentleman knows that the objection was not directed at him, but at the minority leader.

Mr. HAMLIN. I am not going to act as graciously as the gentleman from Massachusetts did. I am going, as far as I am concerned, to permit him to extend his remarks for five minutes.



The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

Mr. GARDNER. One moment, Mr. Chairman. I was entitled to recognition, in my opinion, some time ago under the custom of the House, but the Chair thought otherwise and recognized two gentlemen in succession who opposed the amendment. I am going to incorporate in the Record a reference to section 1445 of Hinds' Precedents:

A member of the committee having occupied the floor in favor of a measure, a member opposing should be recognized, even though he be not a member of the committee.

If the gentleman from Missouri will recall, I explained to him that my objection was not directed at him, but arose owing to a difference with the minority leader. I went to him and said if he would ask again I should not object, whereupon he did ask permission and some other gentleman objected.

Mr. HAMLIN. At any rate, the gentleman's objection was effective and I could not extend my remarks. I am not going to object.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none and the gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, now will the gentleman from New York answer my question? I understood him to say that the general board has not recommended any battle cruisers.

Mr. FITZGERALD. My understanding is that the board has insisted on battleships as the vital feature of the Navy, and has especially emphasized the recommendation for additional battleships and has not requested battle cruisers.

Mr. GARDNER. I think the gentleman is mistaken and that the general board recommended one battle cruiser last year, but it was turned down. If I am mistaken, I shall correct the mistake later in the day.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I am not talking about last year. They have recommended four battleships for eight years past and have been turned down every year. Such action did not discourage them, but they renewed the recommendation from year to year.

Mr. GARDNER. The gentleman may be right; but the fact remains that we do not have in the United States Navy a battleship of any kind that is as fast as the nine ships that fought the battle in the North Sea.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. The *Blücher* was an armored cruiser, was she not?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. The largest and most powerful the Germans had?

Mr. GARDNER. I think so.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Would it not be fair to compare it with our own armored cruisers, and would you not find that we had two superior to it in armament and equal in speed?

Mr. GARDNER. Very likely; but there would still be the question as to how we would come out of such a battle as that which took place in the North Sea. I hear some one say, "We should lick 'em." That's the talk. We can lick all creation. Yes; we can send our Naval Militia to man the sound steamers, and they can leave their counting houses some fine afternoon and go out and thrash the British Navy. The gentleman who spoke a few minutes ago says that we may wake up to-morrow and find the British fleet at the bottom of the sea and that we can "lick" what remains. Why, Mr. Chairman, there is no use in building a single battleship. We can swim and "lick 'em"! [Laughter and applause.]

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I am not a naval expert, neither am I a student of war conditions, and I do not propose to involve myself in an argument of that kind; but this House and the country is facing a serious financial condition. According to my estimates of the receipts for next year and the expenditures that are now proposed, the ordinary expenditures will exceed the receipts by some \$20,000,000. That is not due to a falling off in the revenue, because the additional revenue or emergency revenue bill that we passed last fall will supplement the revenues that we lose at the customhouses by reason of the war in Europe, but it is due to your increased appropriations. In addition to that—the deficit in ordinary expenditures—there will be a deficit in the Post Office Department, due to a falling off of postal receipts, of at least \$14,000,000, unless conditions change very much. Of course that condition has been brought about to a large extent by reason

of the war in Europe. Our foreign mail service is not paying the revenues to the Government that it has paid in the past, which is natural, and the cost of the service is practically the same. So that as this condition faces the country and the House, unless you are willing to retrench in expenditures, or unless when the next Congress meets you are willing to increase the taxation, you are going to face a deficit in the Treasury of something like \$35,000,000. That is a problem for this House to determine, as to whether or not you propose to go on increasing the expenditures, and when the time comes next year supplement that increase of expenditures by additional taxation, or whether you are willing to retrench in your expenditures.

This bill, as I understand it, carries appropriations for an increase in the Navy of some \$58,000,000. I believe that is seven or eight millions of dollars in excess of what the bill carried last year.

Mr. PADGETT. The authorization is \$53,000,000.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Fifty-three million dollars, with an excess of seven or eight millions over what was authorized last year. The question that confronts this House is as to whether or not you are willing to make some reasonable cuts in this bill or whether you think the exigencies that confront the country now justify you in increasing appropriations for armor and armament, notwithstanding the fact that you must, if you go on with your increases, levy additional taxes on the American people to meet these increases. As I say, I am not a naval expert, but I have always believed that the man who carries the pistol around in his back pocket is in very much greater danger of getting into trouble than the man who goes unarmed. [Applause.] I believe that if you propose to enter into a race of armaments because you believe you are behind other nations in your military forces and your naval equipment, the end of the story will mean war. [Applause.] I believe we ought to have a reasonable navy and a reasonable army, but I do not want to see my country have either a navy or an army that will invite us to make issues that may precipitate our people into the caldron of bloodshed and disaster. [Applause.]

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I do not like not to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HOBSON. I will make the question very brief. Would the gentleman surrender the Monroe doctrine and the open-door policy rather than to fight, or either of them?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I do not think the time will ever come when it will be necessary for this country to maintain the great principles of our fathers at the point of the sword. [Applause.] I have no fear whatever that my countrymen will maintain their position in this world, their position for what is right and what is just, and as long as we only maintain for our National Government a position of what is right and what is just, in my judgment we will succeed without the arbitrament to the battle field. [Applause.] But I believe that you can make a reasonable cut in the appropriations provided for in this bill without endangering your position in the family of nations and at the same time go a long way toward meeting the exigency of your Treasury Department.

I suggest that if you would cut out of this bill one battleship it would save for the next year \$5,678,000. If you cut out of this bill five submarines, it would save \$1,385,000.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Yes.

Mr. MANN. On the question of the battleship which is authorized this year, would there be \$6,000,000 expended on it in the next fiscal year?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I asked the chairman of the committee to give me the figures.

Mr. MANN. Of course, this bill carries an appropriation—

Mr. PADGETT. That is the authorization.

Mr. MANN. Would there be that much expended?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. There would be that much appropriation in the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the gentleman have more time.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have 10 minutes more.

Mr. MANN. I ask that the gentleman from Alabama proceed for 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. MANN. I did not suppose it was possible if the battleship was authorized now to expend \$6,000,000 upon it in the next fiscal year.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I will say to the gentleman that I am not an expert on these questions; and not being an expert, not having the knowledge myself, I asked the opinion of the chairman of the committee.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I wish the gentleman would yield for a moment in order that I may correct one of his statements. The gentleman stated that if we would strike out five submarines we would save between one and two million dollars. The testimony before our committee is that those submarines cost \$550,000 each, and five submarines knocked out of this bill would save nearly \$3,000,000.

Mr. PADGETT. That is authorization and not appropriation. The gentleman from Alabama is giving the figures as to the appropriation for the next year carried in this bill for the different authorizations.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. In other words, that the boats would not be finished entirely next year.

Mr. PADGETT. In other words, the authorization of a battleship is on a cost of about \$15,000,000, but of that amount we appropriate the first year only \$3,678,999.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I am not giving the figures which would ultimately be saved to the Government.

Mr. PADGETT. In regard to the submarines, each submarine is \$220,000 in construction and machinery and \$57,000 in armor and armament. That would be \$277,000 each, and five times that much for five submarines would be the gentleman's figures.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. The figures which I have here are those given to me at my request by the chairman of the committee. They do not represent the ultimate cost of these boats, but merely the saving which we would save next year. That is the point I have in mind. Now, if you cut out of the bill one hospital ship, you would save \$500,000. If you strike out the transport, you would save \$1,125,000 for next year, making a total that you can save in this bill in the construction of one battleship, five submarines, a hospital ship, and a transport, of \$8,688,000, or about the amount that you are increasing this bill over last year.

Mr. PADGETT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Yes.

Mr. PADGETT. The authorizations are about \$8,000,000 more; the appropriations are about \$4,000,000 more.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. What I say to the House is this: You are in no more danger of war to-day than you were when the naval appropriation bill was passed last winter a year ago. [Applause.] Evidently you are in less danger of war, because the various nations of Europe are locking horns between themselves, and if this Government pursues its own way wisely and safely, as I believe it will, under the administration of the President of the United States, we are in less danger of war than we have been for many years before. Now, as to the armament, I am no judge of what battleships we should build or what submarines, but I do know this, that the entire naval armament of the world is being tested to-day. The world is learning its first great lesson in the school of experience on the battle line, as to what ships are best to build and what ships in the future may be abandoned as worthless in naval affairs. Therefore it seems to me to-day is a wise time, and instead of increasing your appropriations at least to cut them down to what you have been appropriating in the past, and let the experience of Europe in this war teach you where you can wisely and most efficiently expend your money in the future. Now, before I take my seat I propose to offer an amendment to the pending amendment to strike out four battleships and make it one battleship.

SEVERAL MEMBERS. Two.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Well, there is an amendment to that; I expect to amend the amendment, so that the House may have an opportunity directly to vote upon this question. If I understand that the sentiment of the House is willing to have that reduction, I will then propose to cut down the submarine boats by five, which will reduce them to the number proposed, as I understand, by the naval authorities themselves; but, of course, if the sentiment of this House is to go on with this increase, why, then, I will have to submit, and will submit cheerfully.

Mr. PADGETT. Will the gentleman yield for just a moment?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I will.

Mr. PADGETT. The Secretary of the Navy recommended 8 submarines. The general board recommended 16 what we call coast-defense vessels, costing about \$550,000, and 3 large seagoing. The 12 of which the gentleman and myself were speaking, and my personal expression to him was made in

reference to what I had suggested to the committee, and that is where the 12 came in.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. The 12 would be at least in a mean between the general board's recommendation and the Secretary of the Navy. Now, in conclusion I only want to say this: Here is an opportunity where you can cut out of this bill between eight and nine million dollars without in any way affecting the efficiency of the public service. There is no imminent danger of war. On account of the conditions that have been brought about by the war in Europe in the Treasury Department you are facing a deficit unless you cut your appropriations, or unless you are willing to go to your constituencies and say that you propose to increase the burden of taxation on them in order that you can increase your expenditures. [Applause.]

Mr. BUTLER. Will the gentleman yield for just one question?

Mr. SHERWOOD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. SHERWOOD. As the gentleman says there is no danger of war and we have more battleships now than we know what to do with, why should not we cut out all the battleships and reduce the amount by \$15,000,000?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I will say to the gentleman from Ohio that if I were following my own desire in the matter I would cut out both battleships at the present time. [Applause.] But I want to accomplish something; I want to try to work out a plan that can succeed or has hopes of succeeding. Now, I know that there are a good many men in this House who would not be willing to go too far on such a program, but I think the exigencies of the Treasury Department are such that we ought to make an earnest effort to cut down some of these appropriations, and therefore I am willing to compromise on both sides of the House and strike a golden mean and leave one battleship in there if the House is willing to agree to a reasonable program.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has again expired.

Mr. BATHRICK. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 15 minutes on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio asks unanimous consent that he may proceed for 15 minutes.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I want to ask unanimous consent that debate on this paragraph and all amendments thereto close at 2 o'clock. That will be a half an hour, and we have already spent nearly three hours in debate on this question.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment which I desire to offer. I do not desire to speak on the number of ships, but I do desire to have five minutes to speak upon the speed of ships and to offer and speak upon an amendment which I offered, and which was carried four years ago, providing that they should have a speed at least equal to the highest speed of any battleship in the world. I desire to offer that amendment, and I must have five minutes' time in which to speak upon it. Will the gentleman from Tennessee yield me five minutes for that purpose?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will allow me just a moment. I failed to offer my amendment. If the committee will allow me, I would like to move to amend the amendment of the gentleman from Alabama by striking out "four" and inserting "one."

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Clerk will report the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD].

The Clerk read as follows:

Amend the amendment by striking out the word "four" and inserting in lieu thereof the word "one."

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. No other amendments are now in order. Two amendments have already been offered.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I offer a substitute for the amendment as amended.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, I demand the regular order.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks it is in order. The gentleman offers a substitute for the pending amendment.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I understood the gentleman wanted to move to strike out the paragraph. I think that would be in order.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. That is what I move to do—to strike out the paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be in order. The Clerk will report the amendment.



The Clerk read as follows:

Strike out the paragraph beginning with line 2 and ending with line 8 on page 64 of the bill.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I wish to modify my request. We have already been debating the matter about two and one-half hours now. I ask unanimous consent that debate upon this paragraph and all amendments thereto close at half past 2 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] asks unanimous consent that all debate on this paragraph and all amendments thereto close at half past 2 o'clock. Is there objection?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object.

Mr. GRAY. I reserve the right to object, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I take it that this is the main feature of the bill, probably.

Mr. PADGETT. Largely so; yes, sir.

Mr. MANN. We can finish the bill to-day and to-night, anyhow. Let us find out how much time the gentlemen want.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I will modify my request again and try to accommodate the Members as best I can. I ask unanimous consent that all debate upon this paragraph and all amendments thereto close in two hours.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee asks unanimous consent—

Mr. MANN. I would like to control an hour on this side.

Mr. PADGETT. I was going to leave it to the Chair to control.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair prefers the gentlemen shall control the time.

Mr. MANN. I would like to control an hour on this side.

Mr. PADGETT. That the gentleman from Illinois control one hour and I control the other. I will divide that time among the number applying for time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee asks unanimous consent that all debate on this paragraph close in two hours, one hour to be controlled by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN] and the other hour to be controlled by himself. Is there objection?

Mr. CULLOP. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I want 10 minutes to speak in support of my amendment, and I object unless I can get it.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi objects.

Mr. BATHRICK. He stated he would not object if he could get the time he asked for.

Mr. PADGETT. I move that debate on this paragraph and all amendments thereto close in two hours.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee moves that all debate on this paragraph and all amendments thereto close in two hours.

The question was taken, and the Chair announced that the ayes seemed to have it.

Mr. FOWLER and Mr. BATHRICK demanded a division.

The committee divided; and there were—ayes 66, noes 26.

So the motion was agreed to.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I may consume one hour of that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Illinois will control an hour and the gentleman from Tennessee an hour. [After a pause.] The Chair hears no objection.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that there is no quorum present.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois makes the point that there is no quorum present. The Chair will count. [After counting.] One hundred and thirty-six Members are present—a quorum. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] is recognized for one hour.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. I desire to offer an amendment to the paragraph. When will it be in order?

The CHAIRMAN. It will not be in order until the amendments now pending are disposed of.

Mr. HOBSON. A parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. MANN. As I understand, the committee gave me control of one hour.

Mr. HOBSON. That is what I wanted to ask about.

Mr. FOWLER. I object to anybody controlling any of the time except the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's objection comes too late. The Chair stated the proposition and nobody objected, and the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] is recognized for one hour.

Mr. FOWLER. A parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. FOWLER. There are Members on the floor who desire to offer amendments to this paragraph. I desire to know if there will be any opportunity given for the purpose of offering additional amendments and for debate thereon?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state to the gentleman from Illinois that there are now pending an amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] to strike out the paragraph and an amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON], and an amendment to that amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD], and until the last amendment is disposed of, no other amendment will be in order; but when that is disposed of, the gentleman will have an opportunity to offer an amendment.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I desire to ask the Chair if it is not parliamentary to offer an amendment to the substitute?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks not. The Chair thinks it might be in order to offer an amendment to perfect the paragraph, but two amendments are now pending for that purpose.

Mr. FOWLER. But is it not parliamentary to offer an amendment to the substitute?

The CHAIRMAN. It would be, but there is no substitute pending.

Mr. FOWLER. I understand that there is, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Chair understands otherwise. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] is recognized for an hour.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. FOWLER. I desire to have the privilege of offering a substitute for the amendment now pending.

The CHAIRMAN. But a substitute is not in order for the reason that there are two amendments now pending, and it is not in order to offer an amendment when two amendments are pending, a substitute being an amendment.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. BARKLEY. What are these two amendments that are now pending?

The CHAIRMAN. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] and the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD].

Mr. BARKLEY. Is it not true, Mr. Chairman, that the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] offered a substitute?

The CHAIRMAN. He offered an amendment to strike out the paragraph.

Mr. BARKLEY. That was in the form of a substitute, was it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Not at all. The other amendments are for the purpose of perfecting the paragraph, and they will be disposed of before the amendment of the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I understand that the rule adopted is that the debate on the paragraph and amendments to it will conclude in two hours. Does that cover the substitute I offered for the amendment?

The CHAIRMAN. It does. It covers the gentleman's amendment, together with all other amendments which have been offered and which may be offered. Now the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] is recognized for one hour.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. HELM].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. HELM] is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. HELM. Mr. Chairman, I am not assuming the attitude before this House of a military or naval expert. I am simply trying to apply some plain common sense to the conditions that I find exist from a careful reading of the newspapers. The first thing that attracts me in this morning's newspapers is that an ex-Secretary of the Navy states that the inefficiency of our Navy is due to politicians. Now, every Member of Congress knows the department must submit its estimates and recommend the type of ship, including speed, armor, and size of guns, and Congress has almost always followed the department's lead. The

Congress of the United States has been extremely liberal not only with the War Department but with the Navy Department in all of its requests. Neither of these departments can claim that they have not had ample funds. For the last 14 years, according to this statement coming from ex-Secretary of the Navy Meyer, the total appropriations for our Navy from 1900 to 1914 were \$1,656,000,000, while the appropriations for the same period for Germany's Navy were \$1,137,000,000.

We have not as effective a fighting organization in our Navy as Germany has in hers. Nobody would dare get on this floor and say that we can go into battle in anything like the state of efficiency that Germany stands to-day. Her navy is organized on a fighting basis. The combined navies of Great Britain and France can not protect their commerce against her.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Kentucky yield to the gentleman from Michigan?

Mr. HELM. Yes.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. One of the chief items of expense in our Army and Navy is the pay of the men.

Mr. HELM. My good friend, if you had been here at former sessions of Congress and heard me criticize the excessive pay and emoluments the officers in the Army have been getting, you would be convinced that you are mistaken. Why, Members have almost been ready to get up and fight because I have been contending for years that the War Department and the Navy Department had not an organization fitted for fighting purposes. It has not been so long since promotions in the Army were based on proficiency as a landscape gardener; the officer that kept his post in attractive order was advanced for that reason. That is the fight I have been trying to make and maintain here for several years. The difficulty is that these departments have not been directing their efforts to the business of building up a fighting machine, but the attention of the Army and the Navy has been directed to getting more pay and emoluments out of the United States Treasury and to the social equation. That has been the line of my fight.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Does the gentleman think the enlisted man gets too much or too little pay?

Mr. HELM. No; but the officers do.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. But the greater part of the expenditure is for the pay of the enlisted men.

Mr. HELM. Oh, no; you are dead wrong, my dear fellow. The pay for these officers of the Army and Navy runs up into millions and millions.

Now, I am trying to point out some of the defects that are so glaring that an unskilled and inexperienced layman as myself can see; the trouble is that everybody here seems to think that the whole problem depends on the number of battleships we have in the Navy and the number of soldiers we have in the Army, when the fact is that both armies and navies consist of a number of organizations perfected into a fighting machine. Please tell me, when gentlemen get up here and show that we have only one submarine that is capable of submerging, what fighting efficiency there is in that? It is an indictment of somebody. We have heard the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs go down the line and prove that while several of our submarines can be used for some purposes, only one of them is a perfect machine.

Whose fault is that? The department has been granted almost all the money it has asked for, yet the speed of our ships is too slow, according to a published statement of an ex-Secretary of the Navy, while the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER], if I understood him correctly, says our battleships are fitted out with torpedo tubes that never have been fired. Am I correct in that?

Mr. GARDNER. No. Does the gentleman want to know what I did say?

Mr. HELM. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. I quoted from the report of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Admiral Straus, in which he says:

At present all these vessels—

Referring to battleships anterior to the *Nevada* and *Oklahoma*—in other words, every battleship now complete—

all these vessels are equipped with a short-range torpedo, which may be considered obsolete for the battle fleet.

Mr. HELM. There you are. That is the kind of defect I am complaining about. Here is the gentleman from Alabama, Capt. Hobson, asking for the building of four more battleships, which, according to his own statement, will be supplied with ineffective 12-inch shells. He ought to know whether this statement is right or wrong. It is a serious statement and a vital matter. If our battleships have been supplied with shells

that are to all effects and purposes worthless, have we not incurred the risk of being compelled to go into a naval engagement with no ammunition at all? Whose fault is it, and where does the blame rest? These are some of the fatal defects that I am trying to point out and am trying to get before the attention of the House. [Applause.]

Mr. MANN. I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. HUMPHREY].

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, a few moments ago the distinguished leader of the majority [Mr. UNDERWOOD] made a plea for economy, and claimed, of course, that the condition of the Treasury was due to the war, and he is pleading for economy upon the ground that the Treasury is empty. Now, if the condition of the Treasury to-day is due to lack of customs revenues, I wish that the distinguished leader had stayed on the floor long enough to explain why it was that the customs revenues last year, as compared with January, 1913, decreased over \$5,000,000 seven months before the war. Was that due to the war in Europe? How did it happen that the customs revenues last February, six months before the war, decreased \$9,900,000? Was that due to the war in Europe? I wish that some of my mathematical friends on the other side of the aisle would figure out how we happen to have a deficiency of \$70,000,000 in the National Treasury due to the falling off of the customs revenues, due to the war, when the figures just issued by the Treasury Department show that our imports last year were only \$3,200,000 less than they were in 1913.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that there is no quorum present.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois makes the point of order that there is no quorum present. The Chair will count. [After counting.] One hundred and one Members present—a quorum.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, when the point of no quorum was made I had just asked that some mathematical genius arise and enlighten the world as to how we could lose \$70,000,000 of revenues upon \$3,200,000 worth of imports, one-half of which are on the free list.

Referring to the condition of the revenues for just a moment—in May, 1916, sugar will be on the free list, and we shall lose \$53,000,000 there. In 1916 the present so-called war tax will end, and we will lose \$54,000,000 there. Adding that to the present deficiency, and in 1916 we will have a deficiency of \$177,000,000 in the National Treasury. When this happens are you going to quit building a navy entirely? Instead of striking out a battleship would it not be better to place the tariff back upon sugar and revive that industry in the South, and take that much money away from the Sugar Trust and give it to the Government? Although we have already lost \$12,000,000 revenue on sugar, will any man on this floor rise and say that he has bought a pound of sugar for one cent less? Would it not be better to restore the duty upon wool and get \$15,000,000 into the National Treasury from that source rather than strike out a battleship? Will anyone claim we are buying clothes for less? What are you going to do? Are you going to leave this country without any protection simply because you have not the courage to enact a tariff bill that will produce the necessary revenue? My distinguished friend from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD] said that the man who carried a pistol is much more apt to get into a quarrel than one who does not. Perhaps that is true. It depends on circumstances. If somebody knew that I had in my home something that he wanted, and was determined to break into my house and get it, I would think I would be very much less apt to have trouble with that gentleman if I was armed and he knew it. China is to-day without a pistol. Shall we imitate her?

Now, I want to turn just for a moment to the Pacific coast. I asked my distinguished friend from Pennsylvania [Mr. BURLER] this morning—I am sorry he is not on the floor at this moment—how we would protect the Pacific coast if we had war to-day? His answer was that we were prepared to defend it. How? He did not tell you. On the Pacific coast it is not a question of adequate Navy. We have none there. There is now, and has been for years, but one battleship upon the Pacific. We do not have ample fortifications. The largest battle squadron in the world can go right up to the wharves at Bel-lingham, a town of 25,000 people, without coming within 15 miles of any gun, and there they can take control of three great transcontinental railroads. Do you tell me that is protection?

Mr. HENSLEY. Will the gentleman yield right there?

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Yes.

Mr. HENSLEY. The Pacific coast has not suffered any because of that situation, has it?

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. I do not know what the gentleman means by that.



Mr. HENSLEY. You say you have but one battleship over on the Pacific coast. I ask you whether the Pacific coast has suffered any because of that situation?

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Maybe not, but will the gentleman pretend to say that one battleship is sufficient protection for the Pacific coast? Is that the argument he wants to make?

Mr. HENSLEY. Has it not been sufficient?

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Oh, yes; and we need not have had any Navy on that theory. Why do we need a navy on the Atlantic coast if that argument is good?

Mr. HENSLEY. Why are you so frightened about it right now?

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. I will not stop to answer so absurd a proposition as that. The gentleman stands as the best illustration of the valor of ignorance that I have ever witnessed.

Mr. HENSLEY. "Upon what meat doth this our Caesar feed that he is grown so great?"

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. I do not feed on the same that the gentleman does, for I would not make the exhibition of myself on the floor of this House that he has made. If the gentleman wants to interrupt again, why, let him come ahead.

Now, Mr. Chairman, when we talk about protection upon the Pacific coast the reply always made so far has been that we do not need to fortify those cities, because they have told us that an unfortified city would not be attacked in time of war.

We have seen the answer to that in Europe. We know that if we had a war the great cities of the Pacific coast, if the enemy could reach them, would be captured and placed under tribute. But the reply they make is that we have our battleship squadron which can be sent through the Panama Canal to the Pacific coast. What are the facts about that? You let war be declared to-morrow, and if it was with Japan and she was prepared exactly as we are prepared—and the presumption is that she would be in much better shape because she would know that she was going to declare war; but suppose she is in no better shape than we are—a battleship squadron from Japan would reach Puget Sound two weeks before you could possibly get our squadron there. What protection would our battleship squadron be to the Pacific coast two weeks after the Japanese squadron had been there? Gentlemen who make the statement ought to study their geography. Take down your map and look at it, and you will see that from Panama, when you are through the canal, to Seattle is almost the same distance as it is from Seattle to Yokohama. We must have a squadron through the canal and on the Pacific Ocean before we would be on equal terms with a squadron starting from Japan.

Gentlemen apparently lose sight of that. We on the Pacific coast have always supported the naval bill but have not received any benefits from it. We have been left absolutely unprotected. We believe that we are still a part of the Union. We think that when we are paying the taxes we ought to receive some consideration. There is not a man on the floor of this House on either side who will stand up in his place now and for one moment say that the Pacific coast is protected from attack. The only thing they say is, "Oh, we can defend the Pacific." How? These boasts do not have much weight. I sometimes think that that class of men—unintentionally, of course—honest, patriotic as any of us, who talk this way, who say that we can raise a million men overnight and that we could defeat any enemy without guns or ammunition; who say, as the gentleman from Massachusetts said; who think that we could swim out and sink these fleets—while they are sincere, I think they are doing the country great injury. If statements of that kind were made by a foreigner, how quickly you would resent it and reach the conclusion that they were doing that only to throw us off our guard. As one man from the Pacific coast, I believe that the only protection to that coast, the greatest guaranty of peace, is in the Navy. I do not advocate a great standing Army, although I would like to see it larger than it now is; but to spend a reasonable amount for the Navy, as a protection for the Pacific coast, is the best guaranty for peace. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I make the point that no quorum is present.

Mr. MANN. I hope the gentleman will withhold his point of order for a moment.

Mr. FOWLER. I will withhold it.

Mr. MANN. I had figured upon giving 5 minutes more to the gentleman from Washington, but as he does not want it I will be glad to yield it to my colleague from Illinois.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois yields 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER].

Mr. HOBSON. And the chairman has yielded 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER], which makes 10 minutes. I ask the gentleman from Illinois if he will not withdraw his point of no quorum in the interest of expediting business?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Tennessee yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I renew my point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois makes the point of order that no quorum is present. The Chair will count. [After counting.] One hundred and one Members are present—a quorum.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, just at this point, while Members are here, I want to make a suggestion. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER] has notified me that he intends to make continued points of no quorum. I am going to ask the House to remain in session to-night until we pass this bill. If Members will stay here and maintain a quorum, it will expedite the passage of the bill. If they do not remain here, it will be just that much more inconvenience for Members and will delay the adjournment to-night. I hope that Members will stay on the floor and avoid that necessity.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I understand from the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER] that I am to have the 5 minutes which the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN] yielded to him. I will yield to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER] 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understood the gentleman from Illinois to yield 5 minutes to his colleague from Illinois.

Mr. PADGETT. I am to have the 5 minutes that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN] yielded to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER].

Mr. MANN. What is that?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands the chairman of the committee proposes to yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER], provided the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN] yields him the 5 minutes that he yielded to Mr. FOWLER.

Mr. MANN. I decline to do that.

Mr. PADGETT. Then, Mr. Chairman, I have yielded my time and I have only 5 minutes remaining, which I yield to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER].

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, we have just witnessed a most wonderful performance on the floor of this House. This paragraph provides for two battleships, but the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] has offered an amendment for four. We have debated this amendment for more than an hour, and now it is proposed to debate it for two hours more, and at the end of that time the debate upon this paragraph and all amendments thereto is to be closed.

Mr. Chairman, there are Members here on the floor of the House who believe that our Navy is weak and inefficient because of the slowness of our war vessels and a failure to equip them with high explosive shells. We have been led to believe that when we reached this paragraph we would be given an opportunity to offer amendments and ample time to debate these important features, but by the action of the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs [Mr. PADGETT], aided by a few men of his type, we are deprived of such opportunity. Now in order to allay our outraged feelings he and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN] generously propose to yield to us 10 minutes in which to present our views. Our disappointment can only be measured by our bitter contempt for such conduct, and I denounce it as an outrage not only upon the American Navy but upon the American people. Such offer to contribute this crumb of time to me is no inducement to me to keep quiet while wrongs are being committed against the welfare of my country. I would not consent to the compromise of any matter, however great or important to me personally, if in doing so it carried with it the compromise of my own honor or the honor of my country.

Mr. Chairman, it is well known, not only in America, but to the people throughout the civilized countries of the world, that the speed of the American Navy drops down so low that it becomes a tub as compared with the other navies of the world. The speed of our dreadnaughts will not average more than 14 to 18 knots. The greatest speed claimed for any of them is 21 knots, while most of them have a much less speed; whereas the speed of the dreadnaught type of other countries such as Great Britain, Germany, Japan, Russia, and even the least country which claims to be a naval power, Italy, is 25 knots. Yet our tub Navy drags along year after year under the influence of a spell thrown over Congress which is like the spell thrown over the king and his audience at the appearance of Banquo's ghost. From what source this spell comes I am unable

to say, but when I was a member of the Illinois Legislature I saw spells come over that body, and when I saw leading Democratic members and leading Republican members hugging and kissing each other in and about the capitol and walking leisurely in arms to the hotels it meant the planning for and final division of a jack pot.

Mr. Chairman, there is an invisible force, an undercurrent influence which permeates some of the greatest affairs of our Government. The Armor Trust has played its part most skillfully, and the only man in the Department of the Navy who has ever had enough courage to beard this lion in his den was Hon. H. A. Herbert, Secretary of the Navy under Mr. Cleveland, until the present Secretary of the Navy, Hon. Josephus Daniels, arrived on the scene. In both of his annual reports he denounced this infamous, mottled, and many-angled concern as a highwayman, criminally holding him up in naval contracts.

Mr. Chairman, some of the Members of Congress have been studying the philosophy of modern naval engagements abroad and have come to the conclusion that we should not only increase the speed of our war vessels but that we should equip them with high-explosive shells, and we are anxious to offer amendments at this juncture, as it is the only place in the bill which will permit such amendments to be offered without encountering the shoals of points of order, which would be promptly made and which would be just as promptly sustained, but by an arrangement which has been perfected by the influence of the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs we are absolutely cut off from offering an amendment for that purpose. Members on the other side of the aisle wanted to offer such amendments—

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FOWLER. Yes; I always yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BUTLER. I thank the gentleman very much. Does the gentleman know that those fast battle cruisers cost \$22,000,000 each?

Mr. FOWLER. No; I do not know it; but on the other hand I have consulted experts, as great experts as live in this country, and they say that if those two vessels that we are about to authorize were constructed on the battle-cruiser type we would save \$3,000,000.

Mr. BUTLER. That is not according to the information given to us.

Mr. FOWLER. That is the report I received, and I submitted the question to one of the greatest naval experts in the world. Mr. Chairman, if the American Congress could get a fair opportunity to debate the question of the speed and character of the explosives on these two vessels I have no doubt but that we would find a majority on the floor of the House to-day in favor of both increasing the speed and supplying them with high-explosive shell.

#### HIGH SPEED IS THE LIFE OF A NAVY.

Mr. Chairman, about a dozen years ago Great Britain began to increase the speed of her warships. Up to that time her battleships had a speed of 17 and 18 knots. Her armored cruisers had a speed of 20 to 22 knots. This was practically the speed of the battleships and armored cruisers of the naval powers of the world, such as Germany, United States, France, Japan, Russia, and Italy. Apparently no effort had been made prior to this date to excel in speed, naval genius having been employed in a desperate struggle to produce on the one hand an armor plate so thick and so tough that it could not be penetrated by a projectile, while on the other side an equally desperate effort had been made to produce a shell which could penetrate the most perfect armor. This rivalry developed the kruppized nickel armor and the armor-piercing shell; both sides were claiming the victory.

Just about this time two high-explosive shells made their appearance in naval circles. They were both invented by Americans—Gathman and Isham. Gathman used gun cotton as an explosive and Isham used trinitrotoluol. Each of these inventors claimed that his shell could be thrown out of a gun at long range and that on striking a vessel it would explode and sink the ship.

In 1907 Great Britain decided to drop the armored cruiser and planned the construction of the battle cruiser with a high speed. Critics, not only in Great Britain but in all naval circles, condemned this new type of warship. The advantages of this new ship are summed up in an editorial by the editor of the Naval and Military Record, a British weekly magazine, page 72. I quote the last paragraph:

"We owe the critics of the battle cruiser a debt of gratitude. Despite their activity they did not succeed in deflecting the admiralty from its policy except for a very short period, when money was scarce and the needs of the navy in other directions

insistent. The naval authorities persisted in the construction of battle cruisers, and, happily, the Dominions provided two others, raising the total number to 10. And then, at last, in the *Queen Elizabeth* class they evolved the apotheosis of the battle cruiser in which, owing to the substitution of oil for coal and the consequent saving of weight, we obtained a ship with a speed exceeding that of any large cruiser in the world in combination with gun power and armament superior to those of any other battleships built or building for service under any foreign flag. The debt which we owe to critics of the battle cruiser rests upon the assumption that they were in some measure responsible for the failure of other naval powers to imitate our policy and build battle cruisers. The only two nations which realized the value of this type were Germany and Japan. Fortunately, the enemy laid down only one vessel every year, and equally fortunately her strength in effective ships of this class has from one cause and another been steadily reduced. The *Goeben* is lost; the *Von der Tann*, if not lost, is missing; and the *Seydlitz* and *Derfflinger* are evidently out of action for several months. On the other hand, we still possess almost unimpaired the immense advantage which our margin of strength in vessels of this type confers upon us."

Germany soon followed Great Britain and Japan came in later on, and now Russia has four battle cruisers ordered for 1916. At the beginning of the European war Great Britain had 10 of these fast cruisers, with a speed of 27 to 35 knots. Germany had 5, with 3 more ordered, with a speed of 27 to 29 knots. Japan had 2 and 2 building, with a speed of 27 and 28 knots. Besides, Great Britain has increased her dreadnaughts to 25 knots. She now has 4 completed and 4 more building. Germany has increased hers to 23 knots, Italy has increased hers to 25 knots, and Japan and France have increased theirs to 22 knots. United States has stood still.

Just what success may be attained by a fleet of fast vessels can be more accurately ascertained by turning our attention to the naval engagements which have taken place between the British and German fleets since last July. Two decisive battles have been fought. One off the coast of Falkland Islands and the other on the North Sea.

In the battle off Falkland Islands the German fleet consisted of five vessels. The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, armored cruisers, with a speed of 22 knots, the *Leipzig*, a cruiser, and *Nürnberg*, auxiliary cruiser, both of low speed, were all sunk. The British fleet was made up of fast battle cruisers, among which were the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, with a speed of 28 knots. It is reported that the *Lion*, of 31 knots, was also there. It was a fight between low speed and little guns and high speed and big guns. The result was a complete victory for high speed and big guns.

In the battle on the North Sea the British and German fleets were more evenly matched in point of speed and guns. The Germans had four big ships, one armored cruiser, the *Blücher*, of 26 knots, and three battle cruisers, the *Seydlitz* and the *Derfflinger*, of 27 knots each, and the *Moltke*, with 28 knots. The British fleet had at least five battle cruisers, the *New Zealand*, 26 knots, the *Indomitable*, 28 knots, the *Tiger*, 29 knots, the *Lion*, 31 knots, and the *Princess Royal*, 34 knots. The *Blücher* was the slowest German ship in the fight, and she was the only ship that was sunk. Twenty-six knots proved to be too slow in a running fight and emphasizes the advantage of high speed over low speed.

Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty was in command of the English fleet, and in his report of the battle, found on page 70 of the Naval and Military Record of England, February 3, 1915, he says: "The situation developed by degrees into a stern chase. Speed was worked up to 28 and 29 knots, and the enemy were gradually being overhauled. At about 18,000 yards slow and deliberate fire was opened, and we began to hit at a range of 17,000 yards. \* \* \* The result of the action was the *Blücher* sunk and two other battle cruisers very heavily on fire and seriously damaged." On page 71 of the same periodical, under the head of "The naval outlook," a French correspondent says: "The new victory of Admiral Beatty \* \* \* is held to be a striking confirmation of the lesson of the battle of the Falkland Islands, once more demonstrating that speed, combined with superior caliber, enables the admiral that possesses such assets to force an unwilling enemy to fight and select the range at which crushing concentration of fire can be best realized with the maximum of results and the minimum risk."

Mr. Chairman, the Scientific American of February 6, 1915, page 128, in commenting on the efficiency of the American Navy, says:

"The predreadnaught, because of its slow speed and inferior gun power, would be unable to stand up in the battle



line against modern dreadnaughts. \* \* \* It would seem that our Navy has at last come around to the recognition of the great strategic and practical value of the fast and heavily armed battle cruisers which undoubtedly have done the most work thus far in naval warfare."

The wish of the author of this language certainly is father to the thought, for as a matter of fact no such policy has been recommended by the Department of the Navy or the Committee on Naval Affairs. Many of us have been fighting for such a policy for the last four years, but those who have had charge of the appropriation bills for the Navy have invariably used their skill and power to defeat us, and they have succeeded in doing so.

All other naval powers have fast battle cruisers with a speed ranging from 25 to 35 knots, and ordinary common sense and patriotism demand that we should have them; and we would have them if Congress could free itself from the paralyzing influence of the armor trust. The Scientific American, on the same page referred to above, says:

"In addition to the vessels shown, the United States Navy includes 18 old cruisers of various out-of-date types, vessels which if used for makeshift scouts would be in danger of destruction by the swift and powerfully armed modern scouts and high-speed battle cruisers, of which the leading foreign nations possess so many."

In an editorial of January 26, 1915, the Washington Post, in commenting upon the results of this unfortunate event, under the heading "Big guns and swift ships most perfect defense," said:

"Sunday's encounter between British and German warships in the North Sea was a fair, open fight, with the opponents fairly well matched. The victory went to the British fleet because of large guns and because one of the German battle cruisers was overmatched in speed. \* \* \* Admiral Cradock's big ships went down before heavier guns off the Chilean coast. Admiral von Spee, who defeated him, was in turn defeated, losing his squadron and his life off the Falkland Islands, when he encountered heavier guns and speedier ships. Now, the German squadron in the North Sea is beaten by speedier ships with bigger guns."

"Is any more evidence required by Congress as to the kind of vessels that should be provided for the United States Navy? Great Britain and Germany have furnished an object lesson to the United States that is priceless if heeded. The strongest and most effective defense that the United States can provide is a Navy of swift ships mounting the largest guns that can be turned out."

Mr. Chairman, it is said that the chameleon, a lizard-like animal of Africa, often becomes agitated, one portion of his body trying to go one way and the other part trying to go another way, which renders him unable to move at all. This more clearly represents the attitude of those charged with responsibility of furnishing America with an efficient navy.

#### HIGH EXPLOSIVE SHELLS.

Mr. Chairman, it is well known to all naval experts that high-explosive shells can be successfully used in naval warfare. In the present European war they have been employed by all of the warring nations, both on land and sea, and have proved to be the most destructive of all other projectiles. These shells were first used by Japan in naval warfare at the battle of Tsushima in 1905. In this battle Russia had eight battleships supplied with armor-piercing shells, while Japan had only four battleships, but equipped with high-explosive shells. By this advantage Japan was able to destroy the Russian fleet with but little damage to her own fleet.

In a target practice in 1911 at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay one high-explosive shell was sufficient to sink the *Puritan*. In November, 1913, the British navy, in a target practice, the *Empress of India* being used as the target, at a range of 17,000 yards, tore holes like great lock gates in her sides by high-explosive shells. In the siege of Liege in 1914 one high-explosive shell, thrown at long range from a big siege gun by the Germans, destroyed a mighty fort and killed 150 men.

Mr. Chairman, both the army and navy of every important country in the world are supplied with these modern high-explosive shells. But neither the Army or Navy nor the coast defense of America is supplied with them, yet they were invented by an American, who has offered us the use of his patent without cost. Admiral Strauss, chief of the Bureau of Naval Ordnance, says they are dangerous and without practical virtue, overestimated, and a delusion. This in the face of the tests which we have made with marvelous results—the destruction of the Russian fleet by Japan in 1905 by high-explosive shells, and the dreadful wholesale destruction of the strongest

forts in the world during the present European war. Admiral, you had better get your ear to the ground. Something is going to happen.

#### THE TORPEDO DIVING SHELL.

At the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay a few days ago, Mr. Chairman, I witnessed a most wonderful test with a torpedo diving shell, fired from a 12-inch gun with a velocity that would give it a range equal to the longest range at which a ship can be seen. When this shell struck the water it did not ricochet like other shells, but it took the water and ran forward 100 to 200 feet and then exploded, throwing up a large column of water, as a submarine mine would do. Had it encountered a war vessel in its path it would have exploded immediately upon striking it. I was informed by a naval expert who was present that former tests made with this shell demonstrated that an impact with the thinnest plate on a torpedo boat, or even a periscope of a submarine boat, was sufficient to cause the shell to explode immediately.

This marvelous experiment proves that this shell is destined to open up a new field in naval warfare. Henceforth torpedo shells may be fired through the air with the range and accuracy of other shells, and in addition to the deadly effect which will result on striking the vessel of the enemy, they may be made to strike the water in front of the vessel and dive under it and then explode against the most tender parts of the vessel with the most deadly effects. Mines may be planted by guns at long range.

The advent of the torpedo diving shell will render armor plate less useful, since it attacks a ship where it is not and can not be protected by armor. Moreover, the underwater part of a ship is a much larger target than that protected by armor; hence the probability of hitting a ship in its most tender parts and destroying it is much greater than the probability of hitting the armored parts. These tests demonstrate that a torpedo shell is available that will destroy any kind of a ship, from the heaviest dreadnaught down to the smallest torpedo boat or submarine, without even hitting them, and independent of their armor protection.

I am informed, Mr. Chairman, that it is the intention to charge these shells with trinitrotoluol, an explosive which, I understand, is perfectly safe. Now, if the Department of the Navy will supply the 28 battleships which the General Board of the Navy says are outranged and defenseless against fast ships having heavier guns in foreign navies with torpedo shells, the efficiency of the Navy may be vastly improved at a very small cost. If the Department of the Navy is sincere in its demand for greater battleship strength, it can be secured at once by supplying our old ships with these torpedo diving shells, thereby adding to our Navy fighting strength which is not possessed by any other navy in the world.

Mr. Chairman, on looking into the history of the high-explosive shell, I find it has been before Congress and this country for about 16 years. That during this period the advantages of fast warships equipped with these shells have been continuously urged by the inventor. Other countries recognizing the advantage of these modern inventions have built fast ships and equipped them with high-explosive shells, while we have adhered to a policy which has made our Navy the laughingstock of naval experts and the eyesore of those responsible for its inefficiency. The torpedo, the mine, the submarine, the turreted battleship, and nearly every other valuable invention in naval warfare are the inventions of Americans, and this crowning invention, the torpedo diving shell, which supplements all of these, is the invention of an American—Mr. Isham—and he should not only have credit for it, but America should have the advantage of appropriating its use to the exclusion of all other nations.

Like the great Ericsson, Mr. Isham is an engineer. He has gained international distinction in his profession by his works in three countries, and it is as an engineer rather than as an inventor that he has developed his new and wonderful system of attack. In unprejudiced circles Mr. Isham stands very high, and in order that Congress may give more attention to his splendid ideas with a view of securing his inventions for the benefit of our Navy I hereby quote what I recently heard an admiral of our Navy say concerning his ability, which was this: "I regard him"—meaning Mr. Isham—"as the highest authority in the United States on the use of high-explosive shells and their use in warfare."

Should America, through her Congress and Navy Department, fail to take the advantages of this shell and permit it to fall into the hands of other nations, it would certainly be a big blunder, if not a crime.

Mr. Chairman, those who have been charged with the responsibility of furnishing America with an efficient, up-to-date Navy must certainly begin to feel the weight of public criticism



during these troublesome times of wholesale bloodshed. They know that speed, long-range guns, torpedo shells, and torpedo diving shells are elements of strength. All of these are within easy reach and a failure to incorporate them in the future additions to our Navy will be good cause for retirement from public life. The nation which attains superiority in the speed of her ships, in the size and range of her guns, and in the size and explosive force of her shells will be able to control the high seas and dictate the commercial policy of the world.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GREEN].

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, a few years ago it was common to brag of our Navy, and Fourth of July orators often expressed unbounded confidence in our ability to "whip all creation." I never was in accord with this boastful spirit, which so often gave just offense to foreign nations, and if the only effect of the statements of those who defend a larger Navy was to silence these empty vaporings and raise the standard of efficiency in our fleets the result would be highly beneficial. Unfortunately, there are many critics of the Navy who are neither temperate nor accurate. Alarmists in the press and pessimists in Congress have assumed that a great conflict was impending and have gloomily predicted that in case of war our fleet would be annihilated, our coast towns bombarded, our territory invaded, and our national existence only saved by the payment of an immense ransom. The country at large has been astounded and terrified by these reckless assertions. Many whose opinion of the real conditions is based upon these erroneous statements have been clamoring for large additions to the Army and Navy, and, without stopping to think that the cost would not be confined to millions of dollars, but would run into billions, have demanded that we should have a Navy powerful enough to overcome that of any other nation.

Mr. Chairman, I can not claim to have had experience in the Navy, like the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON], but I do not belong to the list of those who do not know how many dreadnaughts we have in our own Navy, nor what their armament is, and who have been referred to by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER]. I have, as the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] suggested, made some study of these matters in the light of history and past events, and in the light of the lessons as I read them a conflict with England is so highly improbable as to be practically impossible, and a conflict with Japan is so many years away as to make it a remote possibility indeed. If England desired a war with this country, this is not the time that she would seek it. She had her opportunity many years ago, when we ourselves invited it. During a prior Democratic administration, that of Mr. Cleveland, we issued to England, through the message of the President, what was practically an ultimatum on a subject as to which it afterwards developed we were entirely in error if not absolutely in the wrong. At that time our Navy was weak indeed. England's Navy was then so much more powerful than ours as to make our fleet insignificant in comparison. No other international complications at that time troubled England. There was no danger that any other country would make war upon her. An unparalleled opportunity was then presented had England desired to have war with this Nation. This opportunity will never again present itself. England is now engaged in a conflict which will drain her resources for years to come and put war with us out of consideration. It was fortunate for us at that time that England did not call the bluff that we made, for it was more or less of a bluff; and it was fortunate also for England herself, because a conflict between this great Nation and that other great nation would not only be a calamity to the vanquished, but in only a lesser degree a calamity to the victor.

Our Navy is, indeed, much inferior to that of England—so much so that it is doubtful whether it would be possible for us to overtake that nation even if we put no limit upon expenditure. But we do not need such a navy any more than we need forts along the boundary line between us and Canada. The English Government has announced that it does not take into consideration the possibility of a war with this Nation, and we do not need to prepare for it.

It has been intimated that we are in danger of conflict with Japan. Japan is a poor nation, and is to-day in the throes of a financial and industrial depression. It is in urgent need of money, but it is so deficient in resources that its people are to-day groaning under the weight of taxation with which they are oppressed. Count Okuma in a recent public address said that the present war was a great financial and economic injury. When her last Parliament recently added \$50,000,000 to their budget in order to pay the expenses of the war in which she is now engaged, the action precipitated a riot

on the streets of Tokyo, and the ministry was compelled to resign. The Emperor dissolved the Parliament and new elections were called, to the end that some method might be devised to lessen the national burdens.

Let me say in this connection also, as showing the determination of England not to enter into conflict with us, that while Japan's alliance with England is both offensive and defensive, when Japan protested against the action of California, England had the United States excepted from the treaty which created this alliance in case of war between us and Japan.

Why it should be thought that in the midst of her financial difficulties Japan is seeking to cross swords with a nation like our own, which has a much stronger Navy and resources so much greater, is difficult to comprehend. Japan does not need more territory. It now has Korea, Formosa, and half of the great island of Sakhalin, only partially developed. There is plenty of room in these regions for its surplus population, and its statesmen realize that its future greatness must depend not so much upon its career in war as in the development of the arts of peace. It seems to be thought that it is a comparatively easy task for Japan to sail some 4,000 or 5,000 miles across the Pacific Ocean and attack our western coast. All naval experts have pronounced it to be a stupendous undertaking. Japan has not a single naval base on the way. It has no opportunity to replenish its navy, to keep up its supplies, and satisfactorily provide for its ships on that long voyage. An expedition of that kind would be of a nature that has never been undertaken in all the history of war—and, in my judgment, never will be. Let me say in this connection also, since gentlemen talk so easily of hostile fleets bombarding our coasts, that never in the history of modern naval warfare has any commander attempted or even thought of placing his vessels under the fire of half-way efficient coast defenses.

Even in the war which we had with Spain none of our admirals ever thought for a moment of putting his fleet under the fire of such antiquated fortifications as existed at Havana.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. I will.

Mr. GARDNER. Was not that because they could land at Santiago?

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Oh, no. If we could have bombarded Havana we would have done so and forced its surrender.

Mr. GARDNER. But did not, because there were plenty of other places to land.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Not at all.

Mr. GARDNER. That is what Admiral Fletcher said in his testimony.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. He was speaking of another matter.

Gentlemen seem to talk as if there was no way of protecting Puget Sound from the attack of a hostile fleet. They say that its fortifications are insufficient. If this is so, they should make a plea to the committee on fortifications.

Puget Sound presents a region that is most highly adapted for mining and can be fully protected in that way. Gentlemen remember that in the recent battle in the North Sea the British fleet stopped 70 miles from Helgoland on account of the mines and submarines, and yet the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] talks of a hostile fleet not merely making some raid on an unprotected place, like the Germans made on England, but actually capturing our naval stations without any efficient resistance.

I know the gentleman has had the benefit of actual experience in warfare, but a much higher officer, one of our admirals, who has had a much longer and more varied experience, has testified that our ports are actually overfortified; yet it is assumed that a hostile fleet could run past the forts without injury and disregard the mines and submarines. Let us look abroad for some lessons. The English fleet is far superior to that of Germany, yet it never ventures in sight of the German coast, and its commanders have adopted the only safe and practical policy. In this connection I observe that some gentlemen have airily spoken of an enemy's fleet landing a great army upon our open coast as if it were some easy and trifling matter. Mr. Chairman, a fleet of transports engaged as it would be for days in landing an army by small boats would afford the finest target for submarines that could possibly be imagined. Gentlemen forget, also, that warships can not successfully defend such a fleet against an equal hostile force. No naval commander would think of organizing such an expedition until our vessels of war had been defeated and at least half of them sent to the bottom of the ocean.

I do not wish to overlook Germany. It is said that her navy is more powerful than ours. This may be, although it is a matter of some dispute. Offensively our fleets can fire a heavier



broadside, although their tonnage is less; and the effects of the present war, of which I wish to say more later, are rapidly being manifested. Since the war began, Germany has lost 45 armed vessels altogether and about 20 of her regular navy, among which were her best armored cruisers. She has more dreadnaughts than we, but our battleships are more numerous and more powerful. More than this, the German Navy was evidently not built for a campaign across the ocean. Something like 20 of her battleships do not carry enough coal to enable them to safely cross in war times. Germany has, it is true, more fast ships, but our Navy was built to fight and not to run away; to defend our coasts, not to chase merchant vessels.

It is not necessary, however, that I should pursue these comparisons. From every point of view, Mr. Chairman, we are less in danger of war than at any time since our national existence began.

We are most happily situated. We have no territory that any other nation seeks to possess, and we neither need nor covet the possessions of any other nation. However much we may disagree as to the cause of the great conflict now raging in Europe, we must all agree that whatever may have been its cause it has no connection or relation to our situation. A wide expanse of ocean separates us from the great powers, and thousands of miles of water make a barrier superior to any fortifications.

Why, Mr. Chairman, should any nation desire a conflict with us? Assuming that there is some nation animated by a spirit of aggression which seeks new fields to conquer, why should it select one of the greatest and most powerful countries of the world as an easy victim? In the continent south of us are found other and smaller nations, with cities second only to New York and Chicago in population, abounding in wealth, yet with an army inferior to our own and a navy which could not oppose an effectual resistance. Here, also, are vast regions but little populated, which seem to invite rather than repel invasion, yet none of the nations of South America seem to be in fear of aggression. Some may say that this is because of the Monroe doctrine, which binds us to protect them; but all of these nations have manifested a desire to repudiate this principle. They do not ask for our protection, and the fears and terrors of invasion which seem to excite so many of our people are entirely wanting among them, for they believe they are able to protect themselves.

Situated as we are with reference to other nations, there must be somewhere a golden mean between those who want the strongest navy in the world and those who think it already larger than is necessary. The true rule, I consider to be, that our Navy need not be large enough for the purpose of aggression, nor should it be so small that it could not be relied upon for defense. The two dreadnaughts provided for in this bill will cost \$15,000,000 each and \$1,000,000 each year they are in service. But surely we can afford, and ought to have, a better navy than so poor a nation as Japan, and if we are to preserve our superiority we must make some additions. The value of the submarine, particularly as a weapon of defense, has been demonstrated, and we should add the 16 provided by the bill, together with the large seagoing submarine. The additions to the Navy provided by the bill are reasonable, and should not be reduced.

The great powers of Europe are now engaged in a life-and-death struggle, into which each is now casting the last man and the last dollar. This frightful cataclysm has already absorbed the flower of the youth of each nation and strained their financial resources to the point of breaking. The torch of war has left smoking ruins of great cities and spread devastation through smiling lands. The German casualties to date have been over 2,000,000, and the allies, including prisoners, have lost far more. The cost to Great Britain for war expenses is about \$10,000,000 a day, to Germany perhaps a little less, but the total loss to the five great powers, including commercial losses, is now estimated at the staggering sum of \$25,000,000,000. Apparently it must continue until both sides are utterly exhausted. In any event the victors in such a war can not recover for half a century.

Mr. Chairman, among these warring nations there is scarcely a household that is not in mourning; there is not a business, profession, or occupation that is not crushed with the burdens of war taxes; each day chronicles the failure of more business houses; each hour extends further the long list of the dead and dying. Can anyone believe any of these belligerents now wishes to add another nation to its opponents? Will it be claimed that when this war ends any will be so bereft of sense and reason as to plan to attack the one great power whose resources in men and money are as yet untouched? Should we

not, on the contrary, expect that when it ends they will turn their attention again to peaceful pursuits and seek to restore their shattered resources?

Mr. Chairman, it is fortunate indeed that we as a people have never been imbued with the spirit of aggrandizement, for if we were inclined to aggression a navy more powerful than that of most nations would be an incentive to war. In the final analysis all our greatest protection against war must be in our capacity to act justly and deal honorably as a nation. We should be big and strong morally as well as physically if we would avoid conflict, and our size should never lead us to impose on weaker nations. Thus may we lead the march of nations, not in war's cruelties and barbarities, but in the arts of peace and in the cause of morality and religion. Then when new generations view our wonderful prosperity and happiness, in contrast with nation-wide wreck and ruin—the only result of the sacrifice of countless lives—they will turn in horror from another conflict of nations, and this will be the last great war.

Mr. PADGETT. I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BATHRICK].

Mr. BATHRICK. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a startling statement to this House, and I want to make it in the brief time given me. I want to invite your attention to this diagram which I have drawn on cardboard, and I will show you how to take 12 of the obsolete battleships and put them in as a live part of our efficient fighting force. We put in the bill the other day an amendment to compel the Navy Department to cease purchasing 12-inch armor-piercing shells until they had proven that these 12-inch shells could penetrate 10 inches of armor at a distance of 12,000 yards. Now, let us see how the armor-piercing shell acts on the water. This diagram is supposed to illustrate the armor-piercing shell fired from this gun, pointed to strike the water near the vessel that is fired at. If it strikes the water at this point, it ricochets over the vessel. If it does not ricochet, it explodes instantly on contact with the water, and the shot is lost. It is a miss. Suppose this armor-piercing shell hits. This is the angle of the trajectory, and you see it comes over and strikes at an angle to the armor; it does not strike the armor plate squarely. We have been experimenting at Indianhead with different charges of powder, firing armor-piercing shells for years. By these experiments at short distances they got a theoretical trajectory, and because they pierced through armor plate under experimental conditions they have considered for years that they could pierce armor plate at 6 miles' distance, or 12,000 yards; but when they experimented by actually shooting these shells at 12,000 yards they could not pierce the armor.

Our subcommittee on armor and armament of the Committee on Naval Affairs and others saw this; it is of record, and everyone should be willing to admit it. Nevertheless, it is insisted that we must go on building millions of dollars worth of those armor-piercing shells of the same alleged type that they have been using. We want them to experiment with this explosive shell, which we have demonstrated will do as shown in this diagram. Notice this trajectory [indicating]. Suppose this shell strikes near the target; it will run on the water, and will not ricochet, and then it will sink and explode. If it explodes within 15 or 20 feet of the vessel—and this has been experimented with and proven—it will cave in that part of the vessel below the water line. Again, if it hits the vessel fairly, it will explode 180 pounds of a powerful explosive, with disastrous results to the ship. For 16 years the inventor of this shell has been working to get it before the attention of the Navy Department, and has met with remarkable and almost inexplicable obstacles. That was what that amendment was for the other day—to force these people to stop buying these armor-piercing shells of 12-inch diameter until they demonstrated that they have an armor-piercing shell that will pierce armor at 12,000 yards and be an effective projectile. The experience in Europe shows that 12,000 yards is the minimum war range; and, that being true, the armor-piercing shell is of little use to us.

Mr. HOBSON. The Chief of Ordnance, Admiral Twining, was asked this question:

At what range can 10-inch K. C. armor be penetrated by 12-inch armor-piercing shells if they be fired with 2,850 foot-seconds velocity?

And his answer was:

Nineteen thousand yards, if the impact on armor is normal.

Mr. BATHRICK. Showing how badly he is mistaken.

Mr. HOBSON. And now they are not willing to have that put down to 12,000.

Mr. BATHRICK. Showing they are absolutely mistaken. The real purpose of the shell is to get it through the armor and have it explode on the inside. No such result has been attained



In practice at 12,000 yards. It has been proven incontrovertibly, to anybody with reasonable intelligence, that explosive shells have come in use by foreign nations, and we want the department to try out this shell here. If you vote down the amendment that we got into the bill, they will keep on buying these armor-piercing shells which will not pierce, although we have a very large stock of them now and a sufficient surplus.

I append a letter to me from Mr. Isham, inventor of the shell:

Hon. ELLSWORTH R. BATHRICK,

Member Subcommittee on Ordnance Tests,  
House of Representatives.

SIR: Our naval strength is vested in battleships. The value of a battleship is dependent upon the projectile it employs. If this is inefficient, the battleship is worthless. The Navy Department now acknowledges that armor-piercing projectiles can not penetrate even 10-inch armor at 12,000 yards. Then why are they placing 13½-inch armor on our battleships? Three years ago Admiral Twining stated before the House Naval Committee that the 12-inch guns could penetrate 10-inch armor at 19,000 yards. I was accused on the floor of the House of slandering that officer because I branded it as a misstatement. They are now exerting every effort to show that our armor-piercing shells are the best in the world, and that the supply of them must not be restricted by compelling them to be able to penetrate a 10-inch plate at 12,000 yards. If these armor-piercing shells are incapable of doing this, they and the battleships which carry them are useless, numerous decisions having been rendered to show that the vitals of foreign battleships are protected by even thicker armor, for which reason all tests of torpedo shells have been demanded by the department to be made against 12-inch plates. Moreover, 12,000 yards is less than the range at which naval battles are being decided in the present war. It has also been shown by the Proceedings of the Naval Institute and other technical journals that have been quoted on the floor of the House that the *Empress of India* was sunk by British warships employing British shells in a test at a range between 16,000 and 18,000 yards, the shells "blowing holes in her like lock gates."

Nearly 17 years ago I was sent to this Government by our ambassador to Mexico to demonstrate my torpedo shell, which had demonstrated there as a principal advantage over armor-piercing shells that it could destroy a battleship by exploding near as by hitting it. Last week I had my first test in this country to establish that it could be done. It was admitted for all these years that if a shell carrying 100 pounds or more of high explosive could be exploded within 15 feet of a battleship it would destroy it as a mine would do, but they claimed this could not be done; that the shell would ricochet the same as the armor-piercing shell did, and there was no trial until last week, when it was found that this result could be secured. All countries recognize, and the European war has demonstrated, that the torpedo has compelled a minimum battle range of at least 10,000 yards. This test last week showed that at any battle range my shells bite and dive beneath the water, which the armor-piercing shells will not do. The test also showed that after running underneath the water from 100 to 200 feet they will explode; some of them did not because of a too close fitting locking pin. Black powder was used in the shell at the suggestion of the board, but it is obvious that any explosive may be used. Hence the test proved:

1. That battleships may be destroyed by such shells.
2. That armor plate is no protection against such underwater attack.
3. That the target offered to underwater attack is at least five times as great as the armored parts forming the target for armor-piercing shell attack.

If any further advantages over armor-piercing shells were necessary they are supplied by a test made recently at Indianhead, which showed that the same torpedo shell would destroy an 8-inch plate or explode immediately if it struck even the thinnest plating employed on a torpedo boat or a submarine.

To attain these results has required persistent effort for more than 16 years. The question then arises whether this delay has resulted from the influence of interests involved. When the Congress in 1901 authorized the purchase of my torpedo shell—which purchase was never consummated—Gen. Miles and others stated that it discounted the employment of armor plate. Hence, it is possible that for all these years the Armor-Plate Trust may have used its specious arguments to prevent the use of torpedo shells. Again, with the development of guns it has been decided by the General Board of the Navy that 28 of our older battleships are outranged by late ships and are to be set aside as obsolete. But since torpedo shells make all the guns on these old ships effective up to the limit of vision at sea and prevent the ships from becoming obsolete, is it not possible that the shipbuilding companies are trying to prevent the adoption of torpedo shells? Furthermore, it is established that submarines can be discovered by air craft and also by underwater detectors, and although heretofore they could not be destroyed by shell fire, last week's tests showed that this can now be done. Hence, it is believed that an investigation will show that therein can be discovered the source of a growing opposition in certain quarters to torpedo shells. From time to time have been uttered such statements as might be most useful to prevent the test and use of torpedo shells. Year after year I have called the attention of the Congress to these incorrect statements and to the resulting menace to our national defenses. On the 30th day of last September I made five serious charges respecting the failure to investigate these matters before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. These charges were recently inserted in the House record by Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois, but it is not expected that action will result until such publicity is given to existing conditions that the people in this country will see what cost they are paying to the special interests engaged in the manufacture of materials and sentiment of war.

Respectfully,

WILLARD S. ISHAM.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. PARKER].

OUR SHIPS ARE SLOW.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to deal with any foreign questions, but with the exact para-

graph that is before us. Leave out all questions as to the number of battleships that Congress shall appropriate for. If we appropriate for any, we wish the best ships in the world. The paragraph always intended this. It said that our battleships should have as heavy armor and as powerful armament as any vessel of their class, and then went on to provide that they should be of the "highest practicable speed." I propose to add after that word "speed" an amendment that was carried through the House a few years ago, so that the speed shall be "at least equal to that of any known battleship." In our desire for armor and armament and to save money we somehow or other have built the slowest fleet in the world—ships that are as much behind those of other nations in speed as our monitors were behind the armored fleets of other nations some years after the Civil War.

SPEED ALWAYS WON.

Speed is a vital characteristic of a ship. Do we not remember how speed took English cruisers under Drake all over the world, how they could not be caught, and how Drake's small fleet with gun power and speed vanquished the Spanish Armada? Do we forget that it was speed that kept the *Constitution* and the *President* afloat when all the English fleets were in chase, and that it was speed which enabled the *Alabama* in the old days to go around the world and capture merchantmen as it pleased, and that enabled the *Emden* to do the same thing quite recently? Do we forget the battle of Tsushima Straits, where the Japanese fleet by their speed could select their place of attack and meet the head of the Russian line with broadsides?

VITAL TO ALL NAVAL WORK.

Without speed you can neither give battle nor evade it. You can neither raid nor catch an enemy's raider. You can not select your position when you go into battle. You can not escape in defeat or complete a victory. You can not make an effective blockade nor can you evade blockade. You can not safely divide your own fleet nor can you concentrate your fleet upon the divided parts of an enemy's fleet. Without speed you can not take a fleet where it is not expected to make an unexpected attack. Speed is the essence, next to gun power, of naval efficiency. We ought to have at least one battleship which is a battle cruiser, that can perform the prodigies that have been performed in this war by swift vessels that could get away from any submarine because of their speed, and could make their own attack where they pleased. In the present great conflict the dreadnaughts have either lurked in harbors, unable to get anywhere, not daring to form a battle line, or else they have come out only to be sunk, as the *Blücher* was sunk the other day, by a swifter squadron. Let us have the best ships we can get, at any rate. We now have no 30-knot battle cruisers. We have not even any fast scout cruisers, such as the *Emden* or the *Karlsruhe* or the *Glasgow*, the only survivor of the English fleet in the battle in the Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. May I have one minute more?

Mr. MANN. I yield one minute more to the gentleman.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I say that we have not even any fast cruisers for scouting. They are almost as essential as the battle cruiser. Whether we have few or many, we want to learn how to make these vessels. Vessels are made on a pattern, and I do not believe there is a shipbuilder in the United States now who has made or planned or knows how to make a 30-knot scout cruiser or a 30-knot battle cruiser. We want specimens, at least, in our Navy of every valuable type. I am myself for a larger Navy. But I appeal to gentlemen who are for a small Navy to insist at any rate that it shall be the very best of its size. [Applause.]

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. KENT].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. KENT. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I stand before you as a man who notoriously advocates the interests of peace. A long time ago there was a saying that possibly some of you may have heard, to the effect that "War is hell." Along about the time that that dictum was established there was also established a statement that "one of the saddest and most helpless things that can be imagined is a cat in hell without claws." [Laughter.]

We are surrounded by hostile nations. We are surrounded by a world at war—by a world plotting and planning to involve us—and it is our duty here and now and wherever we find ourselves to stand out and to fight for our position as a Pacific Nation, as a Nation that will not accept the inoculation of hydrophobia. Under other conditions, under conditions which



I believe should obtain, under conditions where the world is not afflicted with rabies, has not gone mad, I should continue my advocacy of curtailing preparation for war. But with the conditions that now confront us, with the jealousy of foreign nations, with our own selfish advocacy of increasing our own commercial supremacy at the cost of those who are now afflicted with rabies, I think it is a time when we should be prepared to protect ourselves.

Whatever preparation we shall make for war ought to be defensive. If we carry out the wildest plans that anybody has advocated in this House; if we compare such prospective preparations with the armaments of the Old World; if all were adopted, we would not be prepared as an aggressive Nation to beat an egg. [Laughter.] What we must do here and now is to solemnly devote ourselves to the cause of peace, and, furthermore, to say that we shall defend ourselves and shall be able to defend ourselves as a peaceful Nation if we are attacked. [Applause.]

Our greatest defense does not lie in warlike preparation. It rests in our right of embargo. If we find that we can not agree with any nation of this world that is now at war, we always have the right of declining to do business with such nation, and if we exercise that right, all nations at war will either accept our views or starve. If their answer be that they propose to come to our shores and force us to trade with them against our will, then it is time for us to consider how we shall defend ourselves against being drawn into a war not of our choosing. We are always subject to foreign hostility, and to treason at home. We ask for peace, and may be obliged to fight for it.

For my part, it makes no difference to me what a foreign nation declares in regard to the rights of an American resident abroad or to one doing business in a foreign nation. If the Japanese people desire to expel every American there resident and to confiscate his property, well and good. But if, on the other hand, any nation pretends to dictate to us what we shall do concerning our own internal affairs, whether that concerns right of ingress, right of land ownership, or right of citizenship, I am here to say that I would rather fight and die than submit to such dictation. Here is where we must draw the line. We must have a certain amount of force behind us to hold our reasonable, rational rights, our just demands for home rule and neutrality, and because of that necessity, because we are living in a world full of rabies and hatred, I am going to vote for two battleships, for submarines, and for defense as a prevention against oppression and inoculation with hydrophobia. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has used four minutes. He yields back one minute.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. CULLOP].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. CULLOP] is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. CULLOP. Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for the Underwood amendment, and, whether it is adopted or not, I shall vote for the motion of the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] to strike out the entire paragraph. In my judgment there is no occasion now for us to provide for the building of battleships or to increase our Navy.

I do not understand the doctrine of the gentleman from California [Mr. KENT], who has just left the floor, that the best way to promote peace in this country is to build two battleships a year to get in a better position to fight—more equipment for war. This is a strange doctrine, to my mind, that he advocates.

Now, I would like to ask this question: If we were to build a battleship now, what type of battleship would we build? The type that would be proper for to-day, experience is teaching us from the war in Europe, would be obsolete to-morrow; and if we build a battleship, we surely would not float it in water. If we did, a submarine would come along and blow it out of water. So that if battleships are to be built, they ought to be built with the provision that they are to be used only on dry land, in order that we may preserve them. [Laughter and applause.] Experiences of the European nations in the dreadful war raging there clearly demonstrates how helpless these monsters of the seas are when attacked by the powerful submarines.

Talk about war! Throughout the history of this great country no foreign nation has ever attacked us. If we are to judge the future by the past, another century and more will roll by without any attack on us from any foreign nation in the world. In all the wars we have had we have made the attack, and no foreign nation thus far in the nearly 140 years of our history has ever made an attack upon the United States. We have in

all our wars with foreign nations been the aggressor. They have been content to let us alone.

But gentlemen say that to preserve peace we must be prepared for war—prepared to provoke war. If we are prepared for war, we are more likely to provoke war; but if we are prepared for peace, we are more likely to preserve peace. Caution will be exercised, and through it peace will be preserved.

What is the condition of the leading nations of the earth to-day? We are the only great nation in all the world enjoying peace. Every other great nation has on its hands to-day all the war that it can handle, and most of them more than they can successfully handle. We would not expect war from Great Britain, because Great Britain to-day is engaged to her fullest capacity in war. We would not expect war from Germany, because Germany is surrounded with nations in war, fighting for her life, spending her treasure, killing off her men who are suitable for war. We would not expect war from Russia. We would not expect war from Japan. We would not expect war from any leading nation in the world. If we should have war with any of these nations, we would have to make the attack, because no leading nation is in a condition to attack us and carry on a war with us, and will not be for years to come.

And yet gentlemen who advocate a large Navy policy are proclaiming that that policy is to be inaugurated for the purpose of preserving peace instead of provoking war—a strange doctrine indeed. [Applause.] It is the policy of this Nation to maintain peace and avert war, a most humanitarian policy and one that meets the commendation of the people of the world, one that is winning us renown throughout the length and breadth of all civilized nations. It is giving us a commanding position among other nations and one that is winning for us the first place among nations as a world power. We are attempting to lead the world into the great field of industrialism, away from militarism, so that the standard of civilization will be advanced and the happiness of the people assured. [Applause.]

But, sir, this high ideal can not be accomplished, this great humanitarian work promoted, this better era for all mankind secured, by pursuing a policy of militarism, one that is calculated to earn respect through fear, or maintain our position by force. If we are to pursue that policy, the time will come when other nations will resent it and we will have to resort to force to maintain it. Then our situation will be as deplorable as that of the European nations to-day. They are suffering because of the militarism inaugurated years ago, and in the rivalry of the nations of Continental Europe in maintaining that policy they have brought on the pitiable situation in which they are found and from which they are unable to extricate themselves, save alone through the bloodiest war the world has ever witnessed. Their example should be an impressive lesson to us, and one that warns us we should steer clear of such a policy and avoid the consequences it is sure, if maintained, to bring upon us. [Applause.] Let us hope we will.

But, Mr. Chairman, ever since I became a Member of this great lawmaking body, in March, 1909, the building of battleships in the naval appropriation bill each year has provoked more animated controversy than any other subject discussed by Members of Congress. For some reason Members entertain decided views on this question which are altogether irreconcilable. It occurs to me the leaders in these discussions make greater preparation for the debate on this subject than any other, and more tenaciously defend their positions, both pro and con, than is done in any controversy held on the floor of the House.

Evidently the principles underlying this subject are of a nature about which men may widely differ and each have sound basis upon which to found his contention. The motives of both seem to emanate from the highest order of patriotism, and therefore challenge the respect and admiration of all.

For myself, I hope to take a practical consideration of this question, viewing it from a utilitarian standpoint, carefully relying on the conditions which in my judgment should have their influence in solving the question as to how I should vote on the pending measure. It is not alone a satisfactory reason, to my mind, that we should do this or that because some other rival nation is doing something. That would not be a good "hard-and-fast rule" to follow in things, and especially on this question. I have heard the argument made on this floor by the advocates of a big Navy that England was building three battleships; therefore we should build two; or that Germany was building four battleships, and therefore we should build three. Supposing that England is building three and Germany four; why should that make it necessary for us to build two each year? Must we do as England and Germany in a matter of this



kind? Are we the imitators simply of these great nations? Should there not be a better reason than this advanced for our action? Doubtless many people believe that these nations are now reaping, to their sorrow, their own folly in this regard. Perchance if these and other European nations had pursued the policy of keeping peace instead of preparing for war the deplorable situation in which they are found to-day would not exist. Who knows but what if they had been preparing for peace instead of war to-day they would be enjoying peace instead of being involved in the most disastrous war known in all the annals of time, a war which threatens the disruption of nations and a changing of the map of Europe.

For years it has been the settled policy of leading nations of Europe to prepare for war, and they are now reaping the inevitable result of the policy they have so constantly pursued. They can not complain that these policies have brought about the result for which they were calculated. They have boasted about their splendid navies, and they have the natural consequences of their rash preparations. Surely these great navies were not organized for peace, but for war; and war they have. We have been following their examples, and if we continue we are sure to experience the same result. Should not their unhappy condition, as the result of their Navy policy, be an object lesson to us, and we should for that reason follow it no longer. Look at the anomalous position—all these years preaching peace, eternal peace, and yet yearly increasing the preparations for war. What an inconsistent position; one that misleads nobody nor deceives anybody. The world knows what such a policy means. If we are in earnest about establishing universal peace, we should abandon the policy of increasing our preparations for war; if we do not, we will have war sooner than we expect.

If we believe in the doctrine of universal peace and that it can be established by intermediation, as proposed, we should practice what we preach and not the reverse of it. Can we hope to convert the world to our doctrine unless we show by our own action our own conversion? Is it contended by the advocates of this doctrine that we can by speech declare for peace and by our every action show that yearly we are making greater preparations for war convince the world we are for universal peace? Does anyone believe but that the nations of the world will draw their own inferences from the difference between what we are saying and what we are doing, and that they will place more reliance on what we are doing than on what we are saying? Is not being prepared for war more likely, on little provocation, to precipitate war than peace? People assume, and correctly so, that a person prepared for trouble is not only expecting trouble, but is sure to find it. What is true of individuals is true of nations in this respect.

We proceed yearly to increase, instead of curtail, our preparations for war; and when protest is made against this course the response is heralded back that England, Germany, and other countries are increasing their armaments and we must do likewise in order to keep up with the procession. This is not a sufficient reason. If some other country is blundering in this matter, wasting its treasure, pursuing an indefensible policy, they furnish no reason for us to do likewise. We are not required to do as they are doing. Armies and navies produce nothing; they consume only—destroy and waste. The eyes of the world are turned upon production, eliminating wasteful and destructive agencies in order that every available means of human endeavor may be employed in production, creating wealth and enriching the world. [Applause.]

Before the war now raging in Europe it was estimated that the world powers were burdened with the enormous debt of more than \$35,000,000,000, practically all of which was incurred for wars and the results of war. The interest on it is paid by the people, the poor as well as the rich, the employee as well as the employer. In our country more than 70 per cent of annual expenditures are made for military purposes, past and present, and the sum grows annually. It constitutes an enormous burden on the people, against which they protest, but in vain. It has been freely stated prior to this year that the nations of the world are annually spending \$2,000,000,000 on armaments to enable them to be able, if they desire, to annihilate each other; that more than 20,000,000 men have been taken from the fields of productive labor to man the armies and navies, which entails a loss of approximately \$500,000,000 a year. Consider that if these were returned to productive employment what an impetus it would furnish the energies of the world and what a material contribution it would make to the progress of mechanical, industrial, and intellectual life throughout the world. It might well be said, then, that arts of peace are paramount to arts of war; that intellect dominates, and not brute force.

For years England has been spending four and a quarter times as much for militarism as for education; France, 4.3; Austria, 4.5; Italy, nine times as much; and Russia, twelve times as much. Every nation in the world except Switzerland is paying more for militarism than for education. Even our own country is doing so, much to the chagrin, be it said, of the American people, who are peace-loving and God-fearing people. In the last 10 years we have expended more than \$1,500,000,000 on our Army and Navy—preaching peace and constantly and expensively preparing for war. This sum applied to education would have educated in our best colleges 2,000,000 young men and women and equipped them to meet the highest responsibilities of citizenship whereby they could have contributed to the advancement of civilization and elevated the standard of a truly national glory. The sum we have thus appropriated for militarism in the last decade exceeds the entire interest-bearing debt of the United States by approximately \$500,000,000. This enormous sum has been turned from the field of production into nonproductive channels. Is it not time to change the course of the ship of state in this regard, abandon this policy for one more remunerative, better adapted to promote civilizing influences which will improve, promote, and glorify our age? [Applause.]

Our people have not been a war-serving or war-loving people. We deprecate war, and our people have devoted their energies and abilities to the development of our natural resources, our agricultural and manufacturing interests, accomplishing marvels in these great and useful fields of endeavor until they now outrival almost every other nation in the world. Our national wealth has grown so rapidly that now it aggregates the startling sum of more than \$150,000,000,000, the greatest of any nation in the world. So that we have not felt or stopped to consider the enormous growth of our military expenditures. But now, as the growth is so rapid and the sum so large, we are beginning to feel it, and its burden is weighing heavily on the people who must bear it, and they are raising protest against it and appealing for relief.

Because of the deplorable war in Europe we are now pressed for financial relief in governmental expenditures; we deny any intention of engaging in war; we applaud every peaceful effort and frown upon every attempt to precipitate a resort to arms. Then why swell at this time the appropriation to build great dreadnaughts which, if our purposes are realized, will rot at the docks in our harbors? We know that if we appropriate the money to build the battleships provided for in this bill it will be four or five years before the work of their construction will be commenced; that the wars now raging in Europe and in Mexico will have been ended and passed into history long before their hulls will have moved from the dry docks at the place of their construction to the waters of the adjacent harbors, there to be fitted for use. What excuse can we render to our constituents for such inexcusable conduct? Will they not censure our course as indefensible?

If we do not expect war, why make this vast expenditure preparing for war? Why build these great ships to lie idle in our harbors? If we build them, why not dedicate them and those already built to commerce? Why not employ them in the transportation of our surplus products to the markets of the world, where they will bring remunerative prices, realizing attractive profits to our producers—convert them into money-makers for our people instead of burdens on the taxpayers? If half of our naval fleet to-day was employed in the transportation of our surplus products to the foreign markets it would relieve the congested condition here, inspire industry, and add vastly to the prosperity of the country. Convert them into argosies of commerce while peace with us abides and stimulate prosperity. Make them instruments of profit instead of expense. If peril should present itself, they could be easily withdrawn from the marts of commerce and returned to the purpose of national defense. If they were employed for this useful and beneficial purpose they would perform a greatly needed function and save our people the expenditure of many millions, and accelerate the wheels of prosperity. Expenditures of public money should only be made for public benefits and in such channels as will enable it to return profits to the people who are compelled to furnish the same as a toll levied to raise revenues. If adapted to any other purpose it fails to meet the requirements for which governments were organized, and sooner or later it will arouse the opposition of the people and bring the party responsible therefor into disrepute. [Applause.]

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. GRAY].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. GRAY] is recognized for five minutes.



Mr. GRAY. Mr. Speaker, I want to speak to this amendment for four battleships. The "General Board" we hear referred to is a body in the Navy Department unprovided for by law, but which has come into existence on the initiative of naval officers and the Secretary of the Navy. While I have only praise and commendation for the members of this board, yet, like all other great, good, loyal, and patriotic men, they are more or less actuated by pride, sentiment, and enthusiasm for the service to which they have devoted their lives.

These four battleships provided for in this amendment are in pursuance of a program made in 1903 by this General Board for a fleet of 48 ships. Since that year this special number of ships has been annually recommended as the proper number to constitute our fleet.

I have made some inquiry to ascertain upon what basis this special number of 48 ships has been recommended. It has been suggested that this special number has been fixed with reference to the fleets of foreign nations. Since this number was fixed the fleets of other nations and their building programs have varied from time to time, so that a fixed number at one time with reference to foreign fleets could not have been applicable to such fleets at other times. But this number of 48 ships for our fleet has remained unvarying from 1903 to the present. We are not building to equal England, as no such recommendation has ever been made by even the most enthusiastic naval advocate. This program of 48 ships could not have been made with reference to Germany, as the size of the German Navy has changed three times since this program was first recommended. From 1900 to 1906 the German law fixed the German fleet to be constituted of 34 ships. From 1906 to 1912 the German law fixed the number to constitute its fleet at 38 ships, and since 1912 the German law has fixed the number at 41 ships, which now constitutes the German fleet, or at least did constitute that fleet when the war began and before her great losses were incurred. This 48-ship program could not have been made with reference to the navies of nations other than England and Germany, for all have been and are smaller than our own.

An inquiry relative to this special number being required for advantageous distribution or effective operation has failed to disclose a reason for this special number of ships for either of such purposes. The following questions asked by myself and responses thereto by Admiral Fiske during the hearing before the Committee on Naval Affairs are with regard to this fixed number of ships and show the want of grounds for this special number to constitute our fleet and which inquiry appears at page 1048 of the hearings of this session, as follows:

Mr. GRAY. Admiral, I understand you are a member of the General Board, which has made certain recommendations to the Secretary from time to time.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GRAY. Your board has made recommendations from time to time since 1903 for the number of ships to constitute our fleet?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GRAY. Has that number been fixed arbitrarily or has it been made in pursuance of some plan or policy or system for the distribution of the ships and for effective operation?

Admiral FISKE. It has been made with the idea of effective operation. The question of distribution I do not think entered in. The idea would be that the ships would be distributed after they were, of course, in service.

Mr. GRAY. Had the number of ships been discussed a good deal in the board before it reached this number?

Admiral FISKE. I was not in the board then. I have been attached to the board now more or less for something over four years—not continuously, because I was at sea in command of a division—but I do not know previously what led them to that number.

Mr. GRAY. What plan of effective operation would be carried out by this number of 48 ships, if you know?

Admiral FISKE. That is rather hard to answer, because it would lead me to thinking of something I have never thought of before. I never thought of 48 ships, because we have not got them.

Mr. GRAY. I mean, that was the recommendation?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mr. GRAY. That we were to have them or wanted them?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mr. GRAY. I asked this question as I would like to know something about it. I have heard about this 48-ship policy. Do you know what was the policy of effective operations to be carried out?

Admiral FISKE. No; I do not.

Mr. GRAY. You say you never heard that discussed in the board?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; I have heard it discussed, but as a thing which happened a long while before and as only sort of academic interest.

Mr. GRAY. Was there any demand for a smaller number of ships or for a larger number of ships, or were they all agreed on 48?

Admiral FISKE. I do not know. I was not in the board then. I do not know.

Mr. GRAY. Do you know of any reason why, for effective operations, the number should be 48?

Admiral FISKE. No. It might be 47 or 46 or 49 or 50. There is no magic in the number 48.

Mr. GRAY. But this recommendation from time to time has been 48?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mr. GRAY. I observe here on page 816 of the Navy Yearbook that the policy of giving names to these ships is to name the ships after the States.

Admiral FISKE. Yes; I believe that coincidence in numbers is accidental, however.

Mr. GRAY. All the ships up to this time have been named for States?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mr. GRAY. Is it the policy to continue the naming ships for the States?

Admiral FISKE. I do not know, sir.

Mr. GRAY. But you know that has been the policy?

Admiral FISKE. I know it has been the policy to name these battleships after States, but having 48 battleships and having 48 States was purely accidental.

Mr. GRAY. Purely accidental?

Admiral FISKE. So I am told.

The CHAIRMAN. We did not have 48 States when this plan was adopted.

Mr. GRAY. If they would go ahead and complete this program now and carry out the plan, giving the name of a State to every ship, we would just have 48 ships, would we not?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GRAY. We would not have any more or less?

Admiral FISKE. That is, of battleships.

Mr. GRAY. That is the number that your board recommended we should have?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GRAY. Do you think the pride in having a ship named for every State or sentiment had anything to do with the naming of these ships or as affecting the number of ships?

Admiral FISKE. No; I believe not.

Mr. GRAY. Is it not a most remarkable coincidence?

Admiral FISKE. Yes; it is.

Mr. GRAY. That the number which the board arbitrarily fixed upon and the number of States that we have and the policy we pursue of giving the name of every State to a ship would all coincide? Is not that a remarkable coincidence?

Admiral FISKE. Not so remarkable as you might think, sir, because a great many of our armored cruisers—in fact, all of them—were named after States.

Mr. FARR. And we did not have that many States at that time.

Mr. GRAY. But it is true the number coincides with the number of the States and the policy of naming each battleship for a State.

Admiral FISKE. Yes; but at the time that policy was formulated there were not 48 States.

Mr. GRAY. There were 48 States and Territories, and it was known at that time there would be 48 States.

Admiral FISKE. I do not know.

Mr. GRAY. Is it not a matter of geography and history?

Admiral FISKE. I really do not know, sir; I really do not know.

Mr. GRAY. And you know of no reason for any purpose, even for the distribution of the fleet or for effective operations, that would fix the number arbitrarily at 48?

Admiral FISKE. No; it might have been 47 or 50 or 49 or 46 or 51.

Mr. GRAY. But that has not been the recommendation of the board since 1903; on the other hand, it has been 48.

Admiral FISKE. Why they fixed on 48 I really do not know.

The annual cost to maintain the military of the world in time of peace is ascertained to be over \$2,000,000,000, a sum of such vast magnitude as to preclude estimate, measurement, or comprehension by the human mind, and which would go far to feed the people of the world or to clothe the people of the world or to house the people of the world or to educate the people of the world if made available and used for such purposes. Out of every dollar collected into the National Treasury as taxes from the people 63 cents has been found to be required on account of war and the military of the United States in time of peace, leaving 37 cents with which to pay the cost of government and promote the institution of civil life.

The cost to maintain the military of the United States has multiplied and increased in a growing ratio with every succeeding year. The appropriations to maintain the Navy alone have increased from \$65,140,916.97 in 1900 to \$144,868,716.61 in 1914, and for the increase of the Navy from \$17,140,690 to \$41,091,734 for the same period of time. This year the amount recommended by the General Board, composed of high naval officers, for the increase of the Navy is \$128,224,972, or over \$87,000,000 more than was appropriated for the increase of the Navy last year.

I here give a statement of the totals of the appropriations carried by the naval acts from 1900 to 1914, showing separately the amounts for increase of the Navy:

Years.	Appropriation.	Amount for Increase Navy.
1900.....	\$65,140,916.97	\$17,140,690.00
1901.....	78,101,791.00	25,400,000.00
1902.....	78,856,363.13	22,703,010.00
1903.....	81,876,791.43	25,925,632.00
1904.....	97,505,140.94	32,176,860.00
1905.....	100,336,679.94	42,255,833.00
1906.....	102,091,670.27	33,475,829.00
1907.....	98,958,507.50	23,713,915.00
1908.....	122,063,885.47	30,307,962.00
1909.....	136,935,199.05	38,819,595.00
1910.....	131,350,854.38	33,770,346.00
1911.....	126,478,338.24	26,005,547.67
1912.....	123,225,007.76	20,569,373.48
1913.....	140,800,643.52	35,325,695.00
1914.....	144,868,716.61	41,091,734.00

I also give the estimate of the General Board, composed of naval officers, as their recommendation for the increase of the Navy for the coming year.

Estimates of cost—General Board's 1916 program.

Vessels.	Increase of the Navy, construction and machinery.	Increase of the Navy, torpedo boats.	Increase of the Navy, armor and armament.	Total.
Four battleships.....	\$31,200,000		\$28,532,455	\$59,732,455
Sixteen destroyers.....	14,800,000		5,180,385	19,980,385
Three fleet submarines.....		\$10,740,000	2,187,500	12,927,500
Sixteen coast submarines.....			4,499,928	20,499,928
Four scouts.....	16,000,000		350,775	3,350,775
Four gunboats.....	3,000,000		180,514	2,460,514
Two oil-fuel ships.....	2,280,000		330,500	1,730,500
One destroyer tender.....	1,400,000		179,150	1,319,150
One submarine tender.....	1,140,000		229,700	2,129,700
One Navy transport.....	1,900,000			2,500,000
One hospital ship.....	2,500,000			1,594,065
One supply ship.....	1,475,000		119,065	
Total.....	75,695,000	10,740,000	41,789,972	128,224,972

These ever increasing and multiplying appropriations evince a policy to build up a world-power Navy and commit this Nation to maintaining such a policy. I am opposed to a world-power navy policy for this Nation. I am opposed to the control of the seas policy for this Nation. I am opposed to a rival naval policy for this Nation. I am opposed to any naval policy for this Nation calling for war and such vast expenditures of money to maintain. Such a policy is not only unavailing for defense and protection, but is fraught with all the dangers of strife, antagonism, and conflict, and a jeopardy to our very national existence. The European war is being waged over a world-power military policy. England is striving to maintain a world-power policy, Germany is striving to gain world power, and the thousands of seamen entombed in the hulls of sunken vessels at the bottom of the sea and the thousands of soldiers whose dead bodies are strewn over the battle fields of France and Belgium all proclaim the criminal folly of a world-power military policy.

The true military policy for this Nation should be defense, adequate defense of our shores, while striving for peace and the settlement of international disputes by courts and tribunals, instead of by cruel devastating warfare. Defense is not only the one policy of war justifiable before men and the civilization of the world to-day, but it is the strongest, the most invincible, impregnable, and advantageous position which a nation can take in warfare, and one which compels the aggressor to assume all the burdens of conflict.

Under the policy of defense and military operations at home small nations have prevailed over the great and the weak against the strong and powerful. Under this policy the Colonies wrung independence from England and the South American Republics declared and maintained their sovereign power against the stronger mother country.

Naval and military men not only recognize this principle and the advantage of military operations at home and the burdens which must be assumed in aggression, but agree that no European power could withdraw from their shores to make available against us more than 50 per cent of their fighting force. With this one-half of their navy available to oppose us, a foreign power must meet and operate against—

All our coast defenses;  
All our mines planted at the entrance of harbors;  
All our submarines operating out from our coasts and sea-board fleets;

All our air crafts sailing out from our shores and dropping explosives on attacking fleets;

And lastly our Army on land to intercept any hostile force which might overcome all these and attempt to land upon our shores.

With England, the strongest naval power of the world, and with one-half of her navy equaling ours and operating against us and with all the burdens of aggression to assume and all the advantages available to us of defense, we would be impregnable in defending our shores even as against that nation, and more than impregnable against all other nations so long as we adhere to a policy of defense.

Defense not only carries with it great strategic advantages and burdens to aggression, but it calls to arms soldiers with courage, valor, and determination, which invasion can not inspire in men.

We should build and maintain a Navy only for the defense of our shores, and we should prove to the world that such is our policy not only by our claim but by our works, acts, and deeds and all our preparation and accomplishments for war, and thereby, while maintaining full security and adequate protec-

tion, hold ourselves acceptable and unprejudiced before the nations of the earth as mediators for the settlement of international disputes and ready and in position to lead the way to peace and final disarmament.

Mr. PADGETT. I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY].

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I was very much interested in the remarks of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] this morning. It has been known to this House, of course, for many years that the gentleman from Alabama is an advocate of a very large Navy, but I think this morning is the first occasion when he has been bold enough to go to the extent of advocating a Navy that would equal the combined navies of Germany, Japan, and Great Britain.

Mr. Chairman, during the last 14 years the expenditures of the United States for naval purposes have increased 230 per cent. Those of England have increased 180 per cent, those of Japan 330 per cent, and those of Germany 300 per cent. From 1901 to 1914 the expenditures of the United States for naval purposes have increased from \$61,000,000 to \$141,000,000 per annum. Those of Great Britain have increased from \$141,000,000 per annum to \$260,000,000 per annum, those of Japan from about \$39,000,000 per annum to \$61,000,000 per annum. In other words, according to the percentage of increase in United States naval expenditures in the last 14 years, if that same policy is continued for the next 14 years, the annual appropriation bill for naval purposes will amount to the enormous sum of \$324,000,000.

During the last year Great Britain, Japan, and Germany expended the total sum of \$442,000,000 upon their naval policy. I would like to ask the gentleman from Alabama if he believes that if the policy of naval expansion to the extent of an American Navy in the Pacific equal to Great Britain and Japan, and in the Atlantic equal to Germany were carried out, the people of the United States would submit even for a single year to the enormous expenditure of \$442,000,000 for the purpose of building up an American Navy? And if the gentleman believes they would submit to such an expenditure, and if the same proportion of increase were to be carried out in the next 14 years, as has been carried out by the nations of the world in the last 14 years, the total expenditure by England, Germany, and Japan each year would amount to the enormous sum of \$1,193,000,000 per annum. I ask the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON], and I ask the Members of this House, and I ask the United States as a Nation, whether or not we are ready to embark upon a saturnalia of naval expenditures that would amount to more each year than our total Government expenditures at the present time?

Mr. HOBSON. My estimate was on a two-power basis, Great Britain and Japan, not three; and if we managed ourselves economically we would have very little more pro rata than they would.

Mr. BARKLEY. Last year Germany spent only \$113,000,000 for her navy, whereas we spent \$141,000,000 upon our Navy.

Mr. HOBSON. I am not advocating a three-power navy.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am in sympathy with the motion made by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD]. Every business corporation and individual in the United States who has any business capacity is undertaking in every way to pare down expenses during the stringency that is existing while this European war is going on. Everybody knows that by reason of this great cataclysm that has befallen the human race, in which more than half the area and more than half the population of the world is now at war, and the business avenues and connections of the world are disarranged, every man and every corporation and every industry is undertaking to harmonize its conduct with the necessary expenditures and economies brought about by this war. If it be necessary for individuals to economize, if it be necessary for corporations of every description to economize, surely in this hour of turmoil and distress, when the nations of the earth are compelled to spend millions and billions of dollars for defense, we can afford to cut down our expenditures for naval, military, and every other purpose within the purview of appropriations. [Applause.]

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER].

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise to correct a mistake that I made in a colloquy with the gentleman from New York [Mr. FITZGERALD]. The General Board of the Navy did not recommend one battle cruiser last year, but they recommended four battleships.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. CALDER].

Mr. CALDER. Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for two battleships and the balance of the building program recommended by the



Committee on Naval Affairs. I listened with much interest to the remarks of the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], who just preceded me. He made a good argument. He called the attention of the committee to the condition of our Treasury and the fact that the expenditures of the Naval Establishment has been increased each year until it seems as if we would soon reach the point where we could no longer stand the strain; but I say to him that when he has a house or other piece of property he insures it against loss or damage by fire, by hurricane, or flood—

Mr. BARKLEY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CALDER. No; I can not; I have only 5 minutes. The man insures his property, and the Naval Committee, acting on the advice of the Navy Department, come to us with a fair, conservative naval program, which seems to me must appeal to the common sense of this House and the best judgment of the American people. It is a reasonable insurance for the country, and I am confident will meet the expectations of the people.

I wish it were possible for us this year to authorize four battleships and an accompanying program that should go with them, but we know that this is impossible on account of the condition of the Treasury, and we must be satisfied with the estimates submitted by the committee.

I was thinking the other day of this question of preparedness for war, and it reminded me of the police force in the great cities of the country. We do not give the police officer a big stick and a revolver and clothe him with authority for the purpose of going around the country killing and maiming innocent people. We give him the authority and implements of offense and defense, because we need this protection for the lives and property of the people within the country.

So we build a Navy and have a reasonable sized Army to protect the country from invasion from without, and to protect us against an uprising that may occur within our borders.

Much has been said about the cost of the Navy, and I believe that Congress ought to give its very careful attention to this question. Our naval bill this year is approximately \$140,000,000, which is an annual increase of \$40,000,000 since I have been a Member of this House. I believe it possible to adopt a policy in the conduct of the Navy Department that would materially reduce the charge on the Treasury. We have been fortunate in the men who have served at the head of the Navy Department, and I believe that if we should give the Secretary authority to conduct the department on purely business principles he could save the country at least \$10,000,000 a year in the management of the department.

If we are to maintain our position as the great power of the Western Hemisphere, if we propose to insist in the future on a strict observance of the Monroe doctrine, we must have a Navy that can enforce our position if necessary.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, while I do not agree with the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] in the reasons that to him are conclusive why we should have a large Navy, nor do I agree with him as to the magnitude of the Navy that we should have, I do agree with him, and with others, that we should make some very considerable additions to the Navy that we now have.

I have listened to-day, as I have on other occasions in years past, to heated arguments by naval strategists from the interior—about the same region that I come from, so I am qualified to speak respecting them—and I notice with not a little interest that the fighting campaign against Navy increase comes from that section of the country where it is improbable a cannon ball will be able to reach if fired from the sea. [Laughter.]

This is too big a country to find sectionalism in the discussion of this question. National defense, like national honor, is a national question, that knows no sectionalism. There are no interests of one section that run contrary to the interests of other sections, for national defense is but a phase of national integrity, and in it all citizens have an equal interest.

In the time at my disposal I desire to give some of the reasons why I believe our country needs a strong Navy.

Democratic governments such as ours are little prone to foreign conflicts and even less prone to foreign conquests. Our people are essentially peace loving. We covet no man's land, no nation's empire. We do, however, place great value upon our political principles and hold as sacred our free institutions. The perpetuity of these institutions is near our hearts, and should be, since without these institutions our boasted country could not long endure.

These institutions must be ever builded upon strong, virile men. Where there is no manhood there can be no free institutions. I am astounded at the language many gentlemen indulge in these days when speaking of our Military Establishment. From their talk we would be persuaded that the only consideration our country ever should have is to avoid armed conflict. They forget that the possession of these sacred, free institutions was secured through war, and that to preserve them it may be necessary again to fight. A race of withering cowards, without patriotism, without virility enough to shape their destiny aright, even in the midst of foes and hostile elements, would not be worth preserving, and yet that is the race we are to become if these gentlemen's views prevail. I am ashamed of a spirit so weak, so contemptible, and so hopeless. It is unworthy the heritage we have received from our fathers.

I deprecate war; I hope we will never experience another; but if I must choose between war and the destruction of our free institutions, if I must choose between war and the dignity and the future well-being of my country, then give me war.

Many of these gentlemen would be the quickest of all to resent a personal insult. Would they, in fact, meekly endure insult after insult upon their country? Do they not think it now the part of wise men to prepare their country against insult, rather than to risk their all avenging an insult that otherwise will be sure to come.

We all prefer peace; we are all ready to work to preserve peace; but how idle to shut our eyes against the actual conditions in the world. There are some peoples in the world, united into strong and powerful nations, whose mission is not peace, but whose national ambition is national expansion and foreign conquest. The good people of our communities abhor thieving, arson, and murder. Do they cry piteously, "We are for righteousness," and pray that crime shall be no more? No; they hire policemen and peace officers—equip them, arm them—in order that safety of life and property may be enforced. In the community of nations there are to-day warring, ambitious, conquering peoples, and if our integrity is to be preserved, if our free institutions are to be protected, if the welfare of our people is to be insured, we must have the armed strength to hold back the foe.

If gentlemen are to be believed, we should shrink within our shell, withdraw from the world's affairs, quiver, perhaps, as we are kicked, but ever, ever decline to raise an arm for our own protection. Let me assure the gentlemen that it would never be possible to cringe into a shape small enough to escape the attack of a foreign foe when once we had established our reputation as a Nation incapable of defending itself. I speak for a robust Nation, a vigorous, virile people, a power to preserve peace in the world, and capable of protecting its integrity against all comers.

We often hear it said that armed preparation is conducive to conflict. The eminent leader of the majority, Mr. UNDERWOOD, expressed this opinion a few moments ago. I agree that armament may be carried to such an extent as to bring this result, but it never will be brought to that point nor anywhere near that point in America. But the statement is never true of a navy. A navy is essentially an instrumentality of defense. In America it is the only defense we have. Our coast line, our enormous coast line, opens our country wide to the world. We can not possibly build forts that will protect us along our great boundary. Under present conditions the only value of a fort is to make certain that a foe will land at some other point. It is the mission of a navy to make certain that a foe does not land at any point.

Our country will never have a large standing Army. To maintain such an Army is contrary to the genius of our institutions. We must fall back quite exclusively for protection upon the Navy of our country. This, Mr. Chairman, is why I am for a strong Navy.

The American Navy has written the most brilliant pages in American history. Our geographical position makes it essential that our exploits on the sea shall be commensurate with the greatness of a great people.

Those who believe America has a high destiny in the affairs of the world have an added reason for strengthening our Navy. The sea has always been the direct highway, the direct and royal highway, to national greatness. Nations have always honored their sons who have gone down into the sea in ships, and in turn those sons have woven the fabric of their nation's greatness. No country has ever become a leader in the affairs of man unless that country had prestige upon the sea. A purely inland nation has never yet become a world power, and in all ages a nation's greatness has been proportioned to her influence upon the sea. Our Nation's commerce must cover the

earth, and there must be an American Navy reasonably adequate to protect it.

Navy experts are far from agreed as to the value of different types of ships of war. I do not profess to be a navy expert, but it seems to me that all history teaches one thing and all the naval history of the past six months teaches it with special emphasis. The lesson taught by history is that speed is one of the vitally essential things in a fighting ship. This bill provides for two battleships, and the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] moves to increase the two to four. The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD] moves to reduce them to one. It is all on the question of battleships. There is no provision in the bill, none suggested, for ships of the battle-cruiser type. I strongly believe our Navy needs a unit of battle cruisers more than it needs an addition of any other fighting craft.

Mr. Chairman, that which made the name of Sir Francis Drake renowned in history, that which made the name of his fellow countryman, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, heroic in the growth of England's power, is that the boats they moved and fought were speedier and faster and quicker than the heavy galleons of Spain. The great Spanish fighting Goliath was no match for the little English David, fleet of foot. Contests on the sea from the day of the first galley's shock down to the present hour have almost always gone to the swiftest boat. And to-day, when the titanic forces man's genius has put into fighting ships have met in struggles on the sea, the two determining factors have been speed and heavy guns. An English fleet in the south Pacific disappeared from the surface of the sea because it met swifter boats with heavier guns. The victors here were with ease destroyed a few weeks later near the Falkland Islands, when they met a fleet still swifter and with still larger guns. The deeds of the swift *Emden* will be remembered as long as sea fights are remembered. The escape of the mighty and swift *Goeben* from Messina still thrills the world. The English victories in the North Sea were both victories of superior speed and larger guns. The boat that sweeps the sea with speed and big guns is the battle cruiser, and we have not one in our Navy.

Naval history is now being made by battle cruisers. When we place beside these boats of 30 knots' speed or greater our clumsy, slow-moving battleships of 17 and 19 knots, armed with guns considerably smaller and with much less range, we must swallow a big lump of American pride. It does not take an expert to know that our fleet needs some boats of the big-gun, battle-cruiser class. Our early naval history is resplendent with the deeds of heroes who swept the sea in swift ships. To-day we find we have the prize turtle navy of the world. While our fleet is moving with ponderous slowness a foreign fleet of swift ships armed with big guns could keep out of our reach and pepper us to pieces. Have our Navy experts become so grooved by the rut of routine that they have permitted other nations to profit by the experiences of humankind while they alone move blindly and stupidly along?

I am for the building of some battle cruisers. I believe our naval officers at heart are for some battle cruisers if only they had the courage to speak out that which they really think. I know and they know and all the world knows that in the recent war the fast battle cruisers have remained afloat and to rule, while the slow ships have gone down to the bottom of the sea.

Prior to the commencement of this great war some of the experts of our Navy refused to enthuse over the battle-cruiser type. We all recall when the great battle cruiser *Moltke*, practically the first of her class, participated in the naval pageant at New York, these experts shook their heads because her armor was too thin. Speed and big guns made no impression. I wonder what these same men think now, after six months of naval warfare.

But recently some of our Navy experts have been willing to admit that the battle cruiser is a powerful ship; but I have heard them say, as doubtless you have, that a navy must consist of units; and a unit consists of four boats, which must be of such similarity in speed and certain other features as to enable them to be maneuvered together. Very well; let us build two each year, and within two years we will have a unit. No nation has built all her battle cruisers at one time; no nation has built four at one time. They are usually produced in pairs, just as we produce battleships. Japan had two of these built in Great Britain, and then she proceeded to build two herself.

In days of ocean greyhounds we are building turtles. We have forgotten the teachings of all naval history. We have even forgotten the teachings of our own. I do not urge battle cruisers to the exclusion of battleships—not for a moment—but we have a considerable fleet of battleships, with no fast battle cruisers; and our Navy, if it is to be a match for any

other modern navy, must possess a complement of battle cruisers. If it does not, if we are to drag way behind the procession in naval progress, some day America will pay an awful price for this stubborn adherence to a primitive type.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has expired.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. MONDELL].

Mr. MONDELL. Mr. Chairman, though I am from the interior, I am not one of those naval strategists to whom the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. MILLER] referred. Curiously enough in the splendid Commonwealth which I represent, fifteen hundred miles from the nearest tidewater and a mile or a mile and a half above the sea, there is a strong sentiment in favor of a goodly navy. I think I never cast a vote in this House for battleships where my constituents would not have upheld me had my vote been for a larger number than I voted for. I have been one of those who for a number of years past have been in favor of a two-battleship building program, and now, when in the midst of war's alarm, with a good deal of warm talk at home, the Committee on Naval Affairs keeps its program down to two, and I am inclined to follow the committee, although with the battleship already provided for that would make three this year. The more I have thought of the matter, however, and the more I have read of what is going on over yonder in Europe the more doubt I have had as to the wisdom of building great battleships at this time. Certainly what has occurred in the theater of war about the North Sea has not tended to increase our faith in these mighty leviathans of the deep. We have seen the little deadly wasps of the sea keeping the great battleships under cover of land fortifications, or cowering in midsea fearful to attack, seeking self-protection. In this condition of affairs it seems to me of doubtful wisdom for us to go on building these great ships, which may within a very brief period of time be found to be very largely obsolete or out of date for the battles of the future. It is true that the great naval engagement which is likely to mark the close of the present war may demonstrate the efficiency of the present superdreadnaught; but that is not likely, and in any event the close of this war must find Europe exhausted and in no condition to attack us or threaten us in any way. Then there is another consideration. Whatever caused this war, whether too much militarism or too little in some places, whether it was the lust of power or the desire to use the well-prepared mailed fist, the great nations of Europe are in the most lamentable struggle of all times. Their citizens are being killed by the thousands, their homes laid waste, their property destroyed. In a short time, through sheer exhaustion, this must end, and then inevitably there must be some arrangement for the reduction of armament, and when that time comes this great Nation, the greatest power for peace on earth, would be in an embarrassing position if it had on hand a great program of naval expenditure. In consideration of all these things I shall vote for one battleship. [Applause.]

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. STEPHENS].

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, I had not intended to offer an amendment, as I later propose to offer, until after the amendment of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] has been voted upon. My amendment is to further increase our naval program by building battle cruisers, and I want to call the attention of the House and the country to the fact that the American Nation has not one battle cruiser, that Great Britain has nine battle cruisers, with a speed of from 23 knots to 35.7 knots; that Germany has four battle cruisers with a speed up to 29 knots.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Yes.

Mr. HOBSON. And there are also four additional building in Germany, making eight.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Yes; there are in addition to those named four under construction by the German Navy. Japan has two battle cruisers, with two under construction. Italy has four battle cruisers. The United States has none. The fastest battleship in the United States has a speed of a little over 21 knots. In the British Navy the fastest battleship has a speed of 25 knots, and in the German 23 knots. The fastest armored cruiser we have is one of 23 knots, and the fastest armored cruiser that Great Britain has has a speed of a little less than 25 knots.

Mr. Chairman, we need ships with speed, and we need submarines. These two classes of fighting and defense craft have the attention of the whole world to-day, because of the remarkable work done by them in recent naval encounters. Mr. Chair-



man, the United States Navy has not a single battle cruiser, while other nations are provided as follows:

*Battle cruisers.*

Nations.	Built.	Building.	Speed.
			<i>Knots.</i>
Great Britain.....	9	1	26 to 35
Germany.....	4	4	27 to 29
Japan.....	2	2	27 to 28
Russia.....		4	25
United States.....	None.	None.	

Mr. Chairman, the fact that our fastest battleship has a speed of only 21.22 knots, against battleships in British Navy of 25 knots and battleships in German Navy of 23 knots emphasizes our positive need of speedy battle cruisers. I hope my amendment, when offered, will carry.

I yield back the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back two minutes.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] 10 minutes. [Applause.]

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to finish the presentation to the committee of the testimony of Admiral Fiske. As I have already shown you, according to his judgment, our Navy at present is so much superior to the German Navy, and consequently all other navies except England's, that a naval engagement would, in all probability, result in our destroying the entire German Navy without the loss, scarcely, of any of ours. That is what his statements lead to. Now, he went on and then told what was the matter with our Navy. He pointed out the defect about it, and the defect was not that we have not got enough ships, not that we have not sufficient number of dreadnaughts, not that they are not more powerful than any ships in the world, but he said that there are two defects in our Navy. One is that we do not give our personnel a sufficient amount of target practice. His idea is that a slight advantage in the skill of shooting will turn the scale, and that therefore it is all important that we should give our men the highest training that target practice can give them. That is one of the two defects that he pointed out. The other one was that it is not only necessary to give the training to the officers and the men upon each ship, but that it is just as essential that the four ships that make a squadron should be trained to maneuver and to engage in battle exercises and be trained to operate in battle as a unit, and that all the units, all the squadrons in a navy, should be trained and developed to operate not only as an entire battleship fleet, but in connection with all the destroyers and submarines, so as to make one great fighting machine. [Applause.] He says that that is what we have neglected, and it is the truth. It is just like I have told you all the time in my speeches, and you never did believe me; that is, that we have neglected what is vital and important in our Navy because those things do not require any appropriation of money [applause], and everything that requires us to squander the public funds we have never neglected. [Applause.] There is just the trouble about it.

Now, applying that, he says we have 21 of our 33 battleships in good shape, and he says there are 12 of them that have been put out of commission and in ordinary and in reserve; that more than one-third of all our battleships are fixed so that they can not be used in war. He says that it will take five years, if war should break out, even to get those 12 ships in a shape where we could use them. He said we have not got the officers, we have not got the men, and even after we should get them, though we could get them in two years, that after we have the full quota of men and officers to make these 12 battleships useful, it would then take us three years to put them in fighting shape. Now, instead of trying to remedy the defect, we have been doing everything we could, and we are going to repeat it to-day, to make the thing worse. The naval officers tell us that if you authorize two more battleships to-day the only possibility of using them will be to take the officers and men off of two other ships and put them on those two new ones, and then instead of having 12 useless battleships you will have 14, and the more battleships you authorize, the worse you make the condition. At the same time that the battleships are increasing the shortage of officers we have been permitting this plucking board to eliminate 15 more every year. That is the kind of folly we have been indulging in. Now, my friend from Minnesota [Mr. MILLER] gives his view about the thing, and I believe every man in the House has his views. I have my own, but I have always learned this, that when I am sick and I do not know what is the matter with me or how to doctor myself, I go and get a doctor who does know. When a man has a lawsuit

and he can not attend to it himself, he goes to a lawyer who does know how to attend to it, and that is the way we do in life in all of its departments. Now, here is the proposition where we are all ignorant, because we have not studied it enough, and I appeal to you to accept the testimony of the only men who do know about it and to act upon the facts that they give you. Nothing else is common sense.

Now, after Admiral Fiske had given that testimony which shows that, according to his judgment, our Navy is absolutely superior to the German Navy on the facts stated, that the probability of a battle was that it would result in our destroying all of their ships without losing anything, then he was given two opportunities to say something in favor of more battleships, and I want to call the attention of the committee to the fact that the gentleman from Tennessee, the chairman, evidently was disappointed when Admiral Fiske completed his views, and he asked him this question:

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Will the gentleman from Illinois yield me a few minutes?

Mr. MANN. I will yield the gentleman three minutes.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Here is what took place:

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, in connection with the question that was asked you about the training of men and practice and everything, would you be understood as eliminating the construction of more ships, and devoting all energy to the training of the men and target practice?

Admiral Fiske. No, sir. I am afraid that would be a swing of the pendulum too much the other way. I think we have got to look forward to a good many years of competition, and I think the more we can keep our minds on the idea that it is competition the better off we will be. It is not what we do so much as what the other fellows do. It is wonderfully like a baseball team. It is not what your people do; it is what the team does against which you have to play.

Look at the other fellow, he says; that was his answer to the gentleman from Tennessee. Well, let us look at the other fellow. Who is the other fellow? If Germany is the other fellow, what has she been doing? She has not been increasing her navy, she has actually lost 45 ships and, according to all the probabilities in the future, in the next six months she will lose a great many more than she has up to this time. The same way with England, the same way with France and Russia and all others. The probabilities are that they are going to lose a great many more than they have already lost. Now, if you look at the other fellow, then what is the conclusion? Certainly that we need no more battleships. But that was not satisfactory. So the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FARR] made an effort to get Admiral Fiske to change this testimony, and here is what he said:

Mr. FARR. What do we lack?

Admiral Fiske. The fundamental thing is a general staff, which shall arrange the plans. That is fundamental.

He did not tell him we lacked any battleships or dreadnaughts or any other kind of ships; he did not answer him as he wanted him to answer. That was not satisfactory to Mr. FARR, and so he said:

What in the way of ships, etc.?

He presses it on him to know if we do not need more ships. Admiral Fiske says:

We have not enough personnel to man all the ships.

That is the testimony of the experts. I will tell you gentlemen of this committee if the Members could take the 1,300 printed pages of testimony and see what the naval officers, the only men who know about it, say, they would not vote for any battleships. No battleship would be put through this House in this bill if there were not profits in it. It is the money power behind it which is the foundation of it. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER], if I may.

Mr. GARDNER. I want to read from Admiral Fiske's evidence:

Admiral Fiske. The policy of the General Board is to cut down what we really think we ought to have, because if we told Congress what we really think we ought to have they would say we are crazy.

Admiral Fiske has asked for four battleships.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HENSLEY].

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, since I have been a member of the Naval Affairs Committee I have to the best of my ability given careful study to the questions that came before the committee. I have discovered this, Mr. Chairman, that upon any proposition where individuals or institutions were interested, where there was something to be gotten out of the project that was proposed to our committee, when a stand has been taken against those projects, invariably the protests made by those directly interested have been exceedingly vicious and ugly. For the position that I have taken upon the naval questions

invariably the press of this country, the press in the sections of the country where the increases in the main go, has been indignant and has said the ugliest things possible about the members of the Naval Affairs Committee who have not supported their views in respect to these increases.

Only a few moments ago the gentleman from Washington [Mr. HUMPHREY] was making an argument, and he insisted that for many years there had been only one battleship in the Pacific Ocean; that the Pacific coast had not been properly defended; that we should have, with the Navy that is in existence and under the control of the Naval Establishment of this country, more battleships in the Pacific Ocean. In that, I say, the gentleman may be right, for they may be needed as badly out there as anywhere, but when I got to my feet and put the question to the gentleman from Washington whether, in the face of that condition, with only one battleship in the Pacific, they had not gotten along first rate and were not doing very well, without anybody suffering, the gentleman from Washington got very indignant and replied to me in a way, as I see it and understand it, that was ungentlemanly, ugly, and insolent.

As soon as I put the question to the gentleman and he answered me in the fashion in which he did, I recalled that the gentleman had been before the Naval Affairs Committee both last year and this year. I did not suppose that because of the opposition of some of the members of that committee to projects that he was insisting upon that the gentleman from Washington entertained any ill feeling for the members of the committee who did not agree with him. Last year when before the Naval Affairs Committee the gentleman from Washington made a very vigorous appeal, a very eloquent plea, for increases in the Naval Establishment, so as to afford them protection along the Pacific coast. But, my friends, at the conclusion of his statement he was as insistent, he was as eloquent, when he came to the proposition of building a dry dock out in his district as he was in any other portion of his statement before the Naval Affairs Committee. And not only that, but only a few days ago the gentleman from Washington appeared before the Naval Affairs Committee, and on that occasion he was appealing for national defense, but at the same time asking for \$20,000—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. HENSLEY. May I have one minute?

Mr. PADGETT. I yield one minute more to the gentleman.

Mr. HENSLEY. Appealing for an appropriation for a building slip, to cost \$20,000, in his district. So I say now, my friends, that this is the attitude of these gentlemen who are appealing for increases, who are insisting upon more battleships, and all of those propositions. They are asking for those things that inure to the benefit of the people of their communities. And so I pass over the ugly, the insulting, the insolent remarks made by the gentleman from Washington, knowing full well that the membership of this House know him to be one of the most insulting and partisan Members of the House. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield three minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. LEVY].

Mr. LEVY. Mr. Chairman, in explanation of my vote I desire to say that I am, and always have been, in favor of a large Navy, but under existing circumstances it is my intention to vote for two battleships for the simple reason that should favorable action be taken by this House on the four-battleship proposition it is likely to be misconstrued on the theory that we are in danger of war. I, however, am of an entirely different opinion. My views coincide with those of the distinguished chairman of the Military Affairs Committee [Mr. HAY], who, when the Army appropriation bill was under consideration recently by this body, made the following statement:

That we are further off from war than at any time in our history.

For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I hope the committee will indorse the two-battleship program, as proposed by the Naval Affairs Committee. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. PADGETT. How much time did the gentleman use?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman used two minutes.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, how does the time stand?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN] has 9 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Tennessee 13 minutes.

Mr. PADGETT. I will ask the gentleman to use his time.

Mr. MANN. Is the gentleman going to close in one speech?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. MANN. I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ROBERTS].

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, about two hours ago I heard from the lips of the Democratic leader the statement that this country for the fiscal year 1916 would be facing a deficit of forty or fifty millions of dollars, if I remember the figures correctly.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. The gentleman evidently did not hear me correctly.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I read his statement, however.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I said that there was a probable deficit of \$20,000,000 in all expenditures, which, of course, the gentleman understands does not include the Post Office Department.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Let me ask the gentleman on what theory or hypothesis there is to be a deficiency of \$20,000,000 in ordinary expenditures?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Because the estimated expenditures under these appropriation bills will exceed the estimated receipts to that extent.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. What affects the receipts for 1916?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Well, I will say to the gentleman that the estimated receipts are \$735,000,000, which, of course, includes the receipts from the new revenue bill. The receipts last year, if the gentleman will allow me, were \$734,000,000.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I have only five minutes, and I do not want the gentleman to take up all my time.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. So practically the receipts, including those derived from the new revenue bill, are as much as last year, but the estimated expenditures have increased.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Well, Mr. Chairman, if the estimated deficit of 1916 is no nearer to what will actually occur than the actual receipts under the Democratic internal-revenue and income tax have been, as compared with the estimates respecting them, I think it is fair to say we shall have a deficit of not less than \$50,000,000, and probably more, if the same policies and the same laws enacted by the Democracy are continued on the statute books. [Applause on the Republican side.]

If the gentleman from Alabama wants to economize and keep the expenditures within the receipts, why does he select the military defense of the country for the object of his economy? Why not economize in river and harbor appropriations and in public buildings appropriations and in good roads appropriations and in many other of the items in the departmental supply bills, and not effect all economies at the expense of the military efficiency of this Government? And if the gentleman wants to effect these economies, why does he not go the whole limit and cut out all naval building, and by so doing obviate any deficiency in the year 1916?

Mr. Chairman, the building program that has been presented by the committee here is one of the fairest and best-balanced programs that has come out of that committee since I have been a member of it. Many people throughout the country have been swept off their feet by this war in Europe and have clamored that Congress, through its Military Committees, should make extraordinary provisions in the Army appropriation bill and in the Naval appropriation bill. But the Committee on Naval Affairs—and I am glad to say also the Committee on Military Affairs—have not been swept from their moorings by this clamor. They have gone ahead on the even tenor of their way, and this program of 2 battleships, 17 submarines, 6 destroyers, an oil ship, a transport, and a hospital ship is one of the fairest programs that has ever been reported.

The gentleman from Alabama would cripple the battleship feature by cutting out one. He would limit the number of submarines. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that there is no form of warship that so appeals to the public to-day as the submarine. It has demonstrated itself. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I understand the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] intends to close in one speech?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. MANN. I have four minutes?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN] is recognized for four minutes.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I really had not intended to speak upon this paragraph at all, but I think I shall use the four minutes in submitting an observation or two.

Under the appropriation bill of last year we authorized an extra battleship over the two that were directly carried in the bill, by reason of having obtained \$12,000,000 from Greece on the sale of two battleships. That \$12,000,000, however, was covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts and has been expended with other money received in the Treasury, and



the free money in the Treasury now is getting very low, although that battleship has not yet been built. The \$12,000,000 we have spent for other purposes, and if we now authorize two battleships in this bill it will mean that in truth we shall be commencing, practically, three new battleships instead of two, and we shall have to pay for the work that is done on the three instead of for the work that is done on the two.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANN. No; I do not yield to anyone.

Now, I commend the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD]. I have always regarded him as a great statesman, and I do now. [Applause.] He accepts the consequences of his folly. Having brought the Government to the condition where the receipts are rapidly becoming less than enough to support the Government, he accepts the situation and proposes to cut down the expenses. Of course I know that the Democratic side of the House conveniently lays upon the European war every difficulty in the way of Government. But we on our side of the House know that the trouble with the receipts of the Government is the Underwood tariff law, and the trouble with the country is Democratic misrule. [Applause on the Republican side.]

Now, it is an old and accepted doctrine that you can not have your cake and eat it, too. The country has placed the Democracy in control of the Government. However much the country may desire the enlargement of the Navy, the country must understand that while the Democrats are running the Government and enacting bad legislation there will not be money enough to provide two battleships a year. Hence I propose to accept the consequences and vote with the gentleman from Alabama for one battleship and in favor of economy. [Applause.] And I will say to my friends on this side of the aisle that I am in favor of economy all along the line. As long as the Democratic policies are in control we shall have trouble about the revenues and the expenditures. When the Republicans again gain the ascendancy we shall have money enough and we can make the necessary expenditures. [Applause on the Republican side.]

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I shall not consume the time of the committee in the useless and futile purpose of replying to the stale and oft-repeated assertions of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN]. Everybody knows that the country is to be congratulated on the fact that we have a Democratic administration and that Democrats are in control of the Government. [Applause on the Democratic side.] We are meeting many of the extravagances that were put upon the country under Republican administrations. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

Now let us come to the discussion of this matter immediately before the House. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] announced a text which I accept. He said if a man was sick and did not know himself, he should go to a doctor and follow the advice of the doctor. If he had a legal matter and did not know himself, he should go to an attorney and follow the advice of his attorney. Those are sound maxims, but the gentleman does not follow them.

Every single expert that we have, without exception; every admiral, every officer that has come before the Committee on Naval Affairs, not only this year but in the years past, has said that the battleships were the mainstay and the defense and the offense in time of war on the sea, and nothing else can or should take their place. They are the fighting machines. They are the machines that will control the sea. Somebody says that the battleships have not fired a gun. They have accomplished the same result. If there had been a battle and they had destroyed every ship that Germany had, what would have been the result? England would have had control of the sea, and nothing more. She has got control of the sea to-day by the power of her battleships having all of the German fleet either interned abroad or hiding in her own ports behind the protection of her forts. England has absolutely destroyed the commerce of Germany, export and import, amounting to more than \$5,000,000,000 a year.

The battleship is the important weapon of war. Not only that, but something was said here a moment ago about battle cruisers. A battle cruiser would be a very great weapon for certain purposes, but it is not the principal fighting machine. A battleship constructed under a modern program carries armor of 13½ inches. A battle cruiser carries 8-inch armor. Now, they talk about the speed. That does not settle anything. In the battle that was fought the other day it was the gun power that decided the fight. England had 13½-inch guns and Germany was fighting with 8½-inch guns. On the question of speed, if the cruiser comes within shooting distance of the battleship, the battleship is within shooting distance of the cruiser, so that the battleship would destroy the cruiser if she stood before the battleship's fire.

The purpose of the cruiser is not to fight, but it is to destroy commerce and to act in the nature of a scout. The aeroplane is being developed to do the scouting and the reconnoitering, and is being used for that purpose. England has nine battle cruisers; but if you will notice the statistics, she is building only one at the present time.

Mr. HOBSON. Will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. HOBSON. The gentleman will notice that with the 1 which is now building Great Britain will then have 10.

Mr. PADGETT. That is true.

Mr. HOBSON. Ten to thirty-six, or more than one-quarter as many battle cruisers as battleships.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. HOBSON. While Germany has 8 to 20, Japan 4 to 6, and Russia 4 to 7.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; but all of them recognize that the battleship is the implement that will ultimately decide the fighting, and so determine the victory or the defeat.

Now, let us take the advice of the men who know. The gentleman spoke in glowing terms of Admiral Fletcher. I am only quoting the language of Admiral Fletcher in this statement that I am making before you. Every single officer who appeared before us said that the supreme demand of our Navy is for battleships. Gentlemen speak of the speed. A cruiser is a fast vessel, sacrificing its fighting power for speed; but a battle cruiser of 30,000 tons displacement would cost \$20,000,000, as against \$15,000,000 for a battleship. It would cost 25 per cent more a year to operate it than it would a battleship. So that we come down to the vital question in this matter, Shall we stand by and take the recommendation and the opinions of the men who know, and the men upon whom we must rely in the time of battle? They are honorable men, they are learned men, they are true, patriotic men, devoted to the interests and the welfare of the country, and they come without exception and tell us that the battleship is par excellence above every other consideration the thing that the American Navy needs. When we have secured the quota of these that we need, we can turn our attention to other things.

Mr. MILLER. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. MILLER. Having in mind the present state of the American Navy, does not the gentleman think American naval efficiency would be increased by constructing a unit of four battle cruisers for the immediate future, rather than four battleships?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not, and every officer in the Navy who testified said no. Every one of them recognized and recommended battleships.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Will the gentleman yield on that question?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Does not the gentleman think that the officers on board the ships who have to do the fighting in time of war and who want to be carried safely to victory and to the shore again, would recommend the thing that they thought would do the best fighting?

Mr. PADGETT. Why, of course. That is axiomatic.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am not going to take up further time in the presentation of this matter. We have these men. We rely upon them in the time of danger. We trust them in the hour of battle. We put them at the front. They have studied these questions. They are responsible for results. Let us, as sensible men, accept the universal, unbroken testimony of these men and stand by their recommendations. There are several propositions here—

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. PADGETT. I have not time to yield, much as I would like to yield to the gentleman from Illinois. There are several propositions here—one for four battleships. The committee have reported in favor of two. Then there is a proposition to reduce it to one, and there is another proposition to wipe out all and have none. The committee gave careful heed and consideration to them; the department did the same. The committee have recommended two battleships; the department recommended two. The General Board wanted more, but the administration stands for two. It appears in the record that the President has approved the recommendation for two. So we have not only the administration, but we have every officer of the Navy standing solidly behind two battleships as the implements of war that will do the fighting and determine the issue and decide the result of victory or defeat.

I call for a vote.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD] to the amendment of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON].

Mr. GORDON. Let it be reported.

The question was taken, and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I ask for a division, Mr. Chairman.

The committee divided; and there were—ayes 122, noes 123.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be again reported.

The Clerk again reported the amendment, as follows:

Strike out the word "four" in the Hobson amendment and insert "one."

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. If the amendment for one battleship is adopted, will there be an opportunity to vote for two battleships?

The CHAIRMAN. That is not a parliamentary inquiry; but there will be, of course.

Mr. MANN. If the amendment is adopted, then the Hobson amendment will come next for a vote.

The Chair appointed as tellers Mr. UNDERWOOD and Mr. HOBSON.

The committee again divided; and the tellers reported that there were 142 ayes and 129 noes.

So the amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

Mr. MANN. But, Mr. Chairman, the vote now recurs on the Hobson amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands that; but it may be that the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER] is to the Hobson amendment.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I do not know the exact place my amendment comes in, but I want it to fit in the appropriate place.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amend, page 64, in line 6, by striking out the words "highest practicable speed" and insert in lieu thereof the words "speed of not less than 28 knots per hour."

The CHAIRMAN. That is not germane to the Hobson amendment. The question now is on the Hobson amendment as amended.

Mr. SLAYDEN. A parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. SLAYDEN. The effect of this if adopted would be to change the paragraph at the top of page 64 and provide for one battleship.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; if it is adopted.

The question was being taken when Mr. PADGETT demanded tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chair appointed as tellers Mr. UNDERWOOD and Mr. HOBSON.

The committee divided, and the tellers reported that there were 139 ayes and 148 noes.

So the amendment of Mr. HOBSON was rejected.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an amendment.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the committee I desire to offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER].

The Clerk read as follows:

Amend, page 64, in line 6, by striking out the words "highest practicable speed" and insert in lieu thereof the words "speed of not less than 28 knots per hour."

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from California desire to offer an amendment to the amendment?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. No; Mr. Chairman, my amendment is to the paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Alabama desire to offer an amendment to the amendment?

Mr. HOBSON. No; Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I offer my amendment as a substitute for the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment to the amendment by Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. Page 64, line 6, after the words "highest practicable speed," insert the words "at least equal to those of any known battleships."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment to the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey.

The question was taken, and the amendment to the amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The question now recurs on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. FOWLER) there were 20 ayes and 113 noes.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. FOWLER. Now, Mr. Chairman, I ask that my amendment be modified so as to provide for a speed of not less than 25 knots.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amend, page 64, in line 6, by striking out the words "highest practicable speed" and insert in lieu thereof the words "speed of not less than 25 knots per hour."

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to speak upon this amendment for five minutes. [Cries of "Regular order!"]

The CHAIRMAN. The regular order is demanded.

The question was taken, and the amendment was rejected.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, now I offer my amendment to the paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama has offered an amendment to the paragraph.

Mr. HOBSON. No, Mr. Chairman; my amendment comes in at the end of the paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. STEPHENS].

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. STEPHENS of California:

Page 64, in line 4, after the word "battleship," insert the words "and one battleship cruiser."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. STEPHENS of California) there were—ayes 65, noes 124.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I move to amend, in line 4, page 64, by striking out the word "battleship" and substituting the words "battle cruisers."

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 64, in line 4, strike out the word "battleship" and insert in lieu thereof the words "battle cruisers."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota.

The question was taken, and the amendment was rejected.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment, which I send to the desk and ask to have read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amend, page 64, in line 6, after the word "class," by inserting the following:

"Including not less than four 18-inch guns capable of throwing shells of 500 pounds of high explosives at longest range of battleship guns."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. FOWLER) there were—ayes 5, noes 102.

So the amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The question now is on the amendment of the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] to strike out the paragraph.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. WITHERSPOON) there were—ayes 75, noes 162.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment as a new paragraph, which I send to the desk and ask to have read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. HOBSON: At the end of line 8 insert as a new paragraph the following:

"Two first-class battleships carrying as powerful armament as any vessel of their class, to have the greatest desirable radius of action, with a speed of not less than 30 knots, and as heavy armor as possible to permit the foregoing requirements, and to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not to exceed \$14,000,000."

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order on that.

Mr. BUTLER. Is that offered as a new paragraph?

The CHAIRMAN. It is.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I desire to be heard upon the amendment.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the paragraph just passed is the one to which an amendment providing for battleships is germane.



Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be heard on the proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will hear the gentleman on the point of order.

Mr. HOBSON. The point of order is that this is a different type of battleship.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Oh, no; that is not my point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman makes the point of order that the gentleman from Alabama should have offered his amendment to the paragraph just passed.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I feel it ought to be a new paragraph in the bill. If the Chair will read the amendment, he will see that it is not in line with the wording of the battleships provided in the bill, and I felt myself that when the amendment for one battle cruiser was offered as a substitute for battleships in the paragraph it was subject to the point of order. But this is a separate paragraph and is not subject to the point of order. We have a right to make various types of ships in the bill, and this is a type of ship we are going to eventually come to, and I wish to lay it before the Congress, and incidentally before the country, in advance of its final adoption.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is simply for battle cruisers. It substitutes the word "cruiser" for the word "ship."

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will call attention to the fact that it is not for a battle cruiser, but it is an amendment providing for battleships.

Mr. HOBSON. Very well; if the Chair wishes to call it battle cruiser, well and good.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not wish to call it anything.

Mr. HOBSON. I am not going to take time. I ask unanimous consent to change that and to make it a battle cruiser. What is there in a name, Mr. Chairman? I would like to be recognized on the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has not yet decided the point of order.

Mr. HOBSON. I thought the point of order had been withdrawn.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Oh, the gentleman can not withdraw points of order for me.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would have sustained the point of order if the amendment had remained as the gentleman introduced it, but as the gentleman has changed it—

Mr. HOBSON. I suggest to change it to battle cruisers. What is there in a name?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will overrule the point of order.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer another amendment, with the word "cruiser" substituted.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the Chair sustains the point of order to the first amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama, and the gentleman now offers another amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Two first-class battle cruisers, carrying as powerful armament as any vessel of their class, to have the greatest desirable radius of action, with a speed of not less than 30 knots, and as heavy armor as possible to permit the foregoing requirements, and to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not to exceed \$14,000,000.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will hear the gentleman.

Mr. MANN. The rule, as I recall it, is that it is in order to insert a provision for any new fighting ship where the Navy now possesses one of that class, but where a new type of ship is to be provided for, then that is not in continuation of a work now in progress and must come in in the form of legislation.

Now no one claims, I think, certainly if they do claim it it is only for the purpose of argument, that there are now any battle cruisers in the Navy, hence this is an authorization for a new type of fighting ship and not in order under the rulings which have been made from time to time on that subject.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I do not care to be heard upon the point as to the matter of its being in order, but I will say, if the Chair holds that it is out of order, that I will offer this amendment, and instead of "battle cruiser," offer it simply as a "cruiser."

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is ready to rule.

Mr. GARDNER. I would like to be heard upon the point of order.

Mr. HOBSON. I will not keep the attention of the House longer.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks the amendment is clearly in order, and it has been ruled again and again that the naval appropriation bill may carry warships and things of that sort. The Chair, therefore, overrules the point of order.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, this would give a type of ship with qualities that all the world will have inside of 10 years. Now, I am not a prophet nor the son of a prophet, but I will take occasion now to state that at the Naval War College in Newport in 1907, we worked out a series of maneuvers on the war board, and at that time I requested that ships as high as 30,000 tons should be imagined as existing and they were called "Hobsons." It was believed at that time it would be many, many years before the world ever came to the 30,000-ton ship if it ever reached that size, but all the nations are now building them.

The ship called for in my amendment would be of about 40,000 tons. The principle is this: The useful weight—the displacement—varies as to the cube of a linear dimension, and the dead weight—the hull, decks, and the like, like a surface—vary as to the square; so the larger the dimension and the larger the ship then the larger the proportion of the weight will be available for offensive and defensive purposes. We are bound to come to these large ships before long. We should be the first. The vessel would have the high qualities of both the dreadnaught and the dreadnaught cruiser. I realize that this would be a very large increase over what already has been provided; but let me remind my friends that to-day we are not increasing as fast as six nations of the world. Take the matter of capital ships building. Great Britain stands first, with 17; Russia stands second, and ties with Germany, each with 11; France stands fourth, with 8; Japan fifth, with 6; and America comes in sixth, with 4. Now, take the tonnage. In tonnage building to-day Great Britain stands first, with 556,000 tons; Russia stands second, with 407,000 tons; Germany stands third, with 354,000 tons; France stands fourth, with 211,000 tons; Japan stands fifth, with 180,000 tons; and America stands sixth, with 129,000 tons. Do not let anybody imagine that if they vote for my amendment they tend to have the American program on the basis of any two nations. It would barely get America up to fourth place. To-day we are the fourth great nation of the world. We will, when the ships now building are completed, be below France. Even according to this program of two battleships a year, it will not be many years until we are the sixth navy in the world. Now, gentlemen here may take the responsibility. I am going to give them the opportunity. I am going to give them an opportunity to vote down this amendment and say that America shall descend to be the sixth-rate nation in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama.

The question was taken, and the Chairman announced the yeas seemed to have it.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a division. I would like to look at the Members; I shall not ask for tellers.

The committee divided; and there were—ayes 54, yeas 121.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as an additional paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report it.

The Clerk read as follows:

On page 64, at the end of line 8, add as a new paragraph the following:

Two scouts, to have the highest practicable speed and greatest desirable radius of action and to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not to exceed \$4,000,000 each."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I desire to be heard, but I will not use up the five minutes. I want to call the attention of Members to the fact that our fleet to-day is without eyes. It can not see a hundred miles. It ought to see across the Atlantic Ocean, and as far as from the Pacific coast to the Hawaiian Islands, and from there to Asia. It is the only Navy in the world whose fleet has no scouting vessel, and has no vessel that can be used for an ocean scout. The great battle cruisers and special scout cruisers are the eyes of the fleets of Europe. The former can make reconnaissance in force. That is, they can fight while they scout.

The only scout vessels we have are the antiquated type of the *Birmingham* class, that can not keep the seas—little, small cruisers that ought to be used as gunboats or put into the discard. So to-day our fleet, which lacks aeroplanes with which to scout, and lacks Zeppelins with which to scout, and which lacks enough torpedo-boat destroyers to care for the defense of the fleet, has neither battle cruisers to scout with nor any scouts proper. We maintain the 21-battleship fleet in a condition where it simply could not fight on equal terms with a 21-battleship fleet of any other country. Our fleet is in a condition of inferiority that is exceedingly serious. The General Board urged that we provide four scouts in this bill, two for each division of

the fleet. Instead of that we have not a single one. I am not going to dwell on it. This is a proposition not to increase the Navy. You voted down those propositions. The proposition is whether we are going to make the Navy we now have efficient or not, and on that basis I give the membership a chance to vote.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The question was taken, and the Chair announced that the yeas seemed to have it.

Mr. HOBSON. Division, Mr. Chairman. I want to look at those also.

The committee divided; and there were—ayes 55, yeas 99.

So the amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Six torpedo-boat destroyers, to have the highest practicable speed, to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not to exceed \$925,000 each.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to make that eight.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

Mr. HOBSON. Make it eight. Strike out the word "six" and insert the word "eight."

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 64, line 9, strike out the word "six" and insert the word "eight."

Mr. HOBSON. I do not do that, Mr. Chairman, to increase, as I said. This body has determined on two battleships, but the principle of strategy the world over is that every battleship to be effective and have its defense against submarines ought to have four destroyers. It is simply to make the appropriation for two battleships symmetrical.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The question was taken, and the Chair announced that the yeas seemed to have it.

Mr. HOBSON. Division, Mr. Chairman.

The committee divided; and there were—ayes 50, yeas 101. So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Washington offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 64, after line 11, insert the following:

"Provided, That three of said torpedo boats herein authorized shall be built on the Pacific coast: *Provided further*, That the cost of construction on the Pacific coast does not exceed the cost of construction on the Atlantic coast plus the cost of transportation from the Atlantic to the Pacific."

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to that.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The question was taken, and the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 64, line 11, after the word "each," insert the following:

"Provided, Such torpedo-boat destroyers shall be so constructed with respect to draft and beam as to enable them to use such coastal waterways and canals as afford means of safe communication in times of peace and strategic advantage in times of war."

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order on that.

Mr. MOORE. I ask the gentleman to reserve his point of order. I did not expect, of course, that this amendment would pass, but—

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Tennessee reserve his point of order?

Mr. PADGETT. It is too late.

Mr. MOORE. Just for a moment. I want to make a request for unanimous consent.

Mr. PADGETT. Very well.

Mr. MOORE. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to extend my remarks in the RECORD on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the gentleman's request?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] makes a point of order on the amendment. The Chair sustains the point of order. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

One submarine to be of seagoing type to have a surface speed of not less than 20 knots, to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not

exceeding \$1,400,000, and 16 submarines to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not exceeding \$550,000 each, and the sum of \$3,405,000 is hereby appropriated for said purposes to be available until expended. The sum of \$800,000 is hereby reappropriated out of the total unobligated balances of all annual appropriations for the Naval Establishment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, and made available until expended for the construction of the submarine torpedo boats herein authorized.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order on that portion of the paragraph commencing with line 18 down to and including the word "authorized" in line 23.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair sustains the point of order.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 64, line 18, after the word "expended," insert: "The following sums are hereby reappropriated out of the unobligated balances of the following appropriations for the Naval Establishment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914: 'Equipment of vessels,' \$625,000; 'Steam machinery,' \$175,000, and made available until expended for the construction of the submarine torpedo boats herein authorized."

Mr. FITZGERALD. I make a point of order, Mr. Chairman, against the amendment in that it makes this money available until expended, in contravention of the covering-in act, which requires appropriations to be covered into the Treasury at the end of two years.

Mr. PADGETT. The practice of the Navy is to carry it until it is expended.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has no question but that it is subject to a point of order.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I understand that the "Increase of the Navy" is excepted from the covering-in act. The law exempts the "Increase of the Navy."

Mr. FITZGERALD. Oh, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the gentleman any law there?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not have it with me. Does the Chair sustain the point of order?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is compelled to sustain it unless the gentleman will cite the law authorizing it.

Mr. PADGETT. I move to strike out the words "and made available until expended."

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Tennessee.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 64, line 18, after the word "expended," insert:

"The following sums are hereby reappropriated out of the unobligated balances of the following appropriations for the Naval Establishment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914: 'Equipment of vessels,' \$625,000; 'Steam machinery,' \$175,000, for the construction of the submarine torpedo boats herein authorized."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The question was taken, and the Chairman announced that the yeas seemed to have it.

Mr. FITZGERALD. A division, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. A division is demanded.

The committee divided; and there were—ayes 133, yeas 20.

So the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, the Clerk, in reporting the amendment, struck out the words "and made available." The only words to be stricken out are "until expended." It is to be made "available for the construction of the submarines herein authorized." The only words to be stricken out are "until expended."

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment will be modified as indicated.

There was no objection.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute for the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. SLAYDEN] offers a substitute for the amendment, which the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. SLAYDEN: On page 64 of the bill, under "Increase of the Navy," strike out lines 12 to 23, inclusive, and insert in lieu of the provisions for the same the following:

"Three submarines of seagoing type, to have a surface speed of not less than 20 knots, at a total cost not exceeding \$1,600,000 each; and 30 submarines of coast-defense type, at a total cost not exceeding \$665,000 each, and the sum of \$10,000,000 is hereby appropriated for said purposes, to be available until expended."

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I want to say just a word with reference to that. A few moments ago the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] in his fervid oration in defense of a type of war vessel which, in the opinion of many people, is rapidly disappearing as an effective weapon, and which in the present war has disappeared almost completely by immuring itself in certain harbors and refuges of safety, said that the battle was not to the swift, for which he has scriptural au-



thority, but that it was to the biggest ship and the heaviest guns. That contradicts the report made by the distinguished British admiral, Sir David Beatty, the other day, in reporting the result of the conflict in the North Sea. He said that he abandoned the pursuit of his crippled and retreating enemy because the presence of submarines was suspected. Now, Mr. Chairman, experts differ as to the value of the battleship. Expert PADGETT, of Tennessee, differs from Expert Admiral Sir Percy Scott; and I submit that a man who has spent 40 years on the sea and who has achieved such distinction in his profession, and who has been decorated in the manner in which they reward service of that kind in that country, is better entitled to the confidence of this House on the matter of submarines.

But, Mr. Chairman, the submarines are making their own argument very effectively every day, as reported in this afternoon's paper which I had in my hand only a few minutes ago, and which shows that they are extending the war zone into waters which heretofore have been regarded as practically lakes of the British Empire. The submarines are making their own argument, and I shall not detain the House any further.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas.

The question being taken; on a division (demanded by Mr. SLAYDEN) there were—ayes 53, noes 86.

Accordingly the amendment was rejected.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the word "sixteen," in line 15, on page 64, and substitute therefor the word "two."

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 64, line 15, strike out "sixteen" and insert in lieu thereof "two."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, is no debate allowed on this amendment?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that, according to all the testimony by the naval experts, there is not the slightest justification for 16 submarines. We already have built, building, and authorized 59. There are only two concerns in the United States that build them, and they have been years and years building those already authorized, and there is just no way to get them built. In addition to that, the naval experts say that we do not need any more submarines. Admiral Fletcher, the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, was urged to say that we needed a large number, and he declined to do it. He said it might be advisable to build a few more, but he told us that 50 were as good as 100 or 500, and that is the testimony of all the experts who have testified on the subject.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to call the attention of the committee to this fact, that these experts all say it is an erroneous idea that we ought to have enough submarines to station a number in each harbor to protect it. They say that is not the function of the submarine; that the submarines ought to be organized into a flotilla, to go with the battle fleet in case of war; that they ought to be trained to maneuver under the command of the commander in chief, and that they ought to be divided up into small flotillas, say, of 10 each; and that the only function of the submarine is in the battle, for the commander in chief so to maneuver his fleet as to give them an opportunity; in other words, to maneuver the fleet so that he will force the enemy's fleet to come within striking distance of his submarines. The submarine has such slow speed that it is impossible for it ever to get to another ship. Its only chance is to strike when the other ship comes close to it, because it can not catch up with the other ship. They tell us that 50 would be as good as 500. They tell us that if they can not give 50 an opportunity to strike at the enemy they could not give 500 the opportunity, and that if they can give 50 an opportunity they will destroy the enemy's fleet.

There is absolutely no excuse for this expenditure of money for useless submarines. Therefore I hope the House will adopt my amendment.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I hope the amendment of the gentleman from Mississippi will not be adopted. The Secretary of the Navy this year recommended to Congress that there be at least 8 submarines, 1 of seagoing type. The General Board recommended 16 of the coast-defense type and 3 of the seagoing type, 20 knots or more speed. The Secretary of the Navy in the hearings before the committee said repeatedly that we should have more submarines than he had recommended, and that he hoped the committee would report more if they could do so without sacrificing a battleship. Now, the committee have not gone to the extreme of

the General Board's recommendation in that we only report 1 seagoing submarine and 16 of the smaller type. The gentleman quotes one of the naval experts as saying that 50 submarines are enough. I want to call attention to the speech delivered by Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight before the Efficiency Club, of New York City, on the 29th of January, 1915. I presume there is not in this country a more level-headed, a more sagacious, a better-informed man on the needs of the Navy Department to-day than Admiral Knight.

This speech, a copy of which I hold in my hand, has been favorably commented upon from one end of the country to the other. The admiral says:

We should have at least 100 submarines. Now we have less than 60 built and building. The General Board says that we ought to have at least 100.

All the authorities, except one, quoted by the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] say that we should have not less than 100 submarines. Mr. Chairman, while I am on my feet and before my time expires I ask unanimous consent to insert this address by Admiral Knight in the RECORD. It is a very temperate, a very deliberate discussion of the situation in our Navy Department to-day with regard to the efficiency of the Navy and what is needed to bring it up to its highest state of efficiency, and I commend the reading of it to every Member of the House.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I submit that the recommendation of the committee should be sustained.

The following is the address of Admiral Knight referred to:

ADDRESS BY REAR ADMIRAL AUSTIN M. KNIGHT, UNITED STATES NAVY, AT THE ANNUAL BANQUET OF THE EFFICIENCY CLUB OF NEW YORK CITY, JANUARY 25, 1915.

I appreciate very highly the privilege of addressing you this evening, not alone because of the compliment which the privilege involves, but because of the possibility of usefulness to the Navy and the country which seems to be connected with it. If I do not speak as fully as you might wish me to, I shall at least speak frankly.

It is not my intention to go into questions of the efficiency of individual ships, the results of target practice, and kindred topics. I propose to deal with the efficiency of the Navy as a whole, considering it as a great and very complicated machine, upon which hundreds of millions of dollars have been expended, with one end in view, and only one—the development of a supremely efficient weapon for the defense of the country against any and every enemy which may come against us.

I was asked a few weeks ago what the War College considered that the fleet should do, and I replied:

"The War College considers that every effort of the fleet, and every effort of the department in connection with the fleet, should have for its sole aim the war efficiency of the fleet. Every effort which does not directly contribute to this end is in itself a wasteful expenditure of energy, and so far as it is a diversion from this end is distinctly harmful."

No doubt there are many differences of opinion among those assembled here to-night as to what constitutes an adequate Navy for the defense of the United States. There may even be some present who think that we should have no Navy at all. But on one point I am sure there will be no difference of opinion—that if we are to have a navy it should be as efficient as it possibly can be made. And everybody who knows anything about the Navy knows that this is not its present condition. I am not one of those who hold that it is altogether inefficient. Unsatisfactory as conditions are, it would be very easy to exaggerate them. When things are wrong you can always find extremists to tell you that they are much worse than they actually are. Some people think that this is the only way to make an impression. Others are so constituted temperamentally that they can see nothing good in anything which falls short of perfection as they see it.

I am going to assume that all of you who are gathered here to-night occupy a reasonable middle ground so far as temperament is concerned, and that to make an impression upon you I need not do violence to my own temperament by painting the picture which I shall draw for you in maximum contrast of light and shade.

There is much about the Navy which is splendidly efficient. But as a whole it is far less efficient than it can and ought to be. Our ships are fine. Our officers are capable, industrious, and ambitious. Our enlisted men are the equals of those in other navies. But efficient ships and officers and men do not alone make an efficient navy. They must be welded into an efficient whole by a unity of organization and administration and purpose which coordinates their capabilities and directs their efforts toward a common end, wisely selected and very clearly seen. Here is the first point at which we are lacking. We are lacking also in that harmonious composition of the fleet which is needed to give to every element of it the support that it needs from other elements, to make up a symmetrical and well-balanced whole. And we are lacking to a marked degree in absolutely essential facilities for the care and preservation of our ships, especially in the matter of dry docks.

Finally, we are lacking in efficient organization of the personnel. Here, so far as officers are concerned, the conditions are altogether deplorable. In a service like the Navy, where spirit is everything, where enthusiasm must be the driving power back of every activity, I ask you to picture the effect of a condition where a young officer, graduating from the Naval Academy full of spirit and enthusiasm, finds himself confronted with a prospect of promotion to the grade of lieutenant at the age of 52 years.

If you ask me who is responsible for these conditions, I can only reply that the responsibility comes home to nearly all of us. Some of it, I am sure, rests with me—much of it, I believe, with you. Certainly it can not be attributed in excessive measure to any one administration of the Navy Department, for it has existed for half a century at least.



So let us not cloud the issue by assuming that it is a new condition, and that all administrations up to some recent date have been models of wisdom and efficiency, or that naval officers themselves always have been ready with good advice. Speaking as the representative of naval officers as a body, I frankly admit that we have not always seen clearly what was needed and have not always worked together even for ends which we did see clearly. As for the Secretaries of the Navy, it is not surprising that many of them have failed to realize that their first duty was to strive, in season and out of season, to promote the war efficiency of the Navy as a whole. Many of them have not remained in office long enough to learn this. Some, perhaps, have realized it more or less clearly, but have not found at hand an organization through which they could produce results. A few have made material contributions toward improved conditions. I shall have the pleasure a little later of calling attention to one important step in advance which was taken by the present Secretary at the very beginning of his term of office.

A large part of the responsibility, especially that connected with the small size and the unbalanced composition of the fleet and the lack of dry docks, rests with Congress, which has always approached naval legislation from the wrong side, so far as efficiency is concerned—asking, not what do we need for efficiency, but what can we afford to spend for efficiency? Behind the responsibility of Congress lies the responsibility of the country—and you, gentlemen, represent the country—because it has not insisted upon having what was needed, without reference to cost. It may be that this attitude of both Congress and the country is necessary and even inevitable. But I am one of those who believe that this great country of ours can afford to have anything in the way of national defense which it needs; and I assume that all present here to-night agree that we need a navy, and if a navy, then an efficient one, and that whatever efficiency costs is the measure of what we can afford to spend.

One particularly unfortunate feature about the application of the policy of "economy first" in naval expenditures is that it often has been invoked to prevent a small appropriation which would have added many times its own cost to the value of those items for which money was cheerfully appropriated. I shall discuss this more at length hereafter.

But, after all, is it not rather futile to spend our time in trying to place responsibility for existing conditions? It seems to me that what we ought to do is to recognize the conditions clearly—neither exaggerating nor minimizing them—and to dissociate them absolutely from personalities. We can then proceed with a perfectly open mind to consider how the conditions can be improved.

I ask you to accept this point of view and to banish from your mind all thought of politics and every trace of partisanship and fix your attention upon the question before us as one of national, not of political, significance.

The conditions, then, to which I shall invite your attention are those connected with—

First. The size and composition of the fleet.

Second. The organization of the personnel.

Third. The organization and administration of the Navy Department.

First, as to the size of the fleet. I shall not go into this very fully, because my subject is not so much adequacy as efficiency. A small machine may be efficient within the limits fixed by its size. It is from the point of view of efficiency within the Navy as it exists that I wish chiefly to consider my subject this evening. It must be recognized, however, that the actual efficiency for war of a battleship fleet which is efficient within itself may be seriously compromised by the lack of those supporting units which are vitally essential to its operation. There is, moreover, a sense in which we may say that a machine is not efficient if it is too small for the task for which it is designed.

What constitutes an adequate Navy for the United States? The answer will depend, of course, upon the purpose for which we assume that the Navy is to be used. We are all agreed, I presume, that it is not to be used for aggression. Is it, then, to be used solely for defense? If we answer "Yes," we ought to do so with a full recognition of what we are to defend and also of the elementary maxim that the best defense is a vigorous offense. In other words, no matter how resolute we may be to use our Navy only for repelling aggression, it does not follow that we should plan for meeting the aggressor only at our gates. Even if we had no interests outside our borders and no responsibilities for the defense of our outlying possessions and dependencies, we should still, as reasonable beings not wholly ignorant of history, prepare to project our battle line toward the enemy's coasts and to assume a course which would throw upon him the burden of replying to our initiative. In this sense, then, we need a navy for offense; that is to say, for offensive action with a defensive purpose. In shaping our plans along these lines we should not overlook the fact that the policy which dictates the measure of our defense must take full note of the larger national policy which it is to enforce—in relation, for example, to the Monroe doctrine, the Panama Canal, the Philippines, and other matters which are at once of national and of international significance.

The statement is often made—I have heard it made on the floors of Congress—that naval officers themselves do not know what they need. There are naturally differences of opinion among naval officers as to what the strength of the Navy should be and as to the types of which it should be composed. But the country has, in the General Board, a body of mature and experienced officers, whose business it is to study this question and to speak authoritatively upon it. In the main the recommendations of this board from year to year have been consistent with each other and consistent with the best naval sentiment. It has stood, since 1903, for a fleet of 48 battleships and necessary smaller units and auxiliaries. The character of the smaller units and auxiliaries recommended has varied from time to time, following the developments of naval art and science; but the basis of 48 battleships, to be kept up to date by eliminating ships more than 20 years of age and replacing them by new construction, has been steadily adhered to. Now, it may be that we need fewer than 48 battleships or that we need more. Whatever their number is to be, we should have a policy in the matter, looking as far into the future as practicable, and one which, in providing for capital ships, provides also for the smaller units and auxiliaries to round out the fleet into a complete and well-balanced whole, with an appropriate number of cruisers, scouts, destroyers, submarines, colliers, tank ships, supply ships, repair ships, mine-laying ships, tenders, and gunboats.

The program advocated by the General Board would, if it had been followed, have given us 47 battleships, built and building, in 1914. This program has not been followed, and we have at present 37 battle-

ships instead of 47. It seems to me that he would be a bold man who, recalling the history of the last days of August, 1914, when the world passed within a week from a condition of universal peace to one of almost universal war, should say that we do not need the full number of battleships proposed by the General Board, and more.

But battleships alone do not make up a fleet, much less a navy. A fleet without fuel ships is crippled, and one without scouts is blind. It can neither secure information of the enemy's movements nor deny information of its own. To send a fleet thus blind and crippled into hostile waters would be to invite destruction. We have an altogether insufficient number of fuel ships and practically no scouts. Moreover, we are very weak in destroyers, of which a large number should accompany the fleet, to back up the scouts, to act in part as scouts themselves, to stiffen up the screen about the battleships, and to be ready for a dash against the enemy when an opening is presented. The effect of the conditions actually existing is to almost completely nullify the power of our fighting ships. Picture to yourselves the plight of a battleship fleet operating in hostile waters against a fleet much smaller, but with all its elements complete. The smaller fleet, with scouts thrown out a hundred miles or more around its main body, every scout in touch with every other one and with the commander in chief, and with a horde of destroyers backing up the scouts and awaiting the word to attack, would gain and keep touch with the larger fleet while itself evading discovery, and would send its destroyers in at night, unchecked and unnoted by any protecting screen, to drive home an attack which might decide the issue without the main fleets ever having seen each other. And if nothing of this sort occurred, consider the situation where the fleet, with its fuel supply exhausted, finds itself without a reserve supply on which to draw.

There is a widespread and very dangerous opinion that all the fuel ships and scouts we need can be improvised on short notice from merchant vessels. This is one of those miserable fallacies based upon experience in the Civil War and the Spanish War, in both of which we won because our opponents were even more grotesquely unprepared than we were. The Civil War was, I suppose, the most costly war ever fought, and the most unpardonably wasteful in money and in human life. But its cost did not end with the end of the war. Apart from the tremendous pension list, which our most pacific friends insist upon charging up to what they are fond of calling militarism—although it was really the direct result of the criminal folly of unpreparedness—apart from this is the indirect cost of the perpetuation of that folly. Since we were successful in that war—so the implied argument runs—our preparation for it must have been of the kind that makes for success, and we can look for success hereafter from the same policy. To these gentlemen I commend the perusal of a book called "The Military Policy of the United States," by Gen. Emory H. Upton. If any of you here present to-night have failed to read this book, I urge you to read it at once. It exists in conveniently available form as Senate Document No. 494, Sixty-second Congress, second session. It would be interesting to know how many Senators have read it. It is the best antidote I know for the monstrous delusion which sees in every American citizen a soldier, trained, efficient, ready to take his place in the ranks at a moment's notice and sweep the loathed invader from our soil, and in every ship that floats a potential man-of-war complete in everything but guns.

By what seems almost a misfortune, in view of its effect upon the minds of many of our people, the delusion that we, alone of all the nations of the earth, can carry on a successful war without preparation was confirmed by our easy victory in the Spanish War, our opponent, again, being as unprepared as we were. I should be sorry to agree with those who hold that nothing short of an overwhelming defeat in some future war will ever open our eyes to the danger of existing conditions, and I wish to do my part toward opening the eyes of my countrymen before such disaster comes. We must recognize the fact that war is an art, and a very highly specialized art. For every task which it involves there is a need of special tools, efficient in themselves and contributing to the efficiency of the whole organization; and these can not be improvised. Yachts, tugs, and ferryboats can perform certain duties in waters close to our own coasts when they are absolutely unopposed, and any steamer capable of carrying a thousand tons of coal can get the coal to the fleet which is lying quietly outside a quiet port with no threat of interruption to its lines of communication; but no language is strong enough to characterize the fatuity of relying upon such tools for carrying on a real naval war. It is true, no doubt, that there are many fuel-carrying ships that can be utilized by the Navy in time of war; but let us consider, briefly, the characteristics which they should have, and then inquire how many of them we would probably find available in our waters on the sudden outbreak of war. First of all, a goodly proportion of them must carry fuel oil instead of coal or in addition to coal. Second, they must be large. A great number of small craft, manned by untrained crews and commanded by untrained officers, might be a fatal handicap to a fleet operating at sea. Third, they must be fast, for the speed of the fleet will be the speed of the slowest craft accompanying it. Fourth, they must have facilities for handling and transferring their fuel at sea.

I do not know how many such ships there are under the United States flag at this moment, but somebody ought to know how many there are and how and where they can be reached. This should all be provided for in advance; but when it is provided for, it is safe to say that the number will be far short of what a fleet would need, and it is clear that, at the best, such craft could not work at maximum efficiency with a fleet engaged in operations where perfect military coordination is of the first importance.

We need, then, in order to make our 37 or our 47 battleships efficient, more large, fast Navy fuel ships of the *Jupiter* type, many more destroyers, and a considerable number of scout cruisers, designed and built as such, with a speed of not less than 28 knots.

It goes without saying that in these days a scout should carry aeroplanes to be launched from her decks, and this means, of course, that we need a large number of these, and of the most efficient type obtainable. It has been suggested that we can rely upon aeroplanes alone for scouting, sending them out from battleships, and so dispense with cruisers altogether. This might work if no other function were involved than that of locating the enemy, but the screening duty of the outlying line of cruisers is even more important than the scouting duty. To discover an enemy force is helpful; to arrest its advance is far more so, especially when by arresting it we deny the enemy the information about our whereabouts and our movements which it will be his object to secure.

We are weak in submarines, and the submarine, as you are all aware, has within the last few months established its claim to very serious consideration as an element in naval warfare. It has not shown itself the master of the battleship, and I doubt if it will ever do so. But it has taken a more commanding place than most of us have here-



tofore assigned it. I should rejoice if we had to-day 100 submarines instead of less than half that number, built and building. Those that we have are only half efficient, because they lack tenders of the proper type to accompany them and care for their needs and the needs of their personnel. Here again crops up the old idea that a vessel for a special purpose, demanding special characteristics, and vitally necessary to the efficiency of a vital part of our naval force can be improvised out of any old craft which happens to be handy. And here again is illustrated the false economy which in providing a weapon efficient within itself denies it the support outside itself which alone can make it efficient in application.

Running parallel with the omissions in the fleet itself is a corresponding list of omissions in the provision for its upkeep—in dry docks and other navy-yard facilities especially. A fleet without dry docks of suitable capacity and suitably located is only a little less helpless than one without fuel ships.

We have at Guantanamo a station which should be the principal base of our fleet for operations in the Caribbean—the area in which, if anywhere, our control of the Panama Canal will be challenged. But not only have we no dry dock or efficient repair shops there, we have none within a thousand miles of it. Here the expenditure of \$2,000,000 might conceivably double the efficiency of the fleet in some critical emergency by making it possible for every ship to go out in perfect condition; and it requires no stretch of the imagination to picture the issue of a war as hanging upon this point alone. After a battle, the importance of a dock close at hand for repairing damages is too apparent to require more than a passing mention. It might enable the fleet to take the sea again after a brief delay, with every advantage over an enemy fleet less favorably situated.

It is understood, of course, that every station which is designed to serve as a base of supply, of repair, or of refuge for the fleet should be adequately fortified. This is a phase of my subject upon which I should like to dwell at considerable length, but time—and other considerations—make it impracticable for me to do so.

If I have made myself clear up to the present point, you will understand by how narrow a margin we have missed efficiency in the composition of our fleet and the provision for its upkeep, and yet of what vast importance is the space that separates us from it. Two per cent, perhaps—5 per cent, certainly—added to our expenditures year after year would have added at least 50 per cent to the efficiency of the fleet as a whole.

I come now to the question of personnel. In an ideal system the development here as regards both officers and men would keep pace automatically with the development of the fleet, through a law by which the authorization for a certain increase in the number of ships would carry with it the authorization for a corresponding increase in officers and men and for a reasonable flow of promotion. Failing this ideal, we should at least have a periodical readjustment, such as to maintain a personnel ample in numbers, amply trained, and so organized as to insure a flow of promotion which will secure contentment, foster ambition, and bring officers to the command of ships and fleets while still in the perfection of their mental and physical powers. Unfortunately, the present conditions are as far from this ideal as could be imagined. To begin with, we have not the officers and men to man our ships efficiently. This is serious enough, but much more serious is the fact that the promotion of officers is so completely blocked that a young man graduating from the Naval Academy must look forward to spending all the best years of his life in the two lowest grades of the service, to performing as a gray-headed man the same duties that he has performed as a boy, and to receiving but a very small increase in salary. I need not point out to you the inevitable effect of this upon efficiency.

For this condition I could not place the responsibility if I would. Congress long has been calling upon the Navy Department for a satisfactory personnel bill. Several bills have been prepared, and every one has had support. But none has had the cordial support of the Navy as a whole. A new one has been presented to Congress this month. I hope it is a good one, but I confess that I do not know.

In this matter, as in that of the fleet, the question of expense stands in the way of every easy solution that can be suggested. Here is the problem in a few words: We need in the three lower grades of the Navy—ensign, junior lieutenant, and lieutenant—a very large number of officers. We can find room in the highest grade, that of rear admiral, for very few. Let us say, simply as an illustration and without any attempt of arithmetical accuracy, that of 100 men who reach the lieutenant's list not more than 5 can ever become rear admirals. Our problem is to eliminate the other 95 between these two grades without injustice to individuals or unreasonable expense to the Government, always remembering that expense is of far less consequence than the efficiency of which it is the price. The interest of the Navy should naturally take precedence over the interest of individuals, yet if it appears that a given scheme, in conducting to the efficiency which we all so much desire, chances to conduce also to the advantage of individuals, it should not on that account be abandoned.

The enlisted personnel is inadequate for the manning of the fleet as it exists to-day, and falls far short of what would be absolutely necessary in time of war. And we have no reserve on which to call. The present shortage is variously estimated at from 5,000 to 18,000 men, the wide difference between these figures being accounted for by different views as to the manning of ships not actually present with the active fleet. The extreme view on one side is that battleships can be laid up at a navy yard for long periods of time, with 50 or 100 men on board, and still be counted as serviceable. The extreme view on the other side is that when a ship is to be laid up approximately half of her crew should remain with her, and she should be kept ready to join the fleet, not in a year or a month, but in 48 hours. If ships in reserve are to be borne on the Navy list, and to stand before the country as available for war, there is no doubt that the second of these views is the correct one. A battleship "in ordinary," as it is called, with less than a hundred men on board, might as well be eliminated from the list of ships available for any service within a reasonable length of time.

Added to the deterioration in the ships themselves, after a certain period of the neglect that is inevitable where crews are greatly reduced, is the fact that among the plans for utilizing the ships in an emergency is one which contemplates manning them with untrained or half-trained reserves. Such reserves may doubtless be made very useful in time of war if they can be distributed throughout the fleet, to be assimilated by the regular crews of active ships. But the fate of the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* is an object lesson on the folly of manning ships exclusively or even chiefly with reservists.

Here, again, I want to call attention to the mistake of providing the largest and finest fighting ships in the world—for this is what our

dreadnaughts are, and it is largely due to the insistence of Congress that they are so—and balking at the comparatively trifling cost of providing the officers and men to make them fully efficient.

Other factors less concrete than those that I have named have militated and are militating against ideal efficiency. You will all understand that a fleet can not be efficient unless it has abundant opportunity for drilling as a unit. No matter how admirable may be the training and the discipline of the individual ships they will not work together efficiently as a fleet without the teamwork which comes from constant drilling in company with each other under the direction of the commander in chief. And their exercises must be progressive, leading up to war maneuvers on a large scale. We have had too little of this training at all times, and especially within the past year; the necessity of keeping the battleships in Mexican waters having been a controlling factor in all phases of administration of the Navy. This has not made for efficiency, but both the present commander in chief of the fleet and his immediate predecessor testify that the effect upon efficiency has not been as great as might have been expected. Many of the battleships have missed opportunities for target practice; but here, too, the commander in chief reports that the effect has not been disastrous. That conditions remain so good in spite of such extremely unfavorable conditions is a gratifying evidence of the excellence of our ships and the fundamental soundness of our personnel. We must, nevertheless, recognize that the necessity for using battleships in this way is seriously detrimental to their efficiency, and this throws further emphasis upon the importance of an all-around development of our fleet with the demands of peace in mind as well as those of war. If cruisers and gunboats had been available for service in Mexican, Haitian, and Santo Dominican waters, the battleships could have spent the past year together in a good climate carrying on their maneuvers and target practice under favorable conditions.

I come now to what is perhaps the most important part of my subject—the organization of the Navy Department viewed from the standpoint of efficiency. There can be no question that the existing organization is inadequate and would break down under the strain of war. The administration starts from too many sources and flows through too many channels. It lacks the unity of purpose which would come from recognition of the fact that a navy has one excuse for existing, and only one—that it shall always be ready to strike on the minute and with every element of power concentrated behind its blow for the defense of the country.

Do not misunderstand me. I am not telling you that our organization is wholly bad. I am telling you that it is inadequate. In many cases it works rather surprisingly well. But if you analyze these cases you will find that, in so far as the results are good, they are so in spite of the system and because of some personal factor which has compelled efficiency. Moreover—and this is the crux of the whole matter—the cases with which we can deal at the present time are illustrations of peace efficiency, whereas the efficiency upon which our attention should be fixed unwaveringly is war efficiency—not because we are going to have war, but because we may have it, and because the one supreme duty of the Navy is to be ready for it if it comes.

I suppose this relation of the Navy to war, whether possible war or actual war, has always been understood more or less clearly; but it is a singular fact that the organization of the Navy Department takes no account of it. War is the one thing for which no arrangement is made. There are seven bureaus in the department, each with clearly defined duties, but in all the elaborate legislation creating these bureaus and defining their duties there is not a word about the duty of keeping the Navy in readiness for war or preparing plans for war or conducting war after it begins. There would be a certain element of comedy in this if there were not so many elements of possible tragedy. There is a bureau in the department charged with the construction and repair of ships, one with the design of machinery, one with the preparation of ordnance, one with the direction of personnel, and so on; but nowhere is it said, "This bureau shall be responsible for the readiness of the fleet for war, for the preparation of war plans, and for the conduct of war." This, then, is the last and great defect in the efficiency of the Navy. How shall it be remedied? The answer is, I think, by the creation in the Navy Department of a "division of strategy and operations," preferably not coequal with the present bureaus, but superior to them and standing between them and the Secretary. This arrangement would be a recognition of the fact that all the activities of the present bureaus should lead up to the Secretary through a channel which coordinates them all and directs them toward war efficiency.

The title proposed for the new office—division of strategy and operations—covers very completely the ground that I have in mind. As standing for strategy, this division would plan what to do; and as standing for operations, it would direct the execution of its plans. It would correspond more or less closely with the General Staff of the Army and the first sea lord of the British Admiralty, whose duties are thus defined:

"1. Preparation for war: All large questions of naval policy and maritime warfare—to advise.

"2. Fighting and seagoing efficiency of the fleet, its organization and mobilization, including complements of ships as affecting total numbers; system of gunnery and torpedo exercises of the fleet, and tactical employment of air craft, and all military questions connected with the foregoing; distribution and movements of all ships in commission and in reserve.

"3. Superintendence of the war staff and the hydrographic department."

These duties are all performed subject to the general authority of the first lord of the admiralty, who corresponds to our Secretary of the Navy; and I wish to emphasize the fact that I am not advocating a reorganization which would in any way reduce the authority of the Secretary.

I have spoken of strategy as shaping plans which are later carried out by operations. This is a convenient distinction but not an exact one, for in a broad sense strategy both plans and executes. It may be defined as the art of so shaping plans and directing forces as to concentrate the maximum of pressure upon the enemy at the time and place best suited to accomplish the purpose at which we aim. This evidently presupposes a clear conception of what the purpose is at which we aim and a careful preparation—in advance—of the forces and the plans required for attaining the purpose. The strategy of a farsighted nation does not begin with the beginning of war. It has its origin far back in the history of international relations and runs parallel with national policies, taking account of the ends at which these national policies aim and accepting their ends as its own.



First of all, then, strategy is preparation. Secondly, it is execution; always, if it deserves the name of strategy, through the medium of forces and of plans previously prepared.

I have explained that the defects in the organization of the Navy Department are a lack of coordination of authority, as a result of which the administration starts from too many sources and flows through too many channels, and a total lack of provision for planning and carrying forward the operations of war. It must not be supposed that these defects have escaped recognition or that no efforts have been made to correct them. The most successful of the efforts to secure coordination between the bureaus was the adoption during the last administration of a system of aids to the Secretary, who coordinated the work of the various bureaus, and who, when important questions were under consideration, formed a council upon which he could call for advice. The weak point about this system was and is that the aids never have been legalized by Congress, and therefore have no permanent status whatever. In spite of this, they are in a position to do much toward improving the administration of the department.

The General Board was called into existence in 1900 by an order of the Secretary of the Navy, to provide a body for the consideration of war plans and allied subjects. It has performed, and is performing, work of the very highest importance, but it, like the Council of Aids, lacks legislative sanction, although Congress has for many years past shown great interest in its work and not a little deference to its views.

Another and a very important agency to which the Navy Department looks for a contribution to its work in strategy and other matters connected with preparation for war and the conduct of war is the Naval War College at Newport. The War College has been in existence since 1884 and has been an important factor in the education of officers from the very beginning. For some reason, however, it has failed until very recently to command the full recognition which it has deserved from the Navy Department or even from the officers of the Navy. The present Secretary of the Navy visited the college shortly after coming into office, and, with an insight of which many naval officers have shown themselves incapable, recognized its possibilities for usefulness and pronounced himself its friend. Since that time he has done everything to forward its work which could be dictated by the most thorough comprehension of its mission and its needs, and as a result of this generous support, both moral and material, the college has taken its proper place as an institution for the training of officers for high command, and for the development of the art of naval warfare. Thus the college is enabled to contribute something toward making good the lack of a strategic division in the Navy Department itself.

You will see, therefore, that although no law takes cognizance of the necessity for keeping the Navy ready for war, there are many agencies which cooperate toward that end—the Council of Aids, to which the Secretary would naturally turn in an emergency; the General Board; and the War College. These agencies are so closely in sympathy that they are able to cooperate harmoniously with each other and with the fleet, and this cooperation is having important and very valuable results. This does not change the fact that there should be—that indeed there must be—in the Navy Department itself and close to the Secretary, a coordinating office to bring the efforts of these and other agencies to an administrative focus bearing directly upon the efficiency for war. Such a coordinating office I have already sketched as a division of strategy and operations immediately below the Secretary of the Navy in authority.

The creation of this office would provide a policy for the Navy so far as the activities of the Navy itself are concerned, insuring unity of effort, and shaping plans toward the end which we have recognized to-night as the proper end of all our efforts—preparedness for war.

But a policy within the Navy is not enough. I have said of strategy that it should take account of national policy as applied to international affairs. We need, then, a policy broader than our naval policy and including it. This must be a national policy, dealing with both Army and Navy and bringing the broadest statesmanship as well as the highest technical knowledge to bear upon the whole question of national defense. Its enunciation must come from the highest authority in the land, executive and legislative.

This points to a council of national defense, for the creation of which a bill is already before Congress. In such a council, with the President of the United States at its head, we should have the last word in the coordination of national resources for national defense.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi.

The question was taken, and the amendment was rejected.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the word "sixteen" and insert the word "eleven."

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

On page 64, line 15, strike out the word "sixteen" and insert the word "eleven."

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I will not occupy the time of the House in any extensive argument. As I stated to-day, if we strike out one battleship and five submarines and the transport and the hospital ship it will amount to a saving of something like between eight and nine million dollars. On account of the deficit in the Treasury, I regret very much that the House has insisted on the two-battleship program. Of course, that is a decision for the House to make. Unless we are willing to cut the expenditures we might as well recognize the fact that we will be responsible for a serious deficit. I do not intend to take up the time of the House in useless debate, but I think it is only proper that I should renew the motion at this point, in order that the House may have another opportunity to say if it is willing to cut this program.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. UNDERWOOD) there were—ayes 85, noes 94.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I ask for tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chair appointed as tellers Mr. UNDERWOOD and Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts.

The committee again divided, and the tellers reported that there were 100 ayes and 96 noes.

So the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 64, line 16, strike out the figures "3,405,000" and insert in lieu thereof "2,305,000."

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. BROWNING. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record an article from the Washington Post entitled "Submarines can take supplies from the undersea depots that may soon surround the British Isles."

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey asks unanimous consent to print an article in the Record which he mentions. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

The article is as follows:

SUBMARINES CAN TAKE SUPPLIES FROM THE UNDERSEA DEPOTS THAT MAY SOON SURROUND BRITISH ISLES.

BRIDGEPORT, CONN., February 4, 1915.

Simon Lake, the submarine-boat builder, discussing Germany's program of harassing English commerce by undersea attack, to-day stated that the plan was quite practical. With submerged bases of supplies, which undoubtedly already have been planted around the entire island, he said, there is no question in his mind that Germany can soon effect a complete blockade against provisions and arms.

BASES UNDER SEA.

"The success of the German raids," said Mr. Lake, "may be attributed to the use of submerged full and provisions stations, each one of which would supply food and fuel enough for any one submarine to continue activities for months. It is not necessary to look for surface tenders, which would be destroyed by the enemy, and possibly leave the submarine helpless."

"It is now possible to transfer coal from one vessel to another at considerable depth beneath the surface, and it is much simpler to pass liquid from one vessel to another. As far back as 1890 I had constructed a submerged craft of this kind, and successfully transferred a cargo from one boat to another in the Sound off Bridgeport. Sixteen tons of coal were transferred in nine minutes from a sunken barge to a submarine freighter."

AIR LOCKS SOLVE PROBLEM.

"The German submarines are practically Lake boats, as they have adopted all my devices, and it will be recalled that they have diving compartments, which are merely trapdoor contrivances in the bow, connecting the inner portion of the submarine by means of air locks, so that it is a simple matter for a diver to pass from within the boat to the bed of the sea and into another similar diving appliance in a sunken supply ship."

"I believe that, if not already surrounded, England will be soon, with these invisible supply stations, and that the present successes and future blockade of that country by German submarines will be fully accomplished by this method of attack."

The Clerk read as follows:

Eight of the submarine torpedo boats herein authorized shall be built on the Pacific coast: *Provided*, That the cost of construction on the Pacific coast does not exceed the cost of construction on the Atlantic coast plus the cost of transportation from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 64, line 24, strike out the word "eight" and insert the word "five."

The amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

One transport, to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not to exceed \$1,900,000.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the paragraph. It is not authorized by law. There is no authority to provide for a transport.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would ask the gentleman from Tennessee for what purpose this transport is to be used?

Mr. PADGETT. It is for the purpose of transporting marines of the Navy from point to point in the Naval Service.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be heard on the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is ready to rule. The Chair thinks that with all of the activities that go toward the necessary equipment of a navy, it would be considered a work in continuation of an establishment provided for by law, and the Chair therefore overrules the point of order.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment, which I send to the desk and ask to have read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. TRIBBLE:

"I move to strike out lines 5 and 6, page 65."

Mr. TRIBBLE. Mr. Chairman, I do not care to be heard at length upon this question. I propose to offer an amendment to strike out the next two paragraphs. This transport and this hospital ship were not recommended by the Navy Department. They carry an appropriation of \$4,150,000. The Secretary of the Navy does not want these naval auxiliaries at this time. He stated that he did not want them. I have a letter in my



office that he wrote to me since the Naval Committee reported this bill, since these provisions were forced upon the Naval Committee by the Republicans on the committee. The chairman did not vote for these provisions, and only two or three Democratic members of the committee voted for them. Nobody wants these ships. They are not fighting vessels. I move to strike them out, and I think I have said enough to show the Democrats that their duty is to vote with me on this amendment. [Applause.]

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, I hope the amendment will prevail. Marines are carried on fighting ships, and they are expected to be landed as a part of expeditions in which fighting ships are needed. If the Navy Department needs transports to carry marines, it has two transports that are about to be turned over to it. A few years ago Congress appropriated money for the purchase of two vessels of 12,000 tons displacement to be used by the Isthmian Canal Commission in connection with the construction of the Panama Canal. Upon the completion of the canal, or when these vessels are no longer needed, they are to be turned over to the Navy Department as Navy auxiliaries. These two vessels—the *Ancon* and the *Cristobal*—cost \$550,000 each, and have a displacement of 12,000 tons each. They are capable of carrying 1,000 men and officers and each has a speed of 12 knots an hour. It has been said that by the installation of an additional boiler in those vessels the speed can be increased to 14 knots an hour. There is no longer need for them in connection with the work of the Isthmian Canal. They were used to transport the heavy materials required in its construction. One of them has already been put out of commission, and has been used by the War Department to convey troops from Vera Cruz to the United States. The other is not expected to make more than a few more trips. If the Navy Department needs transports, it has them. There can not be any excuse at this time, considering the situation relative to the finances of the country, to justify the authorization of a transport for marines to cost practically \$2,000,000. I hope the amendment will prevail.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, just a word with regard to the transports in the Navy. You will find in Ships' Data, page 106, that we have six so-called transports. One was completed in 1879, and is therefore 36 years old. The youngest of those ships was built in 1895, and is 20 years old. It is a ship of 1,100 tons burden. It is ridiculous to call a ship of 1,100 tons burden a transport. The transport that is most used—the only one, in fact, now fit for use in the Navy Department—is the *Prairie*, of 6,620 tons displacement, which was built in 1890, 25 years ago. The General Board said of these transports:

Not one of the four improvised transports now in the service of the Navy, the *Hancock*, the *Rainbow*, the *Prairie*, and the *Buffalo*, is of the size or is fitted for the work required, nor of the character of construction needed for safety in ships carrying large bodies of men. All are old, single-skin ships, without proper water-tight subdivisions.

What are they doing? On the *Prairie*, the only decent transport we have, they are carrying between eight and nine hundred marines on a ship that is only fitted to carry between four and five hundred, and instead of these marines being carried directly from a port in the United States to some foreign port and there landed they are kept weeks or months on this transport. They must be until there is necessity for their employment on shore. The quarters are so crowded on this *Prairie* that hundreds—perhaps that is an exaggeration—but scores and scores of the men have to sleep in the open, exposed on the deck, where the spray or the waves from the sea and the rain from the heavens come down on them day and night.

Mr. JOHNSON of South Carolina. Will the gentleman yield to me to ask him a question?

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Certainly.

Mr. JOHNSON of South Carolina. Did the gentleman know, when he voted into the bill a provision to build this transport, that the *Cristobal* and the *Ancon* were available?

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. The *Cristobal* and *Ancon* are old ships, and I—

Mr. JOHNSON of South Carolina. They were built since the Panama Canal was started.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. They are older than the Panama Canal.

Mr. FITZGERALD. No; they are not.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. And they are not fitted—

Mr. FITZGERALD. They are.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts (continuing). For transport service.

Mr. FITZGERALD. They are. The testimony of competent men is to the effect that you can easily carry 1,000, and that you could carry 2,000 marines—

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. For the sake of argument, admitting what the gentleman says, we would then be insufficiently supplied with transports.

Mr. FITZGERALD. We have more than we ever had.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. We are building one. If even the *Ancon* and *Cristobal* are all the gentleman claims for them, we then would have a total of four reputable, decent, fit transports on which to carry our marines and sailors.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Certainly.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. The vessels the gentleman mentioned are the Boston Steamship Co.'s vessels which ran years ago out of Puget Sound.

Mr. FITZGERALD. And built in 1905.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Twenty years old, single-skin ships.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Nineteen hundred and five is not 20 years ago. They are the best ships that go from this country to South America.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. But they are not properly constructed ships on which to carry from 800 to 1,000 human beings.

Mr. FITZGERALD. The gentleman is mistaken, for I have gone on those ships myself and I know something about them.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. The fact the gentleman trusted his life to them has nothing to do with it.

Mr. FITZGERALD. The gentleman does not expect to put the marines in a captain's cabin.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. But you expect to put them in some kind of a cabin and not on the open deck.

Mr. BUTLER. Marines are entitled to some place to sleep as much as Members of Congress, and it is—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I understand the Secretary of the Navy has not asked for this transport; that they are building a transport now that was carried in the appropriation bill year before last, and with that the demands of the Navy will be amply met. If this motion is agreed to, it will take out of this bill an appropriation of \$1,125,000. Now, it seems to me as far as this side of the House is concerned, no matter if gentlemen may have differences of opinion on the question of battleships and preparedness for war, this is purely a ship of aggression, to carry your Army or your Navy into a foreign field, and facing this Treasury deficit, if this side of the House is not willing to strike this item out of the bill, then you had better resign your commissions on the floor of this House. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia.

The question was taken, and the Chairman announced the ayes seemed to have it.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Division, Mr. Chairman.

The committee divided, and there were—ayes 111, noes 70.

So the amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

One hospital ship, to cost not to exceed \$2,250,000.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Strike out line 7, page 65.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Mr. Chairman, this House has just saved the country \$1,900,000 by voting for my amendment and striking from this bill a transport, which added nothing to the fighting strength of the Navy if it had been built at this enormous expense. I now ask the membership of this House to strike out the hospital ship. The Secretary of the Navy says that this hospital ship is not needed; that even if war comes there are several old vessels now used for no purpose on earth that could be converted into hospital ships. Yet with his statement before us and even over the protest of the Secretary of the Navy and over the protest of the chairman of this committee and all the Democrats, except three on the Naval Committee who joined with the Republicans, this hospital ship, to cost \$2,250,000, was inserted in this bill and has the support of the committee. I charge that the Republicans on the committee joined with three Democrats and loaded down this bill with things the Democratic administration did not want, and this ship is one of them. If you will vote for this amendment, we will save the country \$4,150,000 in a few minutes, and I appeal to Democrats to support my amendment to strike out this hospital ship. [Applause.] The plucking board is dead; now let us continue to improve this bill and the Navy Department.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, whatever the desperate situation of the Treasury may be, I hardly think it is in sufficiently distressed straits that this House will refuse to provide necessary hospital facilities for those defending the flag of the Republic on the high seas. [Applause.] The question, therefore, is whether or not this hospital ship is necessary for the proper care of the sick or wounded men of the Navy.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I have not time to yield to the gentleman; the gentleman can take time when I get through. There is no question as to the necessity for this hospital ship. I want to say that in the entire Navy Department there is but one such ship—the *Solace*.

That ship was purchased in 1898 and has never been well adapted for the important use to which it has been put. It is an old vessel now, and was a commercial vessel when we purchased it. This Government paid \$600,000 for it, in the first place, paid \$100,000 to have it remodeled, and since that time has spent in fixing it up and in trying to make it suitable \$776,000 more, or a total of \$1,476,000. And those in charge of the Navy Department now say that it rolls and tosses upon the sea and is an unfit vessel in which to care for those who have been wounded or are sick. And not only that, but the vessel has practically outlived its usefulness and can not be depended upon any longer. An officer of the Navy Department told me that when the *Solace* brought home the sick and the wounded from Vera Cruz it had to lay up for six weeks at the docks in New York and could not go back to relieve the situation at Vera Cruz any further. Her engines are old, and it will require an expenditure of \$40,000 to replace them. When these repairs are undertaken it will require many weeks to complete them before it can join the fleet again. Not only that, Mr. Chairman, but a fleet of 20 battleships is equivalent to a city of 20,000 people out upon the high seas, and you have nothing but this old hospital ship to take care of the sick and the wounded of that floating city, a vessel that was not intended for the purpose in the first place, and can accommodate only 234 patients, anyhow. And, further, in case the fleet is divided, and we have to send a part of it into the Pacific Ocean, we will have no hospital ship for that division of the fleet at all. This extra ship should be authorized in this bill. I want to say to you, Mr. Chairman, that this great Government, the richest on the face of the earth, blessed as no other nation has been in a material way in all the tide of time, has not come to a pass, I trust, when we must sacrifice the sick and wounded of the Nation's defenders in order to help out the Treasury of the United States. [Applause.]

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this paragraph and amendments thereto close in 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, if I have confidence in the Navy Department in one respect more than another, it is the confidence that these men will ask for enough money to carry on the service of that department. I have confidence that pride, sentiment, and enthusiasm which men have for the life work in which they are engaged, without responsibility to the taxpayers, as well as duty, will always prompt them to recommend sufficient appropriation for all necessary requirements. The Navy Department by its estimates submitted to the committee has said that this ship was not now needed. The Secretary of the Treasury has told us that this ship was not required. The chairman of the committee has urged that this appropriation was not necessary and opposed the provision for it in the bill. No naval officer who came before the committee declared for this ship as such an imperative necessity that it must be provided for at this time. The Members who voted for this ship in the committee were those who stand for a large Navy program regardless of cost to the people, and only by a few Members who stand in a position to be responsible to the taxpayers and for the condition of the Treasury joining with them was this appropriation voted in the bill. It does not represent the deliberate judgment of that part of the committee who recognize such responsibility and who realize the condition of our public finances, and should be stricken out.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the gentleman from Massachusetts if these old ships are what are called single-skin ships?

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. They are; all of them.

Mr. COOPER. The *Titanic*, which sank and drowned 1,500 people, was a single-skin ship.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I do not know about that. These are single-skin ships, unfit to carry people on the ocean.

Again we have Democracy putting partisanship into this question of the increase of the Navy, partisanship in taking care of

the national defense, and taking care of the welfare of the men behind the guns. The Democratic Party professes its love for the common, everyday fellow; but when they have an opportunity to express it they express it by giving him a stone instead of bread, and then cry partisanship when the Republicans, with a better appreciation of the men and the service, attempt to provide what is absolutely needed. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. GRAY] says that not an officer asked for the hospital ship. Why, does he forget that when the Surgeon General was before us he said that we ought to have two hospital ships? Does he forget that Admiral Badger, lately in command of the Atlantic Fleet, said that we should have two hospital ships? Does he forget that Admiral Fletcher, now in command of the Atlantic Fleet, told the committee we should have two hospital ships? And yet he says nobody came before the committee and asked for a hospital ship.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, the Secretary of the Navy never made any objection to the transport and the hospital ship until after the bill was in this House.

Mr. GORDON. He did not ask for it, did he?

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. It is not fair for gentlemen to get up and say that the committee put into this bill these two items over the protest of the Secretary of the Navy. I want to read what the Surgeon General said in the hearings:

You can not build a hospital ship in a short time in case of war.

He told us we ought to have one with the Atlantic Fleet and one with the Pacific Fleet, one on the east coast, and one on the west coast. And he said they—

Should be provided in peace times, and if the big fleets go south, far, far away, with the necessity with large bodies of men for giving in many cases a more careful treatment by specialists the necessity for hospital ships is apparent. And also for the transportation back and forth of the various sick we need hospital ships.

And yet the impression is sought to be given out, when this administration discovers it is not competent to raise money to carry on the Government and we must economize in the Navy, that we have forced these things on the department against their protest, which I wish to deny emphatically, because there was no objection to transports from the Secretary of the Navy before the committee when we were making up this increase in the Navy.

The gentleman who made that statement, that we forced this into the bill against the protest of the Secretary, either does not know the condition of affairs or he is making a statement that has no foundation.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I shall detain the House but for a moment. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ROBERTS] has been a member of this committee for 16 years. Only in the last six months has he waked up to the necessity of having a hospital ship in the Navy. [Applause on the Democratic side.] The Secretary of the Navy has unquestionably not asked for appropriation of over \$2,000,000 for this purpose. There is no doubt in the world but that we have facilities for taking care of the sick and wounded. At Vera Cruz—

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman pardon me for a moment?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Alabama yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I yield.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. It was at Vera Cruz that the necessity was shown for a hospital ship.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. When it was necessary to transport our sick and wounded from Vera Cruz we brought them here in good condition. There was no complaint made that they were not handled and properly taken care of. The Secretary himself has said so. We are informed by a member of the committee that there are plenty of ships in the Navy that can be used for hospital ships. This time is no time to make appropriations for new ships that are not needed. The gentleman from Massachusetts would vote for every appropriation for a battleship or a naval supply ship, even if it swamped the Treasury of the Government of the United States. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Oh, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman, if he followed my votes to-day, knows better than that.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Where did the gentleman vote to-day against anything to increase the expenditures?

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I voted against four battleships, and I voted against two battle cruisers. I have voted against the amendment of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SLAYDEN] for 23 submarines.



Mr. UNDERWOOD. I do not controvert the gentleman's statement.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Do not make a statement of that kind without knowing.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. The gentleman has voted for the full amount of supplies that he could get in this bill.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I challenge that statement. In the committee I voted against big appropriations for a larger number of ships. The roll call will show it.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I will ask the gentleman a question myself. If you could have put in this bill in committee four battleships instead of two, would you have voted for it?

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. No, sir. I voted against it in the committee. Is there any other question the gentleman would like to ask?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I will proceed, if the gentleman will take his seat. I have the floor. The gentleman stands here to advocate the building up of the Navy always. [Applause on the Republican side.]

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I will not deny that charge.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. The first consideration with him is the building up of a great Navy. My contention is that the gentleman from Massachusetts ought not to lead the Democratic side of this House.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I would not attempt it. [Laughter on the Republican side.]

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I call the gentleman from Massachusetts to order. I expect always to treat gentlemen on the floor of this House with decency and politeness.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Does the gentleman call it decency and politeness to say such things to a fellow Member?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I wish the gentleman to understand that I am willing to yield at the proper time, when he addresses the Chair in the proper way, but I do not propose to be interrupted by ruffian tactics on the floor of this House. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Alabama yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. No; I do not yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman declines to yield.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Will not the gentleman yield a moment?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I will yield if the gentleman interrupts me properly.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I want to ask the gentleman if he calls it fair and courteous treatment to misrepresent in this House my votes cast in his presence and my vote in committee, of which he knew nothing?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I do not wish to misrepresent the gentleman's position.

I was under the apprehension that the gentleman had voted for the largest amount. When he said he had not I accepted his statement, but that was no reason why he should interrupt my speech at every sentence—

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I refuse to yield further.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman refuses to yield.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to say to the membership of this House that I am not opposed to a reasonable Navy, that I am not opposed to the protection of our country, but I do say it is time for the Democratic side of the House to take charge of this bill. [Applause on the Democratic side.] I hope they will take charge of it by taking out this hospital ship, and I move to close further debate on this paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia.

The question was taken; and on a division, demanded by Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts, there were—ayes 135, noes 73.

Accordingly the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a new paragraph. Lines 5 and 6 having gone out, I offer it after line 4. I move to insert the words—

One gunboat, to cost not exceeding \$750,000.

Mr. TRIBBLE. I make the point of order that that paragraph has been passed.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not think so.

Mr. TRIBBLE. We passed that paragraph and cut out the two succeeding lines.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman must remember that those lines went out, and the gentleman is now offering the paragraph

at the only point where he can offer it, and the Chair thinks the amendment is in order.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Will the Chair hear me?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. TRIBBLE. The gentleman goes back to line 4. On my motion lines 5 and 6 were cut out. Now he proposes to go back.

The CHAIRMAN. He must go back in order to have a place to offer his amendment. The language was cut out on the gentleman's motion, and he has got to go back.

Mr. TRIBBLE. I make the point of order that we have passed that paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair overrules the point of order. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 65, after line 4, insert:

"One gunboat, to cost not exceeding \$750,000."

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield a moment, I want to ask that that amendment be agreed to. It was recommended by the Secretary, and the gunboats are needed very badly, especially in foreign waters, to do the duty that they can do. Without these gunboats they must use battleships.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I trust the request of the chairman of the committee will be acceded to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts) there were—ayes 91, noes 100.

Accordingly the amendment was rejected.

The Clerk read as follows:

Except where otherwise directed, the Secretary of the Navy shall build any of the vessels herein authorized in such navy yards as he may designate should it reasonably appear that the persons, firms, or corporations, or the agents thereof, bidding for the construction of any of said vessels have entered into any combination, agreement, or understanding the effect, object, or purpose of which is to deprive the Government of fair, open, and unrestricted competition in letting contracts for the construction of any of said vessels.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the word "reasonably," in line 10.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 65, line 10, strike out the word "reasonably."

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I ask for the passage of this amendment because it may be that in the letting of these contracts the Secretary of the Navy might lay too much stress upon the word "reasonably," and feel that before he can refuse to accept the bids of any company or trust for the construction of any of the vessels authorized in this bill he must know to a moral certainty that a conspiracy has been entered into by such company, firm, or trust to destroy competition. He might feel that the proof of such combination should be strong enough to leave no reasonable doubt upon his mind.

There is not much difference in the ordinary practical construction of the terms "reasonably certain" and "certain beyond a reasonable doubt," especially when the interests of the trusts are at stake. I trust that the amendment will be agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOWLER].

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. I would like to inquire of the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs why this paragraph does not provide specifically for the building of at least some of these vessels in the Government yards in order that our mechanics may be kept busy and the Government always be supplied with trained mechanics competent to do such work?

Mr. PADGETT. There is no necessity for it. The Secretary of the Navy is very strong on that side and is building all he can crowd into the yards.

Mr. COOPER. But this paragraph would not permit him to exercise his choice unless he first be convinced that there is a combination which would deprive the Government of fair competition among bidders.

Mr. PADGETT. He can construct them anywhere, and this directs him to do it if he is satisfied there is any combination or agreement depriving the Government of unrestricted competition.

Mr. COOPER. The gentleman is mistaken. That is not the proper interpretation of the language of the bill—

Except where otherwise directed, the Secretary of the Navy shall build any of the vessels herein authorized in such navy yards as he may designate should it reasonably appear that the persons, firms, or corporations, or the agents thereof, bidding for the construction of any of said vessels have entered into any combination, agreement, or under-

standing the effect, object, or purpose of which is to deprive the Government of fair, open, and unrestricted competition in letting contracts for the construction of any of said vessels.

Under that language the Secretary is absolutely prohibited from building any of these vessels in a Government yard unless he shall first be convinced that there is a combination among the persons, corporations, or firms bidding for the contract.

Mr. PADGETT. The gentleman is mistaken about that. The Secretary has been building vessels under that same language; he built a transport and a supply ship, one at Philadelphia and one at Boston, under this identical language.

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COOPER. Yes; I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. I would like to call the attention of the gentleman from Wisconsin to the paragraph on page 66, which it seems to me governs this question.

Mr. COOPER. What line?

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. The last paragraph, beginning at line 15, where it says—

No part shall be used to procure through purchase or contract any vessels, armament, articles, or materials, which the navy yards, gun factories, or other industrial plants operated by the Navy Department are equipped to supply, unless such Government plants are operated approximately at their full capacity for not less than one regular shift each working day, except when contract costs are less than costs in said Government plants, and except when said Government plants are unable to complete the work within the time required, and except in cases of emergency.

Mr. COOPER. That does not meet the point I make against the paragraph on the preceding page, the paragraph we are now considering. The particular paragraph now before us is, in my judgment, susceptible only of the construction that I put upon it. The ordinary rule of statutory construction is that the mention of one thing is the exclusion of the other; and therefore, as this paragraph expressly provides that the Secretary of the Navy may build in a navy yard if convinced that the bidders are in a combination which prevents competition among them, it follows, of course, that he can not build in a navy yard unless he is so convinced. He has first to be convinced that there is a combination among bidders, otherwise he can not build in a Government yard.

Mr. PADGETT. The gentleman is mistaken, because they have been building in the Government yards under this identical language.

Mr. COOPER. I am absolutely right, and I appeal to any lawyer on the floor. I distinctly remember that previous bills contained language different from this before they passed the House.

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. Will the gentleman yield? I am intensely interested in this, and if the paragraph on page 66 does not overcome the prohibition I want it remedied.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, in order to clear up the matter I move to strike out the words "except where otherwise directed," in line 8, page 65. Then it will read:

The Secretary of the Navy shall build—

And so forth.

Mr. COOPER. No; that does not meet it at all.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin has expired.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Chairman, I ask for five minutes more. This is a very important matter.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin asks that his time be extended five minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. COOPER. I speak of this because in previous Congresses we have had very earnest discussions on this floor over propositions to require the Secretary of the Navy to build at least one vessel in a Government yard. Such a provision has been mandatory in some of the bills, and required him to build certain of the ships in Government yards, the argument in favor of that sort of legislation being that the Government ought at all times to have in its employ experts competent to do high-class naval construction work.

This paragraph is susceptible only of the construction I have put upon it, which is that the Secretary of the Navy must let contracts for constructing these vessels to private bidders unless it shall appear that there is a combination among them—a thing difficult for him to know. How can he determine whether there is a combination to prevent competitive building? In previous Congresses—and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. BUCHANAN] will remember this—we have had protracted debates on this identical proposition.

Mr. ALEXANDER. What amendment does the gentleman suggest to obviate that?

Mr. COOPER. In previous laws there have been mandatory provisions requiring the Secretary of the Navy to build certain vessels in Government yards to be selected by him.

Mr. PADGETT. We can not build a battleship in a navy yard now, because the only yard that can build a battleship has two in it, and it will be two years before they will be out of the way. It is impossible to build a battleship in a Government yard at this time. We authorized one last year, 10 months in advance.

Mr. COOPER. I am not talking about the facts; I am talking about the construction of this proposed law. The chairman of the committee now gives a different reason. He seems now to acquiesce in my interpretation of this proposed law, but says they could not be built in a Government yard anyway.

Mr. PADGETT. I say as a matter of fact they can not do it. The Secretary has full authority and has been building them all along.

Mr. MAHER. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment, which I send to the desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

Line 16, page 65, strike out the period and insert a colon and add: *Provided*, That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to build any of the vessels herein authorized in such navy yards as he may designate.

Mr. MAHER. Mr. Chairman, there seems to be some merit in the contention of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. COOPER], and to clear up the situation I have offered this amendment. I believe the Secretary of the Navy, from his position in the past, is in favor of keeping the navy yards up to their present high efficiency, and this amendment gives him power to provide for the building of any of the vessels herein authorized in the navy yards.

I am sure, judging from the results of the past, that the Secretary of the Navy will so arrange the building program that many of the vessels will be constructed in the navy yards of the country.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be heard in support of the amendment.

Mr. PADGETT. I have no objection to the amendment.

Mr. COOPER. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the words "except where otherwise directed."

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 65, line 8, strike out the words "except where otherwise directed."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

Construction and machinery: On account of hulls and outfits of vessels and machinery of vessels heretofore and herein authorized, to be available until expended, \$22,114,459.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment, which I send to the desk and ask to have read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 65, line 20, strike out the figures "\$22,114,459" and insert in lieu thereof the figures "\$20,864,459."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. I want to ask the chairman of the committee if that amendment proposed by him is sufficient to make allowance for the two paragraphs which were stricken out above on page 65?

Mr. PADGETT. That is what it is for.

Mr. FOWLER. But \$4,000,000 was stricken out there.

Mr. PADGETT. That is, the authorization, but the appropriation is carried here.

Mr. FOWLER. There were more than \$4,000,000 cut out.

Mr. PADGETT. No.

Mr. FOWLER. Yes; \$1,900,000 and \$2,250,000.

Mr. PADGETT. One million and nine hundred thousand dollars is the limit of cost, but you do not appropriate the whole amount the first year. It takes two years to build it.

Mr. FOWLER. Then the figures "\$22,114,459" do not cover the entire cost for the provisions in lines 5 and 6?

Mr. PADGETT. They do not.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the pro forma amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Increase of the Navy, equipment: The unexpended balance on June 30, 1915, shall be transferred to appropriation "Increase of the Navy, construction and machinery," and beginning with July 1, 1915, equip-



ment outfits shall be charged to appropriation "Increase of the Navy, construction and machinery."

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the point of order on that. What does this do?

Mr. PADGETT. In the bill of last year the Bureau of Equipment was abolished, and this is simply to distribute the money that was appropriated under the bill with that bureau in existence to the other bureaus.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the point of order.

The Clerk read as follows:

Increase of the Navy; armor and armament: Toward the armor and armament for vessels heretofore and herein authorized, to be available until expended, \$19,048,998.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the figures "\$19,048,998," in line 9, page 66, and insert in lieu thereof the figures "\$18,588,988."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Tennessee.

The question was taken, and the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. TAVENNER:

Page 66, line 9, after the figures "\$18,588,988," strike out the period and insert in lieu thereof the following: "Provided, That the Secretary of the Navy shall not consider any bid for the supplying of the armor or armament herein provided for unless such bid is accompanied by a sworn list of stockholders and bondholders of the corporation, submitting such bid, such list of stockholders and bondholders to be taken from the books of said corporation as of date of July 1, 1914: And it is further provided, That such list of stockholders and bondholders shall be transmitted in a separate report by the Secretary of the Navy."

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order—I will make the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair sustains the point of order, and the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Total increase of the Navy heretofore and herein authorized, \$45,909,801.

Mr. PADGETT. The total there has to be increased, and we got authority to change totals.

The CHAIRMAN. That has already been agreed to.

Mr. PADGETT. I simply desire to call attention to it.

The Clerk read as follows:

Of each of the sums appropriated by this act, except such amounts as may be required to meet obligations authorized in previous acts and for which contracts have been made, no part shall be used to procure through purchase or contract any vessels, armament, articles, or materials which the navy yards, gun factories, or other industrial plants operated by the Navy Department are equipped to supply, unless such Government plants are operated approximately at their full capacity for not less than one regular shift each working day, except when contract costs are less than costs in said Government plants, and except when said Government plants are unable to complete the work within the time required, and except in cases of emergency.

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer the following amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 66, line 24, after the word "emergency," insert:

"Provided, That hereafter no appropriation shall be available for the salary or pay of any officer, manager, superintendent, foreman, or other person having charge of the work of any employee of the United States Government while making or causing to be made with a stop watch or other time-measuring device a time study of any job of any such employee between the starting and completion thereof or of the movements of any such employee while engaged upon such work; nor shall any appropriation hereafter be available to pay any premium or bonus or cash reward to any employee in addition to his regular wages, except for suggestions resulting in improvements or economy in the operation of any Government plant; and no claim for services performed by any person while violating this proviso shall be allowed."

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on that. This is different from the provision we put in the Army bill.

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. I do not know on what ground the gentleman from Tennessee makes the point of order, but I will agree this language is different from that on the military bill; but—

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will call the attention of the gentleman from Illinois that this provision makes permanent law by inserting the word "hereafter."

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. My reason for desiring this in this language is that it probably will prevent having this up in connection with every appropriation bill that passes the House, and for that reason I thought action at this time, when we are pretty well represented, would be desirable. I will agree that if the point of order is made it will be well taken.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, the point of order is on two grounds. First to the word "hereafter," which makes it permanent law, and then there is another part, which is legislation,

in the last two lines, "and no claim for services performed by any person while violating this proviso shall be allowed."

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. That was in the other one.

Mr. PADGETT. I know, but the point was not raised in the discussion of the other.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair sustains the point of order as to the word "hereafter."

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. Then I desire to offer the following amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 66, line 24, after the word "emergency," insert:

"Provided, That no part of the appropriations made in this bill shall be available for the salary or pay of any officer, manager, superintendent, foreman, or other person having charge of the work of any employee of the United States Government while making or causing to be made with a stop watch or other time-measuring device, a time study of any job of any such employee between the starting and completion thereof, or of the movements of any such employee while engaged upon such work; nor shall any part of the appropriations made in this bill be available to pay any premium or bonus or cash reward to any employee in addition to his regular wages, except for suggestions resulting in improvements or economy in the operation of any Government plant; and no claim for services performed by any person while violating this provision shall be allowed."

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair sustains the point of order on the last two lines, which read:

And no claim for services performed for any person while violating this proviso shall be allowed.

The Chair thinks that is clearly subject to a point of order.

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. I ask to amend the amendment by striking out that part.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman offers the amendment with that language stricken out.

Mr. MOORE. Is that a request for unanimous consent?

The CHAIRMAN. No; the gentleman offers it as an amendment.

Mr. MOORE. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman make the point of order?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order. I understood the gentleman was going to offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman offers an amendment now with those words stricken out. Does the gentleman make the point of order with those words stricken out?

Mr. MOORE. I do not make the point of order on the amendment as modified if those words have been stricken out.

The CHAIRMAN. Those words have been stricken out.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that it be considered as reported.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I want to suggest that the word "bill" occurs in two places, and it should be changed to "act."

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the suggestion made by the gentleman from New York [Mr. FITZGERALD].

The Clerk read as follows:

Change the word "bill" wherever it occurs in the amendment to the word "act."

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, this is an amendment to abolish the Taylor system, so far as it applies to the Naval Service, is it not?

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. That is the purpose.

Mr. MOORE. A similar provision was passed during the pendency of the Army bill, and it has had its effect on some of the arsenals already, as I am informed. I want to ask the gentleman whether or not he knows that there is quite a protest on the part of employees against stopping the bonuses that have been received for extra work?

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. I will say to the gentleman, if he will yield, that my information on that is that the protest has been worked up by the officers in the Frankford Arsenal who are opposed to this legislation, just as employers always seem to be able to find some employees whom they can coerce or influence in some way to come and oppose eight-hour measures, like they did the woman's eight-hour day here and in Illinois. So far as its being the position of the majority of the employees who have courage to speak for themselves, I do not believe there is any truth in the statement that they are opposed to it.

Mr. MOORE. Has the gentleman heard of any protests from Watertown?

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. I have not heard any protests from Watertown. I will read here a statement from a representative of the men who have been seeking this legislation for a number of years, and not only that, but we have a great deal of information in the hearings. We had a special committee to investigate the Taylor system, and they reported in accord with the position taken by organized labor and the labor people who have been protesting against this. It has been established and stated by employers, a large majority of them, I believe, that it is not a system that is acceptable from the employers' point of view.

Mr. MOORE. I desire to say in view of what the gentleman from Illinois said, that probably 300 employees of the Frankford Arsenal have protested against the abolition of this system on the ground that it has worked a practical reduction of their wages. I know the gentleman will doubtless have the ear of the majority on this question, and that his amendment may pass, but I desire to inform him as a friend of labor that at least 300 men and women have protested against the abolition of the system in this instance.

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I desire to state to the gentleman from Pennsylvania and the Members of the committee that this question has been investigated by those who are interested in the welfare of the working people.

Mr. MOORE. Is it not under investigation now by the Industrial Relations Commission?

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. I do not know a thing about that. This is the information that I have.

Mr. MOORE. I am advised that the whole question of the Taylor system is under investigation now by a commission authorized by Congress and that commission has not yet reported upon it. It was also under investigation by a committee of the House.

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. If the gentleman will permit me, I will read here a statement I have from those who have investigated this, giving the actual information on which I based my statement a few minutes ago. I will read a portion of it and insert the rest in the RECORD. It is as follows:

HON. GEORGE F. CHAMBERLAIN,  
Chairman Committee on Military Affairs,  
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: The clause in this year's Army appropriation bill on page 51, beginning with line 13, is directed against certain objectionable features of the Taylor system of shop management and similar systems, sometimes miscalled by the generic term of "scientific management." The clause prohibits time study of workman and the premium system of payment, which together form the basis for the speeding-up scheme invented by Mr. Taylor. This clause does not interfere with standardizing shop tools and equipment, systematizing production methods, or cost accounting. It is directed only against the abnormal stimulus to activity of the workman made possible by the time-study and premium system.

For your information as to our objections to these systems of shop management I refer you to the marked portions of our hearing before the Committee on Labor of the House during April, 1914 (copy sent herewith). This hearing contains, on pages 16 to 38, inclusive, my testimony before the Federal Commission on Industrial Relations in relation to organized labor's objections to certain features of so-called scientific management. This testimony is considered a rather concise statement.

On pages 38 to 52 of this hearing is written defense of the Taylor system as in operation at the Watertown Arsenal by Gen. Crozier (copy of which I also send herewith). The several subjects are discussed serially in my reply. This accounts for the disconnected presentation of the subjects.

This reply also contains many extracts from the writings of Mr. Taylor, showing the underlying purposes and aims of the system. The very fact that any system of the shop management contemplating such drastic and inhuman methods of dealing with employees should commend itself to officials of the Ordnance Department is an indication of the treatment employees could expect if the opportunity to force this system presented itself to those having charge of the work.

The full possibilities of this system has not been taken advantage of at the Watertown Arsenal. This we attribute to the fact that the department has been on its good behavior while several public investigations have been in progress. While the conditions of labor at the Watertown Arsenal, where they are going through the motions of using the system is bad enough, the conditions are not as bad as they would be had no opposition to the system developed.

It is also significant to us that Mr. Taylor has not repudiated any of his writings which were completed before it became necessary for him to defend his schemes before the public, and that the Chief of Ordnance can see nothing wrong or harsh about the aims and methods advocated by Mr. Taylor. These methods to the average man seem abhorrent because of the unadulterated greed displayed and utter disregard for the welfare of the workman.

While the annual reports of the Chief of Ordnance show many glowing accounts of the advantages of the system both to the workmen and the Government, the employees have as yet not been imbued with these alleged advantages to such an extent that they are willing to withdraw their opposition. The employees at the Watertown Arsenal even went so far as to refuse to avail themselves of a collective bargaining agreement proposed by Mr. Thompson, attorney for the Industrial Commission, unless it was specifically stated that the plan was not for the purpose of settling by arbitration their objections to the Taylor system.

As to the advantages to the Government through reduced costs of production by means of the Taylor system it was shown in the investigation by a special committee of the House in 1912 that the alleged savings recorded on page 16 of the 1911 Report of the Chief of Ord-

nance was largely due to the claim that one-half of the cost of material was saved by the system. It does not seem plausible that any system can save one-half of the material used in manufacture.

The information as to savings contained in subsequent reports of the Chief of Ordnance have not been investigated by others than those who are interested in proving the advantages of the system. However, all the alleged savings due to better equipment, high-speed tools, routing of work, and many other common-sense features which have been appropriated by Mr. Taylor as a part of his system would still be preserved after the passage of the restrictive clause herein advocated. Our case, however, does not stand or fall according to whether or not the system as in operation at the Watertown Arsenal has been developed to the point of oppression as yet. Any man of sound mind can see what such measures will lead to. After our power of resistance has been worn away by the system it will be too late to raise a feeble protest. The Military Affairs Committee is well acquainted with efforts made by every nation to prevent other rival nations from gaining strategic position on the high seas, because of what they can do with the advantage gained. This opposition is shown no matter what the nation about to gain the advantage promises.

Much has been made of the presumption that this system increases wages. This is exceedingly misleading. Mr. Taylor claims that by his system he will be able to hire common laborers usually getting about \$1.50 per day and by paying them, say, \$2 per day can teach them to do work for which the employer has to pay a mechanic \$3 per day. This advanced stage of the development of the system has not been reached at the Watertown Arsenal as yet, but it can be attempted at any time the Chief of Ordnance decides. It would not prove that the system was good even though the Chief of Ordnance should pay the men \$10 per day temporarily, which might be done in order to induce some to support the system while the opposition was active. That the Ordnance Department is not given to charity ordinarily is shown by the starvation wages now being paid women employees at the Frankford Arsenal at Philadelphia. They receive \$1.10 per day at present.

Just after the passage of the present bill by the House the Ordnance Department stopped the time study and the premium system at Watertown and Frankford Arsenals; and the officials went out among the employees during working hours to persuade (?) them to protest against the clause herein advocated. When the premium was taken away from the aforementioned women employees their earnings dropped from about \$2 per day to \$1.10, the latter being the nominal day rate. It is well known that where piecework or any task system exists a wide difference is arbitrarily made between the day rate and the task earnings in order to make the task system appear attractive. If, however, the task work were abolished everyone knows that the day rate would have to be increased. These women who are unorganized, and who probably do not understand the economic basis for wages, might readily be led to believe that this artificial low wage is to be permanent and agree to protest, for the same reason that women in Illinois protested against the eight-hour law on the ground that it would reduce wages.

During the consideration of the eight-hour law by the Senate petitions were filed by workmen against the enactment of the law on the ground that it would reduce wages. These petitions were gotten up in much the same way as in the present case, namely, by the influence of the employer circulating the petitions.

At the Watertown Arsenal, where the employees have also gone back to daywork since the passage of the bill by the House, they are still anxious to have the bill pass.

It is also a significant fact that at the Watertown Arsenal, where the premium system has been in operation for several years, that the wages earned, premium and all, is no greater on the average than the wages received by the same grade of employees at the Boston Navy Yard, which is only 7 miles away; and whose wage scale is presumed to be regulated by the same facts. The reason for this is apparent. Under premium systems employees are usually expected to increase their earnings by working harder, when otherwise an increase should be given directly.

The petty injustices involved in this system are so numerous that it forms a daily ground for discontent among the employees. Employees at the Watertown Arsenal, for instance, inform us that the same amount of effort will net them vastly different results in earnings, showing that the time study is inaccurate, and that it is impossible to make it accurate. The variables, in the machinists' business especially, are so great that no exact standards can be set, and where arbitrary standards are set they result only in injustice to employees.

The last four conventions of the American Federation of Labor have gone on record against the Taylor system. In 1911 the present Secretary of Labor, William B. Wilson, was secretary of the committee of the convention that recommended against the system (see pp. 77, 287, and 296 of proceedings of the convention). The American Federation of Labor convention of 1913 also has in its proceedings as severe an indictment against the Taylor system as was ever written (see p. 299 of proceedings).

The Ordnance Department insists that we should wait for the report of the Federal Industrial Commission relative to the system in operation at the Watertown Arsenal. The department had up to date paid no heed to adverse reports made by four committees of Congress, and there is no reason to suppose they will cease their attempt to force the system on the employees unless compelled to by law. However, having had much to do with members and officers of the commission, I feel safe in saying that the commission will not make any investigation of the system at the Watertown Arsenal, and therefore no special report will be forthcoming, and their general report on "scientific management" is not likely to be made until after Congress extends the time for the existence of the commission, due to their lack of time to complete the scope of the work started. There has been enough said by the commission to indicate that they do not think these systems safe from the employees' point of view unless accompanied by collective bargaining in which the workmen shall have an equal voice with the management. This the War Department has indicated its unwillingness to agree to.

Our fear that the Ordnance Department will eventually displace the skilled, well-paid mechanic with cheap labor and by men of lower caliber is amply substantiated by a statement on page 15 of the last annual report of the Chief of Ordnance.

For your information I send herewith the documents herein referred to for verification, and also the reports from committees of both House and Senate on bills which aim to cover the same field as the proposed clause in this Army bill.

In order to obviate the necessity of attaching this clause to every appropriation bill passed by Congress, and thus needlessly take up much valuable time, it is respectfully requested that the word "hereinafter" and the words "or any other appropriation" be inserted in the places indicated in the paragraph before your committee.



As a representative of the employees concerned, I shall be glad to make any further explanation that I can, either in writing or orally.

We believe the workmen of the United States have a right to say how fast they want to work and the degree of temptation and stimulus they are willing to submit to day after day. We feel that we have a right to preserve the race from deteriorating influences.

Trusting this will receive your favorable consideration, I am,

Very respectfully, yours,

N. P. ALIFAS,  
President District No. 44,  
International Association of Machinists.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. [Cries of "Vote!" "Vote!"]

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Answering the point raised by the gentleman from Pennsylvania as to whether the arsenal men are opposed to this—

Mr. PADGETT. Will the gentleman yield for a moment?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. PADGETT. I ask unanimous consent that debate on this paragraph and all amendments thereto close in five minutes.

Mr. MOORE. Will the gentleman embody in that the suggestion that we will get through quicker if the gentleman will listen to what is being said?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee asks unanimous consent that all debate on this paragraph and amendments thereto close—in what time?

Mr. PADGETT. Ten minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I would ask for three minutes.

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD by inserting a statement from the International Association.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the gentleman's request?

There was no objection.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. TEMPLE. Mr. Chairman, I wish to call the attention of the House to a paragraph in the address delivered this morning by Romulo S. Naón, the Argentine ambassador, at the meeting of the United States Chamber of Commerce.

This distinguished diplomatist, who represents a friendly power with which our relations are of constantly increasing importance, has expressed a hope in which I am sure we can all join. If it could be realized, the injury done to neutral nations by the war in Europe would be diminished and at the same time the danger of controversy between neutrals and belligerents would be decreased.

Ambassador Naón said:

As you see, one of the practical measures suggested in this dispatch to relieve the needs of our exportations is bottoms enough. It seems to me that perhaps the way to meet this serious inconvenience—the getting of ships in sufficient numbers—would be to procure the complete neutralization of inter-American commerce. It is undoubtedly not an easy task at the present moment to solve as we would desire all the difficulties encountered by the neutral commerce of the world, in view of the conflicting interests of the belligerent countries; but there could be no reason which would justify opposition to the maintenance to the fullest extent and without any hindrance whatsoever of commercial interchange between the ports of our continent. I maintain that the complete neutralization of inter-American commerce ought to be recognized, and therefore I entertain the hope—or, more than that, I might say that I feel the certainty—that we would be able to have the countries at war agree with us in establishing the rule that during the present war no vessel engaged exclusively in the trade between American ports shall be subject to search, detention, or capture by a belligerent, no matter what flag she flies, so long as she is engaged exclusively in that commerce.

With such a rule, we should be able to obtain all the vessels we need for the promotion of our commerce with the United States and the other American Republics to the maximum, developing, as a consequence, our friendly relations with all of them and lessening the sorrowful conditions created by that war.

Mr. HELM. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

Mr. PAGE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

Mr. HAMLIN. Mr. Chairman, I make the same request.

Mr. FARR. And I make the same request.

Mr. KETTNER. Mr. Chairman, I also ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

Mr. CURRY. And I the same, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to granting these several requests?

There was no objection.

Mr. KETTNER. Mr. Chairman, a few moments ago a distinguished Member of this House remarked to me: "Why are

you in favor of two battleships and these submarines? I consider you a conservative business man and should like to have you explain your position to me." I answered by reminding him that our forefathers on the frontier always carried guns, not for the purpose of killing people, but because they recognized the dangers and the necessity for self-protection.

This is true with us on the Pacific coast, with our long coast line from Mexico, including Alaska. Just a year ago this same Member would probably have laughed had I stated that within five months nearly all of Europe would be at war. Who can say what a few years may bring forth? And, as our fathers carried weapons with which to defend themselves, I believe that it is the duty of the United States to provide for the protection of her seacoast.

For example, my home city of San Diego, within 16 miles of the Mexican border, and the first port of call in the United States north of the Panama Canal, occupies an important point in the defense of the Pacific coast. As we are holding an exposition there this year, I hope to have the pleasure of showing a great many of my friends in this House why we feel the need of protection and why we believe that important strategic points have been and are being overlooked.

The climate of San Diego is such that pleasure boats are never put up in the winter, and in the past 10 years there has been one storm where two or three yachts have broken from their moorings. Everything in the market is grown in the Imperial Valley all the year round and is sold in the San Diego markets at reasonable prices. Reports show that the coast just south is admirably suited to torpedo practice, the sand being of a peculiar spongy quality, upon which the torpedoes bounce, and we who study naval bills every year know something of what each torpedo costs and something of how many are lost in the average torpedo practice by being buried in the sand.

We know that for several years the target practice of the cruisers on the Pacific coast has been held at Magdalena Bay, off the Mexican coast.

It does not seem possible, in the light of these facts, that for 14 years a fuel wharf at San Diego was in the process of construction until last year the naval bill carried an appropriation with which to complete the building of coal bunkers and arrange for fuel-oil storage, and the importance of this station is now further recognized by an item of \$40,000 in this bill with which to provide for further fuel-oil storage.

While I am not an extremist and do not believe in building up an aggressive navy, I do believe that we should have a navy sufficiently effective so that we can protect ourselves and command respect. I also believe firmly in strengthening our coast defenses, and I am sure, in the light of recent events, every right-minded person will agree that the coast cities are entitled to adequate protection. These remarks might have seemed strange a year ago, but times have changed.

This bill carries 2 battleships and 11 submarines, some of which will be built and stationed on the Pacific coast. They are urgently needed, and, after you have visited the Pacific coast this year, I believe you will agree with me, not only in regard to the harbor at San Diego but that the west coast, with its long shore line and few harbors, needs the protection of additional defenses at her harbors and additional vessels with which to guard her easily accessible and otherwise defenseless shore line.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, there are 1,800 men working in the Rock Island Arsenal, and not one of these men has written to me protesting against the passage of this bill. On the other hand, I have received letters stating that the employees of that arsenal are highly elated over the fact that the House has passed a provision prohibiting the use of the Taylor system in the Government workshops.

Mr. Taylor describes his system in two different ways. One is for the general public and the other is for employers. He says in the one that the object of the system is to increase the pay of the workingman. Then he has a book of instructions to employers who are putting in this system, and in that book of instructions the statement is made that the test is made so strict that only one man out of five can keep up.

This system has been investigated by two committees of this House, and I am happy to say that two Members of this House who assisted in the investigation of that system are now members of the President's Cabinet, namely, the Secretary of Labor, Mr. Wilson, and the Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Redfield.

I want to say to Democrats here that in the campaign of 1912 the Speaker of this House spoke to those men at Rock Island and assured them that if the Democratic Party were placed in power, the Taylor system of scientific shop management would be taken out of the arsenals and navy yards, and I think it is up to this side of the House especially to redeem the promise that was made by our party leader.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Illinois yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. MOORE. The gentleman says he has received no protests from the working people at Rock Island against the enactment of this legislation. If the gentleman had received protests from people who had had their wages reduced by the withdrawal of that system he would present them here, would he not?

Mr. TAVENNER. Does the gentleman say his constituents are opposed to the bill eliminating the system?

Mr. MOORE. I am asking the gentleman the question, If he had received such protests, would he present them, as I have done?

Mr. TAVENNER. If I believed that the majority of the workmen were in favor of the system I would not be here speaking against it, but I know that the majority of the men are strongly against it.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether the Taylor efficiency system is in operation in any of the navy yards. I have never heard it discussed in connection with the navy yards. Does the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] know?

Mr. PADGETT. I understand it is not in force in the navy yards.

Mr. CURRY. It is in force in a number of shops in some of the navy yards. It is in force in some of the shops at the Mare Island yard.

Mr. PADGETT. I understand the Taylor or stop-watch system is in force in some of the shops.

Mr. MANN. Two years ago the House, by resolution, provided for a commission to investigate the Taylor system. That commission was composed of Mr. Redfield, then a Member of the House and now the Secretary of Commerce; Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, then a Member of the House and now the Secretary of Labor; and Mr. Tilson, of Connecticut, who was then a Member of the House and who will be a Member of the next House. That commission made an exhaustive study of the subject, but did not report advising that the Taylor efficiency system should be abolished.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANN. For what?

Mr. TAVENNER. For a question.

Mr. MANN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like to ask the gentleman if he is aware of the fact that the chairman of that special committee, shortly after he made that report, did bring in a bill to this House providing for the abolition of the Taylor system in the arsenals?

Mr. MANN. I do not know that he did. If he did, it lay in a condition of "innocuous desuetude."

Mr. TAVENNER. The fact is as I have stated.

Mr. MANN. I do not yield to the gentleman for a statement. I do not know whether the Taylor efficiency system ought to be abolished, or whether it ought to be made use of; but here are two Cabinet officers in the President's Cabinet who investigated this subject, and who certainly know more about it than most of the Members of this House. It is within the power of the Secretary of the Navy at any time, by a stroke of the pen, to prevent the Taylor efficiency system being made use of in any of the navy yards now; and while it is true that we adopted a provision similar to this on the Army bill, I think that was mainly for the purpose of making a little further experiment in those arsenals where the Taylor efficiency system has been put in operation, much over the objection of many of the employees as applied there. It seems to me the part of wisdom for the House to leave it to the executive departments of the Government, as this would only apply for the next fiscal year. Doubtless the Secretary of the Navy, advised as he would be by the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor, who made this investigation and report before, is better qualified to determine how far the efficiency system should be enforced in the navy yards than are the membership of the House.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, the Taylor system of shop management is not in force in its entirety in the Frankford Arsenal, although I understand that some of its less objectionable features have been adopted there. A few days ago considerable excitement was caused among some of the employees of the Frankford Arsenal by reason of an order that was issued by the Chief of Ordnance abolishing a premium system that had been in force since 1910 at the arsenal. I know that the majority of the employees in the arsenal are opposed to anything like

the stop-watch system, but those employees who are receiving very small wages and who have had a task system established for them feel that it is unfair and quite a loss to them to have this order enforced before the proposition in the Army bill abolishing bonuses becomes a law. They feel that it would be more reasonable to let things continue as they were until the 1st of July or until some more equitable wage scale is established.

The bonus system at the Frankford Arsenal was in force mostly in those departments where females are employed. It worked in this way: The wage rate for the women is \$1.16 per day, but for the purpose of increasing the output the management of the arsenal said, "We will fix a task for you, and if you come up to it you shall receive \$1.40 per day, and for all in excess of that task you shall receive half the rate that you get for producing the rest." The bonus for excess work brought the wages of the more efficient workers up to, I understand, \$1.75 or more per day. Now, these women do not like the idea of going back to \$1.16 per day, especially since the foremen have served notice on them that for \$1.16 per day they will be expected to come up to their former tasks, for which they got at least \$1.40 per day.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we have been pursuing an unwise policy in the matter of rates of wages. Instead of establishing a uniform wage scale for a particular class of work in the various shops of the Government throughout the country, we have obliged the commanding officers of those establishments to fix wages in accordance with the rates prevailing in the industrial establishments around them, and we know that it is—

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DONOHUE. Yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. Does the gentleman know that the very system that he has explained there is the speed-up system?

Mr. DONOHUE. I do.

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. And that makes inroads on the physical and mental resources of the working people, because it compels them to work under a strain.

Mr. DONOHUE. I have no desire to defend the Taylor system, because I regard it as a most inhuman one. [Applause.]

Mr. BUCHANAN of Illinois. And if they are fair to their employees and expect them to do as much as they did before, ought they not to pay them as much money as they did before?

Mr. DONOHUE. Absolutely so; but I contend that here is the place where we should fix the whole matter by providing for the establishing of uniform rates for the various Government shops in the country rather than by compelling the commanding officers, as we now do, to fix rates in accordance with the prevailing wage rates in their respective localities. The officers inquire of the establishments around them, and it is not reasonable to suppose that the management of these local establishments have any desire to cause the Government to fix rates that are too high for the locality. I feel, therefore, that Congress should correct this absurdity by the enactment of a law providing that the same wage rates shall prevail in all the various workshops of the Government. This would put an end to much of the trouble and would tend to establish rates of wages that would be more equitable than those now prevailing. In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, I should be glad to see the arsenal employees, who receive low wages, especially the females, continued on the bonus system until July next, when, I hope, more liberal rates of wages will have been established. It would be manifestly unfair and unreasonable to expect the employees to do as much work for \$1.16 as they did when they were receiving \$1.40 per day. The cost of living has steadily increased of late years, and wages must be increased if our present standard of living is to be maintained. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. MANN) there were 82 ayes and 21 noes.

So the amendment was agreed to.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE.

The committee informally rose; and Mr. DECKER having taken the chair as Speaker pro tempore, a message from the Senate, by Mr. Tulley, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had insisted upon its amendments to bills of the following titles, disagreed to by the House of Representatives, had agreed to the conference asked by the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and had appointed Mr. SHIVELY, Mr. JOHNSON, and Mr. McCUMBER as the conferees on the part of the Senate:

H. R. 19545. An act granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the Civil War, and certain widows and dependent children of soldiers and sailors of said war; and



H. R. 20562. An act granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the Civil War, and certain widows and dependent children of soldiers and sailors of said war.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

The committee resumed its session.

The Clerk read as follows:

That no part of any sum herein appropriated shall be expended for the purchase of structural steel, ship plates, armor, armament, or machinery from any persons, firms, or corporations who have combined or conspired to monopolize the interstate or foreign commerce or trade of the United States, or the commerce or trade between the States and any Territory or the District of Columbia, in any of the articles aforesaid, and no purchase of structural steel, ship plates, or machinery shall be made at a price in excess of a reasonable profit above the actual cost of manufacture. But this limitation shall in no case apply to any existing contract.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair sustains the point of order.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following as a new paragraph.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 67, before line 12, insert the following as a new paragraph: "That no part of any sum appropriated by this act for the construction or equipment of vessels of the Navy shall be expended for materials purchased in a foreign country except like materials for construction or equipment can not be obtained in the United States."

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, to that I make a point of order.

Mr. MOORE. Such an amendment was offered to the bill last year and a point of order was made, and the point of order was overruled. It is a germane amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will hear the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. PADGETT. I do not care to say anything on the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The point of order is overruled.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, this amendment proposes to limit the purchase of materials that enter into the construction of battleships and to protect the labor in the United States that creates those materials where such materials can be provided by our own labor. The rulings of the Treasury Department, based on the Panama Canal act, gives certain discretion to the departments, and particularly to the Department of the Navy, in the purchase of materials for the equipment of ships. That discretion pertains to the textile industry, for carpets and hangings must go on the ship; it enters into the glass industry, because glassware must go on the ships; it enters into the iron and steel industry, because those two commodities enter into the construction of the ships, and in fact it enters into very many elements of labor in this country that ought to be protected against unfair foreign competition.

The purpose of the amendment is plain—it restricts the power of the department to the purchase of commodities going into American ships to American-made goods unless those commodities can not be obtained within the United States.

Mr. BATHRICK. Mr. Chairman, I do not doubt but that the Members of the House understand the amendment just offered. If it prevails, it will put us back to where we once were when the only weapon we had against the Armor-Plate Trust was to threaten them with competition from Europe.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, there is quite a movement in the country in favor of "made in America." I believe there is a society or league advocating such a proposition, and I noticed the other day that various people connected with the Cabinet were advertised as having joined the movement in favor of goods "made in America." If the Cabinet under this administration can join such a movement, it seems to me that the Nation itself might join such a movement, and considering the thousands of men out of employment in the country, with the general feeling on the part of the people of the country that we ought to patronize as far as practicable things made by Americans in America, I believe it would be wise and patriotic for this House to say that it will not authorize the purchase of foreign-made goods on even terms with American-made goods. [Applause on the Republican side.] If we build up the Navy and spend the millions of dollars which it is proposed to spend here, that money should be paid to American labor in favor of Americans as against the foreigner. The Navy is for the defense of this country against a foreign attack. Let us also make it a weapon to aid American labor in these days of dire distress. [Applause on the Republican side.]

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on this amendment be now closed.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman asks unanimous consent that debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto be now closed. Is there objection?

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I object.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto do now close.

The question was taken, and the motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. Moore) there were—ayes 64, noes 107.

So the amendment was rejected.

The Clerk read as follows:

That no part of any sum herein appropriated under "Increase of the Navy" shall be used for the payment of any clerical, drafting, inspection, or messenger service, or for the pay of any of the other classified force under the various bureaus of the Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. This is another limitation which is in order, and I doubt not will receive the support of the majority of the House. On the vote just taken in behalf of American labor I notice that the Republican side of the House voted for it, while the Democratic side of the House voted unanimously against it.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, opposing the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois, I desire to say that on the vote taken on the last proposition, which would again put the trusts of America in the position in which they have been under Republican administration, enabling them to loot the Treasury at the expense of the American people, it is quite noticeable that the Republicans all voted in favor of the trusts and the Democrats in favor of the people of the country and of the Treasury of the country. [Applause on Democratic side.]

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the paragraph.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on this paragraph and all amendments thereto close in five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Tennessee that all debate on the paragraph and all amendments thereto close in five minutes.

The question was taken, and the motion was agreed to.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, a point of order. The gentleman has no right to make that motion until there has been debate on the paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair overrules the point of order and the gentleman from Illinois is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, the point of order which was sustained at the instance of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN] struck out practically all of the defense that the American people have against combinations of persons, companies, and corporations. That paragraph provided that no part of the appropriations in this bill could be used to purchase structural materials, armor, or armament from persons, firms, or corporations who have conspired or combined to monopolize interstate or foreign commerce or the trade of the United States, and that no contracts for the purchase of shipbuilding materials could be made at a price in excess of a reasonable profit. This was the only provision in the bill which stood between the people and the ravages of the trusts. But when the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN] interposed his point of order against this paragraph and the Chair sustained it, then all of the protection that we have had and all of the progress which we have made for the last 20 years against the combination of trusts for the control of trade was stricken out of the Navy appropriation bill. [Applause on the Democratic side.] The amendment which the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Moore] undertook to insert in lieu of that paragraph practically gave back to the trusts all of the great advantages which they had gained heretofore over the American people in controlling trade. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

That no part of any sum appropriated by this act shall be used for any expense of the Navy Department at Washington, D. C., unless specific authority is given by law for such expenditure.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment, which I send to the desk. It is the bill to establish the council of national defense. I realize that a point of order will be made against it, and that the point of order will be sustained; and I ask unanimous consent, in order that I may not take up the time of the committee in reading it, that it may be inserted in the Record.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the proposed amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair sustains the point of order. The gentleman from Alabama asks unanimous consent that it may be inserted. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

The amendment referred to is as follows:

On page 67, at the end of line 21, add the following as separate paragraphs:

"There is hereby established a council of national defense, consisting of the President of the United States, who shall be ex officio president of the council; the Secretary of State, who shall preside in the absence of the President; the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate, the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate, the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, an officer of the Navy not below the rank of captain to be designated by the Secretary of the Navy, the president of the Army War College, and the president of the Navy War College.

"The chairmen of the several committees of the Senate and House of Representatives herein named shall act as members of the council until their successors have been selected.

"Said council shall report to the President, for transmission to Congress, a general policy of national defense and such recommendation of measures relating thereto as it shall deem necessary and expedient.

"Said council shall meet at least once in each calendar year on such date or dates as it shall fix: *Provided*, That in time of war said council shall meet only upon the call of the President of the United States: *Provided further*, That special meetings may be called by the president of the council: *And provided further*, That the council may summon for consultation at any of its meetings any citizen of the United States, and upon request by the council the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy shall order any officer of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps to appear before the council for consultation.

"For carrying out the purposes of this act there is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of \$20,000, to be available until expended, and to be expended upon vouchers signed by the president of the council: *Provided*, That all necessary expenses of the chairmen of committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, when called to attend meetings of said council when Congress is not in session, and the necessary expenses of all persons summoned shall be paid from this appropriation, upon approval by the president of the council."

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise and report the bill with the various amendments, with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill as amended do pass.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. HAY, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill H. R. 20975, the naval appropriation bill, and had directed him to report the same back to the House with sundry amendments, with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill as amended do pass.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question upon the bill and all amendments to final passage.

The question was taken, and the previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Speaker, I ask for a separate vote on the amendment which strikes out the words beginning with the word "*Provided*," in line 23, on page 28, and ending with the word "*service*," in line 4, on page 29. I also ask a separate vote on the amendment striking out the words, beginning on page 29, line 12, "in all cases where he had not before retirement passed such examination." The two amendments have reference to the plucking board and restoration of naval officers.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I ask a separate vote on the amendment striking out line 7, on page 65.

Mr. CURRY. Mr. Speaker, I ask for a separate vote on the amendment striking out the 16 submarines and reducing the number to 11.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Speaker—

The SPEAKER. Is a separate vote demanded on any other amendment?

Mr. MANN. I ask a separate vote on the amendment on page 16, the Hobson amendment.

The SPEAKER. Is a separate vote demanded on any other amendment?

Mr. CURRY. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my request.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Speaker, I renew it.

Mr. MANN. What is it?

Mr. GARDNER. The reduction in the number of submarines.

The SPEAKER. If there is no other demand for a separate vote, the Chair will put them in gross.

The question was taken, and the other amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the first amendment. The Clerk read as follows:

Page 16, after the figures in line 17, insert:

"*Provided*, That no part of this appropriation shall be expended for the purchase of armor-piercing shells of 12-inch caliber or larger unless such shells are found by tests to be able to penetrate 10-inch Krupplized plate without breaking up when fired with a standard service powder charge at an actual range of 12,000 yards."

The question was taken, and the Speaker announced the yeas seemed to have it.

Mr. HOBSON. Division, Mr. Speaker.

The House divided; and there were—ayes 108, yeas 79.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Speaker, I ask for tellers.

The SPEAKER. Those in favor of ordering tellers will rise and stand until counted. [After counting.] Twenty-four gentlemen have risen, not a sufficient number.

So the amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the next amendment. The Clerk read as follows:

Pages 28 and 29. Line 23, page 28, after the word "*board*" strike out "*Provided*, That the action in these cases has been examined by the Naval Committee of the Sixty-third Congress of the House or of the Senate and either or both of said committees have reported or ordered to be reported favorably to the House or the Senate a bill to transfer such officer to the active list of the service."

The question was taken, and the Speaker announced the yeas seemed to have it.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Division, Mr. Speaker.

The House divided; and there were—ayes 121, yeas 57.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Speaker, I ask for tellers.

The SPEAKER. Those in favor of taking this vote by tellers will rise and stand until they are counted. [After counting.] Forty-two gentlemen have risen, not a sufficient number.

Mr. HARRISON. The other side.

The SPEAKER. There is no other side to it.

So the amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the next amendment. The Clerk read as follows:

Page 29, line 12, strike out the following language:

"In all cases where he had not before retirement passed such examination."

The question was taken, and the Speaker announced the yeas seemed to have it.

Mr. STAFFORD and Mr. MANN. I ask for a division.

The SPEAKER. Both the gentleman from Wisconsin and the gentleman from Illinois demand a division.

The House divided; and there were—ayes 79, yeas 75.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Speaker, I ask for tellers.

The SPEAKER. Those in favor of taking this vote by tellers will rise and stand until they are counted. [After counting.] Sixty-three gentlemen have risen, a sufficient number.

Mr. CARLIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be again reported; we do not understand it.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the amendment will be again reported.

There was no objection.

The amendment was again reported.

The House again divided; and the tellers (Mr. WITHERSPOON and Mr. PADGETT) reported—ayes 105, yeas 91.

So the amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the next amendment.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my demand for a separate vote on the submarine amendment.

Mr. MANN. There is no way of withdrawing it now.

The SPEAKER. It can be voted upon now. You will have to vote on it, because it was not included in the other. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 64, line 15, strike out the word "*sixteen*" and insert "*eleven*."

The SPEAKER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The question was taken, and the amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the next amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 65, line 7, strike out the line which reads as follows:

"One hospital ship, to cost not to exceed \$2,250,000."

The SPEAKER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The question was taken, and the Speaker announced that the yeas seemed to have it.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Division, Mr. Speaker.

The House divided; and there were—ayes 143, yeas 78.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were refused.

So the amendment was agreed to.



The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read a third time.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Speaker—

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman from Mississippi opposed to this bill?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I certainly am.

The SPEAKER. For what purpose does the gentleman rise?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I rise to make a motion to recommit the bill.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will send the motion to the desk, and the Clerk will report it.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. WITHERSPOON moves to recommit H. R. 20975 to the Committee on Naval Affairs with instructions to forthwith report the bill back to the House with an amendment striking out the word "two," where it occurs in line 4, page 64, and insert the word "one" in place thereof.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the motion to recommit with instructions.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

The question was taken, and the Speaker announced that the yeas seemed to have it.

Mr. CULLOP. The yeas and nays, Mr. Speaker.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. MANN. Does anyone want a roll call on the passage of the bill?

The SPEAKER. That is hardly a parliamentary inquiry.

The Clerk will call the roll.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 149, nays 165, answered "present" 1, not voting 108, as follows:

[Roll No. 57.]

YEAS—149.

Abercrombie	Cramton	Helm	Reilly, Wis.
Adair	Crisp	Henry	Rouse
Adamson	Cullop	Hensley	Rubey
Aiken	Davenport	Hill	Rucker
Alexander	Decker	Howard	Russell
Allen	Dent	Hull	Saunders
Ashbrook	Dickinson	Igoe	Sells
Aswell	Dies	Jacoway	Shackleford
Bailey	Diffenderfer	Johnson, S. C.	Sherwood
Baker	Dillon	Keating	Sims
Baltz	Dixon	Kelly, Pa.	Sisson
Barkley	Donovan	Kindel	Smith, Minn.
Bartlett	Doolittle	Kirkpatrick	Smith, Tex.
Barton	Doremus	Kitchin	Stafford
Bell, Ga.	Doughton	Konop	Stanley
Blackmon	Eagle	Leshner	Stedman
Boohar	Ferris	Lever	Stephens, Miss.
Borchers	Fields	Lewis, Md.	Stephens, Nebr.
Borland	Finley	Lieb	Stephens, Tex.
Brockson	Fitzgerald	Lloyd	Stevens, N. H.
Brodbeck	Flood, Va.	Lobeck	Summers
Browne, Wis.	Flood, Ark.	McKellar	Switzer
Brumbaugh	Foster	Maguire, Nebr.	Tavener
Buchanan, Ill.	Fowler	Manahan	Taylor, Ark.
Buchanan, Tex.	Francis	Mann	Thomas
Burgess	Garner	Moss, Ind.	Thompson, Okla.
Burke, S. Dak.	Garrett, Tenn.	Mulkey	Underwood
Burnett	Garrett, Tex.	Neely, W. Va.	Vaughan
Byrnes, S. C.	Gill	Nelson	Watkins
Byrns, Tenn.	Goeke	Oldfield	Weaver
Callaway	Goodwin, Ark.	Page, N. C.	Webb
Candler, Miss.	Gordon	Park	Wingo
Caraway	Gray	Peterson	Witherspoon
Carter	Gregg	Pou	Young, N. Dak.
Cline	Hamlin	Prouty	Young, Tex.
Collier	Harris	Quin	
Connelly, Kans.	Harrison	Rainey	
Cox	Heflin	Rayburn	

NAYS—165.

Anderson	Danforth	Good	Jones
Austin	Davis	Goulden	Kahn
Barefield	Deitrick	Graham, Ill.	Keister
Bathrick	Dershem	Green, Iowa	Kelley, Mich.
Beakes	Donohoe	Greene, Mass.	Kennedy, Conn.
Britten	Dooling	Greene, Vt.	Kennedy, Iowa.
Brown, N. Y.	Driscoll	Griffin	Kent
Browning	Drukker	Gudger	Kettner
Bryan	Dupré	Guernsey	Kless, Pa.
Bulkley	Eagan	Hamill	Klinkaid
Burke, Wis.	Edmonds	Hamilton, Mich.	Knowland, J. R.
Butler	Esch	Hawley	La Follette
Calder	Estopinal	Hayden	Langley
Campbell	Fairchild	Hayes	Lazarc
Canfor	Falconer	Hinds	Lee, Ga.
Cantrill	Farr	Hinebaugh	Lee, Pa.
Carlin	FitzHenry	Hobson	Lenroot
Casey	Frear	Holland	Levy
Chandler, N. Y.	French	Houston	Loneragan
Church	Gallagher	Howell	McAndrews
Condy	Gard	Hughes, Ga.	McKenzie
Connolly, Iowa	Gardner	Humphrey, Wash.	McLaughlin
Conry	Gerry	Humphreys, Miss.	MacDonald
Cooper	Glass	Johnson, Ky.	Mahan
Curry	Goldfogle	Johnson, Wash.	Maher

Mapes	Patten, N. Y.	Sherley	Temple
Miller	Patton, Pa.	Shreve	Ten Eyck
Mitchell	Peters	Sinnott	Thacher
Montague	Phelan	Sloan	Thomson, Ill.
Moon	Platt	Small	Townsend
Moore	Plumley	Smith, Idaho	Treadway
Morgan, Okla.	Post	Smith, J. M. C.	Tribble
Moss, W. Va.	Powers	Smith, Md.	Tuttle
Mott	Ragsdale	Smith, N. Y.	Underhill
Murdoch	Reilly, Conn.	Sparkman	Volstead
Murray	Riordan	Steenerson	Walker
Nolan, J. I.	Roberts, Mass.	Stevens, Cal.	Williams
O'Hair	Rogers	Stevens, Minn.	Winslow
Padgett	Rupley	Stone	Woods
Paige, Mass.	Scott	Stringer	
Parker, N. J.	Scully	Talbott, Md.	
Parker, N. Y.	Seldomridge	Talcott, N. Y.	

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—1,  
Slemp

NOT VOTING—108.

Ainey	Foss	Langham	Rauch
Anthony	Fordney	L'Engle	Reed
Avis	Gallivan	Lewis, Pa.	Roberts, Nev.
Barnhart	George	Lindbergh	Rothermel
Bartholdt	Gillett	Lindquist	Sabath
Beall, Tex.	Gilmore	Linthicum	Slayden
Bell, Cal.	Gittins	Loft	Smith, Saml. W.
Bowdle	Godwin, N. C.	Logue	Stout
Broussard	Gorman	McClellan	Sutherland
Brown, W. Va.	Graham, Pa.	McGillcuddy	Taggart
Bruckner	Griest	McGuire, Okla.	Taylor, Ala.
Burke, Pa.	Hamilton, N. Y.	Madden	Taylor, Colo.
Carew	Hardy	Martin	Taylor, N. Y.
Carr	Hart	Metz	Towner
Cary	Haugen	Mondell	Vare
Clinney	Hay	Morgan, La.	Vinson
Clark, Fla.	Helgesen	Morin	Vollmer
Claypool	Helvering	Morrison	Walsh
Copley	Hoxworth	Neeley, Kans.	Walsh
Crosser	Hughes, W. Va.	Norton	Walters
Dale	Hulings	O'Brien	Watson
Dunn	Johnson, Utah	Oglesby	Whaley
Edwards	Kennedy, R. I.	O'Shaunessy	Whitacre
Elder	Key, Ohio	Palmer	White
Evans	Korby	Porter	Wilson, Fla.
Faison	Kreider	Price	Wilson, N. Y.
Fergusson	Lafferty	Raker	Woodruff

So the motion to recommit was rejected.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On the vote:

Mr. SABATH (for one battleship) with Mr. GILLET (for two battleships).

Mr. BARNHART (for one battleship) with Mr. LINTHICUM (for two battleships).

Mr. EVANS (for one battleship) with Mr. LAFFERTY (for two battleships).

Mr. FAISON (for one battleship) with Mr. WHALEY (for two battleships).

Mr. SLAYDEN (for one battleship) with Mr. SLEMP (for two battleships).

Mr. MONDELL (for one battleship) with Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island (for two battleships).

Mr. THOMPSON of Oklahoma (for one battleship) with Mr. GALLIVAN (for two battleships).

Until further notice:

Mr. EDWARDS with Mr. AINEY.

Mr. BROWN of West Virginia with Mr. ANTHONY.

Mr. CAREW with Mr. AVIS.

Mr. CLARK of Florida with Mr. BARTHOLDT.

Mr. DALE with Mr. BURKE of Pennsylvania.

Mr. GEORGE with Mr. CARY.

Mr. GORMAN with Mr. COPLEY.

Mr. HARDY with Mr. DUNN.

Mr. HART with Mr. FESS.

Mr. HAY with Mr. FORDNEY.

Mr. HELVERING with Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania.

Mr. KEY of Ohio with Mr. GRIEST.

Mr. MCGILLICUDDY with Mr. HAUGEN.

Mr. MORGAN of Louisiana with Mr. HUGHES of West Virginia.

Mr. METZ with Mr. HELGESEN.

Mr. MORRISON with Mr. HULINGS.

Mr. NEELEY of Kansas with Mr. JOHNSON of Utah.

Mr. OGLESBY with Mr. KREIDER.

Mr. O'SHAUNESSY with Mr. LANGHAM.

Mr. PALMER with Mr. LEWIS of Pennsylvania.

Mr. PRICE with Mr. LINDQUIST.

Mr. WALSH with Mr. MCGUIRE of Oklahoma.

Mr. RAUCH with Mr. MADDEN.

Mr. REED with Mr. MARTIN.

Mr. ROTHERMEL with Mr. MORIN.

Mr. STOUT with Mr. NORTON.

Mr. TAGGART with Mr. PORTER.

Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado with Mr. ROBERTS of Nevada.

Mr. VINSON with Mr. SAMUEL W. SMITH.

Mr. WATSON with Mr. SUTHERLAND.

Mr. WHITE with Mr. VARE.

Mr. WILSON of Florida with Mr. WALLIN.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken, and the bill was passed.

On motion of Mr. PADGETT, a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the bill was passed was laid on the table.

#### ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED.

Mr. ASHBROOK, from the Committee on Enrolled Bills, reported that they had examined and found truly enrolled bills of the following titles, when the Speaker signed the same:

H. R. 20818. An act to authorize the Brunot Island Bridge Co. to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge across the back channel of the Ohio River; and

H. R. 20933. An act extending the time for completion of the bridge across the Mississippi River at Memphis, Tenn., authorized by an act entitled "An act to authorize the Arkansas & Memphis Railway Bridge & Terminal Co. to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge across the Mississippi River at Memphis, Tenn.," approved August 23, 1912.

#### ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 7 o'clock and 52 minutes p. m.) the House, under the order previously made, adjourned until to-morrow, Saturday, February 6, 1915, at 11 o'clock a. m.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, submitting an estimate of appropriation of \$50,000 for the continuation of the building of the United States post office at Portland, Oreg. (H. Doc. No. 1558); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

2. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, submitting an estimate of appropriation in the sum of \$18,000 for the completion of post-office building at Portland, Ind., and the sum of \$150,000 for the continuation of the building at New Haven, Conn. (H. Doc. No. 1559); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

3. Letter from the Public Utilities Commission, District of Columbia, transmitting balance sheets for the year ended December 31, 1914, and other information required by the Public Utilities Commission of the various utilities under its jurisdiction; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

4. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting copy of a communication of the Secretary of the Interior submitting an estimate of appropriation to cover cost of transcripts of evidence before the Quebec Bridge Commission and a set of drawings in connection therewith (H. Doc. No. 1569); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. LOGUE, from the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 18645) for the acquisition of additional site and improvements on Federal post office at Carlisle, Pa., reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1371), which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. CLARK of Florida, from the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 21239) to increase the limit of cost of the site of a Federal building at Oakland, Cal., reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1372), which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. BEALL of Texas, from the Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 15767) to provide for the appointment of an additional judge in the fifth judicial circuit of the United States, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1374), which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, private bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the Committee of the Whole House, as follows:

Mr. DILLON, from the Committee on Claims, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 17964) for the relief of Austin G. Tainter, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1370), which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. JOHNSON of Kentucky, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 20702), authorizing the health officer of the District of Columbia to issue a permit for the removal of the remains of the late Robert A. Culbertson from Woodlawn Cemetery, District of Columbia, to Rocky Spring Cemetery, Chambersburg, Pa., reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1373), which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

#### CHANGE OF REFERENCE.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXII, the Committee on Claims was discharged from the consideration of the bill (H. R. 21327) for the relief of Rittenhouse Moore, receiver of the Mobile Marine Dock Co., and the same was referred to the Committee on War Claims.

#### PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. HAY: A bill (H. R. 21328) making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916, and for other purposes; to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

By Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts: A bill (H. R. 21329) to increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Marine Corps; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. EDMONDS: A bill (H. R. 21330) to provide for the appointment of a shipping board, and to prescribe the duties thereof; to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. FOWLER: A bill (H. R. 21331) to amend an act entitled "An act to create a Department of Labor," by providing for a bureau of the unemployed; to the Committee on Labor.

By Mr. LOFT: A bill (H. R. 21332) to provide for the unemployed, strengthen the national defense, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor.

By Mr. BRYAN: A bill (H. R. 21333) prohibiting the sale, disposal, or having for sale, of intoxicating liquors on railway trains or on vessels or in certain other places used in connection with interstate commerce; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. OLDFIELD: A bill (H. R. 21334) for the relief of drought and famine sufferers in the United States; to the Committee on Appropriations.

By Mr. MURDOCK: A bill (H. R. 21335) to establish an entomological station at Wellington, Sumner County, Kans.; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. CANDLER of Mississippi: A bill (H. R. 21336) for prohibition of the liquor traffic in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, joint resolution (H. J. Res. 416) to authorize the Committees on Agriculture of the Senate and House to investigate a system of rural personal credit; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. DOOLITTLE: Joint resolution (H. J. Res. 417) to authorize the Committees on Agriculture of the Senate and House to investigate a system of rural personal credit; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. TAVENNER: Resolution (H. Res. 724) relative to pay of clerks of deceased Members; to the Committee on Accounts.

By Mr. STEENERSON: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of Minnesota, relating to the placing of an embargo on the exportation of agricultural products; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

#### PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ADAIR: A bill (H. R. 21337) granting a pension to Anna H. Parker; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.



Also, a bill (H. R. 21338) granting an increase of pension to Lilborn R. B. Gray; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. CARR: A bill (H. R. 21339) granting a pension to Walter S. Semans; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. FLOYD of Arkansas: A bill (H. R. 21340) granting a pension to Melissa A. Coop; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. PAIGE of Massachusetts: A bill (H. R. 21341) granting a pension to Abble J. Brigham; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21342) to correct the military record of Simon W. Tucker; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. RUPLEY: A bill (H. R. 21343) for the relief of Catharine Jefferson Dunn; to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. SUTHERLAND: A bill (H. R. 21344) to amend the military records in relation to William M. Cheuvront; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. VOLLMER: A bill (H. R. 21345) granting an increase of pension to Hannah Kelly; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. HINDS: A bill (H. R. 21346) to amend and correct the military record of William Johnson; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. McANDREWS: A bill (H. R. 21347) granting an increase of pension to Edward A. Davenport; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee: A bill (H. R. 21348) for the relief of the estate of Mrs. M. A. Morrison; to the Committee on War Claims.

#### PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By Mr. ASHBROOK: Petition of Coshocton, Ohio, Local Union, No. 379, United Mine Workers of America, favoring Kern-Foster bill to extend work of the Bureau of Mines; to the Committee on Mines and Mining.

By Mr. BROWNE of Wisconsin: Petition signed by H. R. Schlytter, George L. Gates, and other residents of Wittenberg, Wis., asking that the Burnett immigration bill become a law, and protesting against House bill 20644, known as the Fitzgerald bill; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. BURKE of South Dakota: Petition of sundry citizens of Highmore, S. Dak., in favor of House joint resolution 377; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, protests of sundry citizens of Avon, Bellefourche, Lead, Okobojo, and Tripp, all in the State of South Dakota, against House bill 20644, to amend the postal laws; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. BUTLER: Memorial of Chester monthly meeting of Friends, Providence, R. I., protesting against additional preparations for war, etc., by our Government; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. CRAMTON: Petitions of George J. Mossner, of Gera; John Lange and 69 others, of Sebewaing; Ludwig Poppeck and 2 others, of Port Hope; Henry Stark, of New Haven; Rev. F. W. Bublitz and 40 others, of Lapeer; A. H. Sauer and 36 others, of Pigeon; Charles Miller and 51 others, of Sandusky; Rev. August Deichmann and 23 others of St. Paul's Evangelical Lutheran Church, Linkville and vicinity, all in the State of Michigan, in support of House joint resolution 377, proposing to prohibit exportation of arms, etc.; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. DALE: Petitions of Louisiana State Federation of Labor; White Rats; Actors Union of New York; and sundry citizens of New York, favoring passage of the immigration bill over the President's veto; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petition of Brooklyn Diocesan Union of the Holy Name Society, protesting against publication against Catholics being sent through the mails; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of Electrical Contractors' Association of New York, protesting against present postal rates; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. DANFORTH: Petition of G. Gaylord Norton and 34 others, of Elba, N. Y., protesting against the passage of House bill 20644, Fitzgerald amendment to the Post Office appropriation bill; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petitions of G. A. Scharlan and 24 others, of Medina; Rev. Richard Stave and German-American Alliance, of Rochester, N. Y., favoring passage of resolution to prohibit export of war material; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. DRUKKER: Petition of citizens of Passaic, N. J., against Fitzgerald bill, giving Postmaster General censorship over publications; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. ESCH: Petitions of 33 citizens of New Lisbon and F. J. Narosky and 80 other citizens of Onalaska, Wis., protesting against the Fitzgerald amendment to the Post Office appropriation bill; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of Concordia Aid Society, composed of 169 citizens; Frohsinn Singing Society, composed of 105 citizens; and Eighth Ward Aid Society, composed of 410 citizens, all of La Crosse, Wis., favoring bill prohibiting export of war materials; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. FINLEY: Petition of Robert T. Allison, Yorkville, S. C., relative to national defense; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. FLOYD of Arkansas: Petition of sundry citizens of the State of Arkansas, favoring appropriation to complete locks and dams on White River; to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

Also, papers to accompany House bill 21340, granting a pension to Melissa A. Coop; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FOWLER: Petition of citizens of Goreville and Johnson County, Ill., against any curtailment of freedom of the press; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. GARDNER: Memorial of East India Marine Society and Salem (Mass.) Marine Society, protesting against the passage of the ship-purchase bill; to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

Also, memorial of city council of Salem, Mass., favoring passage of the Hamill bill (H. R. 5139); to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

By Mr. GOOD: Petition of monthly meeting of Friends, Bangor, Iowa, favoring bills designed to protect denominational names from use in articles of trade; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania: Petitions of Massachusetts State Branch, American Federation of Labor, and other organizations of workers in the United States, favoring passage of the immigration bill over the President's veto; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petition of Otto Benkmann, of Philadelphia, Pa., favoring resolution to prohibit export of war material; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of the Polish-American Citizens' League of Pennsylvania and Friends of Russian Freedom, protesting against the passage of the immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island: Petition of Carl J. Franz, of Ashton, R. I., favoring House joint resolution 377, forbidding export of arms; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of Providence (R. I.) Branch of National Association for Advancement of Colored People, against "jimmie" street car bill for District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. KETTNER: Petition of citizens of Olive, Orange, Anaheim, Riverside, Santa Ana, San Diego, Bishop, Laws, Big Pine, Chula Vista, and Coronado, all in the State of California, in behalf of House joint resolution 377; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, resolutions of citizens of Fallbrook, De Luz, and Indio, Cal.; also from Chambers of Commerce of Los Angeles and San Diego, Cal., in favor of House joint resolution 344; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. LEWIS of Pennsylvania: Petition of citizens of Macungie, Pa., protesting against passage of House bill 20644, Fitzgerald amendment to the Post Office appropriation bill; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. MADDEN: Petitions of 18,000 citizens of Chicago, Ill., protesting against prohibition in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. MOSS of West Virginia: Papers to accompany a bill to change military record, so as to include the name of William M. Cheuvront; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. J. I. NOLAN: Petitions of sundry citizens of San Francisco, Cal., favoring passage of bills to prohibit export of war material; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. OLDFIELD: Petitions of citizens of the second congressional district of Arkansas, for construction of lock and dams on Upper White River in interest of navigation; to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

By Mr. O'SHAUNESSY: Petition of Arthur Chagnon, Arctic, R. I., favoring embargo on wheat; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of Providence (R. I.) Branch National Association for Advancement of Colored People, against the "Jim Crow" law for District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, petition of Rev. Charles A. Tukes, Providence, R. I., favoring Hamill civil-service retirement bill; to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

Also, petition of executive committee of the Rhode Island Bar Association relative to a bill to authorize the Supreme Court to prescribe forms and rules and generally to regulate pleading, procedure, and practice on the common-law side of the Federal courts; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of I. W. Waterman, of Providence, R. I., against bill to discontinue issuing of stamped envelopes by the Government; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of Providence (R. I.) Central Federated Union, relative to increased cost of flour; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. PAIGE of Massachusetts: Petition of citizens of Clinton, Mass., favoring House joint resolution 377, forbidding export of arms; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. RAKER: Petition of William H. Joyce, of Los Angeles, Cal., favoring House joint resolution 344; to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petition of O. F. Dorn, of Chicago Park, Cal., favoring House joint resolution 377, to forbid export of arms; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts: Evidence in support of House bill 18925; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SCOTT: Memorial of numerous citizens of the eleventh district of Iowa, relative to House joint resolution 377 and similar measures; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of citizens of Mapleton, Iowa, urging Congress to invite all nations to join us in a world federation for adjustment of international disputes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petitions of citizens of the State of Iowa, favoring passage of bill to prohibit export of war material; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. SPARKMAN: Petition of Board of Trade of Miami, Fla., relative to a drainage-aid act; to the Committee on Appropriations.

By Mr. VOLLMER: Petitions of the Hinsdale (Ill.) Liederkranz and 73 American citizens, protesting against the export of war material; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

SATURDAY, February 6, 1915.

The House met at 11 o'clock a. m.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Help us, O God our Father, as the days come and go, to distinguish with more clearness the true and the false, the transient and the eternal, proving all things, holding fast that which is good, and build for ourselves a character which shall stand the test of time and eternity, that we may be worthy of the dignity Thou didst bestow upon us in creating us after Thine own image. And blessing and honor and praise be Thine forever. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

### MUNICIPAL BRIDGE, ST. LOUIS, MO.

Mr. IGOE. Mr. Speaker, I ask to have the bill H. R. 19424, an act to extend the time for the completion of the municipal bridge at St. Louis, Mo., with Senate amendments, taken from the Speaker's table and laid before the House.

The SPEAKER laid the bill before the House, and the Clerk read the title to the bill, also the Senate amendments.

Mr. IGOE. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House concur in the Senate amendments.

The motion was agreed to.

### LINCOLN'S BIRTHDAY.

Mr. GOULDEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that I may address the House for 10 minutes on Friday next, February 12, 1915, on Lincoln's birthday, immediately after the approval of the Journal on the day celebrated.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I stated that I would not agree to any general debate that was not on a bill, but the gentleman from New York, my distinguished and honored colleague, was at the Battle of Gettysburg,

and I think we can make an exception to the rule without establishing a precedent.

Mr. GOULDEN. I thank the gentleman for his kindness and consideration.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from New York asks unanimous consent that he may address the House for 10 minutes on Lincoln's birthday, February 12, 1915, immediately after the reading of the Journal. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

### PERSONAL EXPLANATION.

Mr. RAKER. Mr. Speaker, I want to ask unanimous consent to make a statement for a minute. I was here yesterday afternoon, but on account of sickness in my family I was called out and could not get back in time to vote on the motion to recommit the naval appropriation bill. I returned, but too late to have my vote recorded. If I had been here I would have voted against the motion to recommit.

Mr. MANN. That statement is wholly improper.

The SPEAKER. The statement is out of order.

### CONTRABAND OF WAR.

Mr. HARRISON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record by publishing an article which appeared in the Washington Post of yesterday, written by John Bassett Moore, on "Contraband of war."

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Mississippi asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the Record by publishing an article written by John Bassett Moore. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

### COLUMBIAN INSTITUTION FOR THE DEAF.

The Speaker laid before the House the following communication:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS,  
Washington, February 5, 1915.

Hon. CHAMP CLARK,

Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I hereby tender my resignation as a director of the Columbian Institution for the Deaf of the District of Columbia, Washington, D. C., said resignation to take effect immediately.

Cordially, yours,

T. W. SIMS.

The resignation was accepted, and the Speaker appointed Mr. RAKER, of California, to fill the vacancy.

### SUNDY CIVIL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 21318, the sundry civil appropriation bill; and pending that motion I desire to ask the gentleman from Massachusetts if we can agree upon a time for general debate.

Mr. GILLETT. I will say to the gentleman that I have had requests on this side for 3 hours and 45 minutes, which I would like to grant.

Mr. FITZGERALD. What does the gentleman say to two hours on a side?

Mr. GILLETT. I do not think that would be a reasonable time; that would not take care of the requests of members of the committee.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Would the gentleman be willing to agree to three hours on a side?

Mr. GILLETT. We will try to get along with that.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Then, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that there be six hours of general debate, three hours to be controlled by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GILLETT] and three hours by myself.

The SPEAKER. Pending the motion, the gentleman from New York asks unanimous consent that general debate on this bill be limited to six hours, one half to be controlled by himself and the other half by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GILLETT]. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, with Mr. CRISP in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The House is now in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill of which the Clerk will read the title.

The Clerk read as follows:

A bill (H. R. 21318) making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916, and for other purposes.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the first reading of the bill be dispensed with.